39 Cal.App.5th 771
Cal. Ct. App.2019Background
- Defendant Richard Anthony Evans was convicted of sexual offenses against a child and sentenced to 55 years to life; the trial court reserved victim restitution.
- The DA sought $4,149.07 (reduced to $3,999.07) paid earlier by the California Victim Compensation Board for relocation, therapy, and home security for the victims.
- A restitution hearing was held July 3, 2018; defendant was represented by counsel but was not personally present; parties stipulated to key facts (defendant lived with victims, continuously in custody since arrest, serving life).
- Defense counsel argued home-security costs were unnecessary given defendant’s custody and life term; prosecutor argued restitution for such costs is mandatory when tied to violent felonies.
- The trial court awarded the full $3,999.07 payable to the Victim Compensation Board; Evans appealed, raising three main challenges (absence at hearing; court’s exercise of discretion on security costs; requirement to consider defendant’s ability to pay).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Was defendant’s absence from the restitution hearing reversible? | Presence not required because defendant’s presence would not aid rebuttal; proceeding was properly handled with counsel. | Absence violated constitutional and statutory right to be present at sentencing/restoration hearing. | Presence not required here; absence did not bear a reasonable, substantial relation to defendant’s ability to defend; any error would be harmless. |
| 2. Could trial court order residential security costs as restitution? | Restitution statute mandates full restitution for economic losses including residential security when tied to violent felonies. | Security expenses were unnecessary because defendant lived in the home and was continuously incarcerated, so award exceeded court’s discretion. | Court did not abuse discretion: security costs were within economic losses caused by the crime (offense occurred in the home) and properly ordered. |
| 3. Must court consider defendant’s ability to pay in fixing victim restitution (Dueñas issue)? | Victim restitution is distinct from punitive fines/assessments in Dueñas; ability to pay is irrelevant when compensating victims. | Dueñas requires ability-to-pay hearings before imposing monetary obligations; same rule should apply to victim restitution. | Declined to extend Dueñas: ability to pay is not considered when setting direct victim restitution under §1202.4(f); restitution aims to compensate victims, not punish or raise revenue. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Perry, 38 Cal.4th 302 (Cal. 2006) (framework for when defendant’s presence is constitutionally required)
- People v. Penunuri, 5 Cal.5th 126 (Cal. 2018) (defendant’s presence required only when it bears a reasonable, substantial relation to ability to defend)
- Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730 (U.S. 1987) (presence right depends on criticality and contribution to fairness)
- People v. Giordano, 42 Cal.4th 644 (Cal. 2007) (trial court has broad discretion to choose rational method to calculate restitution)
- People v. Dueñas, 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019) (held ability-to-pay hearing required for certain fines and assessments; court’s decision distinguished here)
- People v. Holman, 214 Cal.App.4th 1438 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (discusses Restitution Fund and interplay with victim restitution orders)
- People v. Cain, 82 Cal.App.4th 81 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (restitution hearings are part of sentencing)
- People v. O'Neal, 122 Cal.App.4th 817 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (definition of "victim" for restitution purposes)
- People v. Kopp, 38 Cal.App.5th 47 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019) (discussion of ability-to-pay analyses for punitive restitution fines)