People v. Diaz
8 Cal. App. 5th 812
| Cal. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Diaz was convicted (2013) of being a felon in possession of a firearm and sentenced in 2014 to six years, including two one-year consecutive enhancements under Penal Code § 667.5(b) for prior prison terms. One § 667.5(b) enhancement rested on a 2009 San Bernardino conviction for petty theft with a prior (former § 666).
- While Diaz’s direct appeal was pending, voters adopted Proposition 47 (effective Nov. 5, 2014), which reclassified certain theft/drug felonies as misdemeanors and created procedures under § 1170.18 for recall/resentencing or redesignation.
- Diaz initially appealed, and this court held he first had to seek redesignation in the court of conviction under § 1170.18(f). After that decision, Diaz obtained redesignation of the 2009 conviction to a misdemeanor in San Bernardino.
- Diaz then petitioned for habeas corpus in the Los Angeles Superior Court to strike the § 667.5(b) enhancement based on the redesignation; the superior court granted relief, struck the enhancement, and resentenced him to five years.
- The People appealed. The majority in this opinion reverses, holding Proposition 47 redesignation is prospective only and does not preclude use of a prior final felony to support a § 667.5(b) enhancement; Diaz’s original six-year sentence is reinstated.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a post‑sentence redesignation under Prop 47 precludes use of the prior as a § 667.5(b) enhancement | Diaz: redesignation under § 1170.18(k) makes the prior a misdemeanor “for all purposes,” so enhancement must be stricken | People: redesignation operates prospectively; a prior that was a felony when committed and when original sentence became final can still support § 667.5(b) | Held for People: redesignation is prospective; enhancement may be used if prior was final felony when enhancement imposed/finalized |
| Meaning of phrase “misdemeanor for all purposes” in § 1170.18(k) | Diaz: phrase should be read to remove prior’s felony character for all uses, including enhancements | People: identical language in § 17 has been interpreted to apply only from the time of reduction forward; same meaning should apply here | Held for People: identical statutory language construed consistently; effect is from redesignation date forward, not retroactive |
| Applicability of Estrada / retroactivity presumption | Diaz: Estrada presumption (ameliorative change applies to nonfinal judgments) supports striking enhancement when redesignation occurs before finality | People: Estrada not applicable because the underlying 2009 conviction was final before Prop 47’s effective date and § 1170.18 provides specific, nonretroactive mechanisms | Held for People: Estrada does not compel retroactive application here given Prop 47’s text, structure, and exhaustive mechanisms |
| Equal protection challenge | Diaz: denying retroactive effect arbitrarily treats differently situated defendants and violates equal protection | People: prospective application tied to enactment date is rational and permissible; ameliorative statutes may be prospective without offending equal protection | Held for People: no equal protection violation; prospective application is rationally related to legitimate penal interests |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Park, 56 Cal.4th 782 (statutory reduction of a wobbler construed to make it a misdemeanor only from the time of reduction)
- In re Estrada, 63 Cal.2d 740 (ameliorative statutory changes presumptively apply to nonfinal judgments)
- People v. Conley, 63 Cal.4th 646 (Estrada presumption and when a special resentencing mechanism rebuts automatic retroactivity)
- People v. Abdallah, 246 Cal.App.4th 736 (court held redesignation prior to sentencing precluded use of that prior for § 667.5(b) enhancement)
- People v. Flores, 92 Cal.App.3d 461 (legislative destruction-of-records mandate indicated intent that old convictions not be used to enhance)
- People v. Cornett, 53 Cal.4th 1261 (identical statutory language should receive same interpretation when covering analogous subject matter)
- People v. Prather, 50 Cal.3d 428 (historical discussion of § 667.5(b)’s aims)