People v. Diaz
2012 COA 158M
Colo. Ct. App.2012Background
- On August 11, 2009, Diaz punched a prison guard while serving a sentence on other charges (the first assault).
- On September 29, 2009, the People charged Diaz with second degree assault of a detention center employee arising from that incident.
- On October 22, 2009, while still serving a sentence on charges predating the first assault, he threw a cup that hit a guard (the second assault) and was charged separately.
- Before trial in either assault case, Diaz finished serving the sentence he was serving when he committed the assaults.
- The second assault case was tried first; Diaz was found guilty and sentenced to 10 years; the next day the first assault case led to a second ten-year sentence, purportedly to run consecutively to the second, which Diaz appeals.
- The appellate court held the district court erred in mandating consecutive sentencing under §18-8-208(1)(f) and remanded for resentencing with discretion on whether the first assault sentence should run consecutively.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does §18-8-208(1)(f) mandate consecutive sentencing to any sentence being served? | People argues the statute requires consecutive sentencing per Benavidez. | Diaz argues the statute is ambiguous and not mandatory. | Statute ambiguity; consecutive sentencing not mandatory. |
| Whether the district court had discretion to order consecutive sentencing for the first assault. | People contends mandatory consequence under statute. | Diaz concedes some discretion exists; court may decide. | Court has discretion; remand for resentencing to determine if consecutive is appropriate. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Benavidez, 222 P.3d 391 (Colo.App.2009) (consecutive sentencing when confined as a result of being charged)
- People v. Andrews, 855 P.2d 3 (Colo.App.1992) (analogous to attempted escape statute on consecutive sentencing)
- Juhl v. People, 172 P.3d 896 (Colo.2007) (avoid constitutional concerns in statutory interpretation)
