People v. Farwell, 234 Cal. Rptr. 3d 434

Background

Defendant Randolph Farwell was tried for felony gross vehicular manslaughter (count 1) and misdemeanor driving with a suspended license (count 2).
During trial, defense counsel—after a bench conference—stipulated to all elements of the Vehicle Code §14601.1(a) offense; the stipulation was read to the jury and the jury was instructed to accept it as conclusive.
The trial court did not personally advise Farwell of, nor obtain a personal waiver of, the Boykin/Tahl rights (privilege against self-incrimination, jury trial, confrontation) before accepting the stipulation.
The stipulation was the only basis for the jury’s misdemeanor verdict; Farwell was convicted and sentenced (concurrent six months for the misdemeanor).
The Court of Appeal affirmed applying the Howard totality-of-the-circumstances test; a dissent argued silent-record cases cannot support such an inference of waiver.
The California Supreme Court held the Howard totality test applies to silent records but found the record here insufficient to show Farwell understood the stipulation waived his constitutional trial rights; it reversed the misdemeanor conviction.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Howard’s “totality of the circumstances” test applies when the record is silent (no advisements or waivers)	Howard applies; a plea is valid if the record affirmatively shows it was voluntary and intelligent	Silent-records differ; courts cannot infer waiver without express advisements or waivers	Howard test applies to silent records too; appellate courts must review the whole record under the totality test
Whether Farwell’s stipulation amounted to a guilty plea requiring Boykin/Tahl advisements	Stipulation admitted all elements, and surrounding circumstances show defendant knew and waived rights	No on-record advisement/waiver; stipulation was entered off the record and after refusal of a plea—no affirmative showing defendant knew he waived rights	Stipulation was tantamount to a guilty plea, but record does not affirmatively show Farwell understood the waiver, so conviction reversed
Whether a distinction should be drawn between waiver of jury trial and other Boykin rights	Court may apply totality test uniformly to all three rights; no special prioritization	Jury-right waiver is different and may require stricter showing	No special hierarchy; Boykin rights are coequal and evaluated under the same totality inquiry
Whether Blackburn (statutory jury-right rules) requires per se reversal for failure to personally advise/obtain waiver	Blackburn doctrine limited to statutory MDO context and does not displace Howard	Silent-records require automatic reversal under analogous reasoning	Blackburn does not alter Howard; it is distinguishable and does not mandate automatic reversal here

Key Cases Cited

Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (U.S. 1969) (a silent record cannot be presumed to show waiver of key trial rights)
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (U.S. 1970) (plea validity requires voluntariness and intelligence)
People v. Howard, 1 Cal.4th 1132 (Cal. 1992) (established totality-of-the-circumstances test for plea advisements/waivers)
People v. Mosby, 33 Cal.4th 353 (Cal. 2004) (applied Howard; review the entire record when advisements incomplete)
People v. Cross, 61 Cal.4th 164 (Cal. 2015) (applied totality test; reversed where record did not affirmatively show knowing waiver)
People v. Adams, 6 Cal.4th 570 (Cal. 1993) (treating stipulations that admit all elements as tantamount to guilty pleas for Boykin analysis)
In re Tahl, 1 Cal.3d 122 (Cal. 1969) (Boykin-related California precedent on plea advisements)
People v. Blackburn, 61 Cal.4th 1113 (Cal. 2015) (statutory jury-right advisement in MDO proceedings distinguished from Howard totality analysis)