People v. Dunbar, 24 N.Y.3d 304

Queens DA instituted a standardized central-booking, prearraignment videotaped interview program (DA + detective investigator) that included a scripted preamble before Miranda warnings.
Preamble encouraged suspects to "tell us your story," said it was their "only opportunity" to speak before court, and urged providing alibi or investigative leads.
Dunbar: arrested minutes after a robbery; interviewed ~23 hours later; heard preamble, then Miranda warnings, then waived and gave a statement; convicted; Appellate Division ordered suppression and retrial.
Lloyd-Douglas: arrested years after alleged assault; interviewed at central booking with same preamble sequence; waived and gave statement; convicted; Appellate Division ordered suppression and retrial.
Trial courts denied suppression motions (waiver voluntary); Appellate Division reversed in both cases; Court of Appeals affirmed the reversals, holding the preamble undermined Miranda protections.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether preamble vitiated Miranda warnings	Preamble was misleading and neutralized Miranda so warnings were not "adequate and effective"	Preamble did not contradict warnings; if warnings given and waived, prior statements only affect voluntariness	Held: Preamble undermined all four Miranda warnings; therefore warnings were ineffective and statements must be suppressed
Whether waiver voluntariness (totality) suffices when warnings recited	Not sufficient where pre-warning statements negate the choice Miranda protects	If full warnings are read and acknowledged, voluntariness is factual and case-specific	Held: When pre-warnings convey messages contrary to Miranda, voluntariness inquiry cannot cure defective advisals (Seibert principle)
Whether preamble statements were directly contrary to Miranda	Argued they effectively told suspects silence/asking counsel would foreclose useful opportunities and that speaking would aid them	Argued preamble was persuasive but not misleading; any ambiguity corrected by the Miranda text itself	Held: Preamble statements ("only opportunity," "you have to tell us now," etc.) undercut right to remain silent, right to counsel, and that statements could be used against them
Harmlessness of erroneous admission	People did not seek review of Appellate Division’s harmless-error rulings	—	Court declined to consider harmlessness; Appellate Division’s rulings stand (orders affirmed)

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (sets required warnings and waiver standard)
Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004) (question-first protocol can render subsequent warnings ineffective)
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (Miranda is constitutionally based; voluntariness test cannot replace Miranda)
Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 (1989) (warnings must reasonably convey rights required by Miranda)
California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355 (1981) (no talismanic form required but warnings must be adequate)
Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50 (2010) (warnings assessed by whether they reasonably convey rights)