People v. Dapont CA6
H047903
| Cal. Ct. App. | Mar 24, 2022Background
- Defendant Jackson Dapont pleaded no contest to first-degree burglary (Pen. Code §459) and unlawful access card activity (Pen. Code §484i(c)) in two Santa Cruz County cases; the parties stipulated to a six-year aggregate prison term but did not fix how the term would be structured.
- At the original sentencing the court imposed a doubled two-year term (4 years) for burglary (strike), plus two years for an on-bail enhancement, and a concurrent two-year term for the access-card offense; the abstract and minutes did not identify the burglary as a violent felony and awarded 332 days actual and 332 days conduct credit.
- The CDCR later notified the court of errors on the abstract: uncertainty whether the burglary was adjudicated a violent felony and that the on-bail enhancement required consecutive terms, not concurrency.
- At a January 3, 2020 resentencing hearing held without Dapont’s presence or a written waiver, the parties agreed to restructure the six-year aggregate as a single six-year aggravated term for burglary (the court found a person was present, making it a violent felony), dismissed the on-bail enhancement and the strike allegation, and imposed a concurrent two-year term for the access-card count; conduct credits were reduced to 49 days under Penal Code §2933.1.
- The People concede Dapont’s constitutional right to be present at resentencing was violated; the central dispute is whether that absence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given potential effects on early parole eligibility under Proposition 57 and CDCR regulations.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether resentencing in absentia without a written waiver violated Dapont’s federal constitutional right to be present | The People conceded the court violated Dapont’s right to be present | Dapont argued the absence violated his right to be present at a critical stage and required reversal unless harmless beyond a reasonable doubt | Court agreed violation occurred and Chapman harmlessness standard applies |
| Whether the absence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt | The People argued any error was harmless and Dapont would not have obtained a better outcome if present | Dapont argued he was prejudiced because the new sentence structure (violent principal term of six years) forecloses early parole consideration under Prop 57 and CDCR regs | Court held the People did not prove harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt and reversed for a new resentencing hearing |
| Whether a mixed-offense aggregate term including a violent felony bars early parole regardless of sentence structure | The People argued Reeves-style aggregation means a violent felony in the aggregate bars early parole irrespective of component labeling | Dapont argued Mohammad and regulatory uncertainty mean a differently structured sentence could preserve early parole eligibility | Court declined to resolve the broader mixed-offense eligibility question, finding regulatory and doctrinal uncertainty made harmlessness impossible to establish |
Key Cases Cited
- Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (U.S. 1967) (establishes harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard for constitutional error)
- People v. Davis, 36 Cal.4th 510 (Cal. 2005) (applies Chapman to violations of the defendant’s right to be present)
- People v. Cutting, 42 Cal.App.5th 344 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019) (resentencing is a critical stage; presence required or valid waiver)
- People v. Simms, 23 Cal.App.5th 987 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018) (same principle regarding resentencing in absentia)
- In re Mohammad, 12 Cal.5th 518 (Cal. 2022) (upheld CDCR authority to promulgate regulations implementing Prop 57; left unresolved when mixed-offense inmates become eligible)
- In re Reeves, 35 Cal.4th 765 (Cal. 2005) (explains aggregation of consecutive determinate terms for certain credit and sentencing effects)
- People v. Suarez, 10 Cal.5th 116 (Cal. 2020) (discusses constitutional right to be present at critical stages)