2019 COA 55
Colo. Ct. App.2019Background
- Delgado was convicted in 2002 of aggravated incest and three counts of sexual assault on a child; he proceeded to trial pro se after his private counsel withdrew and he did not qualify for appointed counsel. A public defender was later appointed for sentencing.
- Delgado alleges the prosecutor offered a determinate 10-year DOC sentence after the first trial but before sentencing; his appointed counsel allegedly advised that the offer was not favorable because the maximum exposure was 15 years determinate, so Delgado rejected the offer.
- The court sentenced Delgado to an indeterminate 15 years to life; Delgado successfully appealed the waiver-of-counsel issue, received a new trial, was reconvicted, and again received an aggregate 15-to-life sentence.
- Delgado filed a Crim. P. 35(c) motion raising ten ineffective-assistance claims; the district court summarily denied the motion without a hearing.
- On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed summary denial as to most claims but reversed and remanded for a hearing on the claim that counsel gave incorrect sentencing-advice during plea negotiations, concluding Lafler and Frye altered Colorado precedent on prejudice and remedies in the rejected-plea context.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether counsel’s incorrect advice about sentencing exposure during plea negotiations established ineffective assistance and required a hearing | People: The district court may summarily deny where allegations are implausible; prosecutor unlikely to have offered 10-year deal post-verdict | Delgado: Counsel misled him about exposure (omitting indeterminate exposure), so he rejected a 10-year offer and was prejudiced | Reversed in part: Allegations, if true, show deficient performance and plausible prejudice under Lafler/Frye; remand for hearing to resolve facts and, if proved, fashion remedy |
| Whether Carmichael’s prejudice/remedy rules remain controlling after Lafler and Frye | People: Carmichael governs Colorado law (prejudice limited to showing defendant would have accepted offer; remedy limited to new trial) | Delgado: Lafler/Frye require showing additional elements (prosecution wouldn’t withdraw, court would accept) and broaden possible remedies | Court: Lafler and Frye supersede Carmichael on required showing of prejudice and available remedies; Colorado courts must follow Lafler/Frye |
| Whether counsel’s advice not to testify at second trial required a hearing | People: Deny where defendant’s allegations fail to show how testimony would change outcome | Delgado: He wanted to testify and relied on counsel’s advice, which prejudiced him | Affirmed: Claims conclusory; no specific allegations what testimony would be or how verdict would change, so no hearing warranted |
| Whether counsel’s failure to investigate victim’s alleged history of abuse required a hearing | People: Trial strategy and rape-shield limits make claim insufficient | Delgado: Investigation would have yielded admissible impeachment/context evidence that could change outcome | Affirmed: Allegations too vague and fail to show admissibility under Colorado rape-shield law or how outcome would differ |
Key Cases Cited
- Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012) (Supreme Court rule on prejudice and remedies when ineffective assistance causes rejection of a plea offer)
- Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2012) (Supreme Court rule requiring defendants to show prosecution and court would not have prevented acceptance/implementation of plea offer)
- Carmichael v. People, 206 P.3d 800 (Colo. 2009) (prior Colorado rule limiting prejudice showing and remedy for rejected-plea ineffective-assistance claims)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong standard for ineffective assistance: deficient performance and prejudice)
- White v. Denver Dist. Court, 766 P.2d 632 (Colo. 1988) (postconviction relief standard that alleged facts, if true, can provide basis for Rule 35(c) relief)