People v. Denson CA2/8
B306605
| Cal. Ct. App. | Jul 14, 2021Background
- In 2010 Marcus Denson (age 18 at the time) committed crimes for which he later pled guilty in 2013 to two counts of attempted murder and one count of voluntary manslaughter with gang enhancements.
- He received a determinate sentence of 25 years and eight months on January 14, 2016; no evidence regarding his youth was presented at sentencing.
- Denson moved in November 2019 for a Franklin proceeding under Penal Code § 1203.01 and People v. Franklin to preserve evidence relevant to a future youth offender parole hearing under § 3051.
- The trial court denied the motion on three grounds: (1) the guilty plea waived any right to a Franklin proceeding; (2) a determinate sentence made him ineligible; and (3) the motion was untimely, treating it like a habeas delay.
- The Attorney General conceded the denial was erroneous; the Court of Appeal reversed and remanded, directing the trial court to grant the motion, conduct a Franklin proceeding per Franklin and Cook, and appoint counsel for Denson.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did Denson waive the right to a Franklin proceeding by pleading guilty? | Denson’s guilty plea waived his right; he cannot now “trifle with the courts” to improve his bargain. | A plea does not waive the right to a Franklin proceeding, especially where relevant law (§§ 3051/4801 and Franklin) arose after the plea. | No waiver; plea did not bar a Franklin proceeding. |
| Does receiving a determinate sentence bar eligibility for a Franklin proceeding? | A determinate sentence means he is not entitled to a Franklin hearing. | § 3051(b)(1) makes defendants under the covered age with determinate terms eligible for a youth offender parole hearing; Franklin preservation is available. | Determinate sentence does not bar a Franklin proceeding; Denson is statutorily eligible. |
| Was the motion untimely because of delay analogous to habeas petitions? | The delay between plea/sentencing and the motion was unjustified; motion should be denied as untimely. | Cook permits a post-judgment § 1203.01 motion for final judgments; Denson filed within months of Cook and is not seeking to upset his sentence. | Motion not untimely; Cook provides the proper vehicle for post-judgment Franklin relief. |
| May a defendant with a final judgment obtain a Franklin proceeding by motion under § 1203.01 following Cook? | Trial court implicitly treated finality as a bar. | Cook authorizes a § 1203.01 motion under the original caption and case number to request a Franklin proceeding after finality. | Yes; Cook permits the procedure. The matter is remanded to grant the motion, conduct the Franklin proceeding, and appoint counsel. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Franklin, 63 Cal.4th 261 (2016) (authorizes trial-court proceedings to preserve evidence relevant to a youth offender parole hearing)
- In re Cook, 7 Cal.5th 439 (2019) (extends Franklin relief to final judgments and prescribes § 1203.01 motion procedure)
- People v. Castellanos, 51 Cal.App.5th 267 (2020) (a plea cannot knowingly waive rights created by a post-plea change in law)
- People v. Medrano, 40 Cal.App.5th 961 (2019) (distinguishes direct-appeal timing limits and allows Franklin motions under Cook)
- People v. Sepulveda, 47 Cal.App.5th 291 (2020) (discusses standards of review applicable to Franklin-related proceedings)