People v. Cruz
B276571
| Cal. Ct. App. | Oct 3, 2017Background
- In 2001 Cruz was convicted by jury of false imprisonment by violence and misdemeanor assault; acquitted on counts including assault with a deadly weapon (ADW); jury found not true on a knife-use enhancement (§ 12022(b)(1)).
- Cruz admitted two prior strike convictions and a prior prison term; sentenced to 26.5 years to life under Three Strikes.
- Cruz sought resentencing under the Three Strikes Reform Act (Proposition 36, § 1170.126); trial court denied the petition, finding Cruz was "armed with a deadly weapon" (knife) during the offense and therefore ineligible under § 1170.12(c)(2)(C)(iii).
- Trial court relied on the record of conviction (trial transcript and appellate opinion), concluding Cruz had ready access to knives and was armed during the false imprisonment.
- Cruz argued that his acquittal on the ADW count and the jury’s not-true finding on the knife-use enhancement established eligibility; the court and appellate panel rejected that, distinguishing "armed with" from "use" or "in the commission of" a weapon.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Cruz) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Cruz is eligible for Proposition 36 resentencing despite a jury finding not true on knife-use enhancement | Cruz was armed with a knife during the false imprisonment; record shows ready access and use as a weapon, so he is ineligible | Acquittal on ADW and not-true finding on §12022(b)(1) mean he was not armed/used the knife; court may not relitigate facts | Held: Ineligible — being "armed with" (ready access during the offense) is distinct from "use"; not-true finding on enhancement does not control eligibility. |
| Whether the court may consider facts beyond elements of the conviction when deciding eligibility | Court may examine the record of conviction (trial transcript, appellate opinion) to determine disqualifying factors | Cruz argued prior jury determinations limit the court; relied on Guerrero and Apprendi/Wilson | Held: Court may consider relevant, reliable parts of the record; Apprendi and Wilson do not bar eligibility determinations under §1170.126. |
| Whether an acquittal on an ADW count precludes finding the defendant was "armed" during a different convicted offense | The government: acquittal on ADW is not dispositive; temporal availability/ready access can support "armed" finding even if ADW not proved | Cruz: acquittal implies he wasn't armed; cannot be re-litigated | Held: Acquittal on ADW does not preclude finding of being "armed" for purposes of Proposition 36 because arming requires temporal nexus/availability, not facilitative use. |
| Proper interpretation of statutory language "during the commission" vs "in the commission" re: weapon | Government: "during" focuses on availability/ready access during the crime; disqualifies for resentencing if armed at some point during the offense | Cruz: Jury's not-true finding on enhancement (which requires facilitative nexus) should govern | Held: Distinction is controlling — §1170.12(c)(2)(C)(iii) disqualifies when defendant was armed "during" the offense; that is broader than an enhancement requiring weapon be used "in the commission". |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Estrada, 3 Cal.5th 661 (2017) (scope of record review in Proposition 36 proceedings)
- People v. Bland, 10 Cal.4th 991 (1995) (defendant "armed" means weapon was available for use; ready access constitutes arming)
- People v. Osuna, 225 Cal.App.4th 1020 (2014) (distinguishes "during the commission" from "in the commission"; availability/temporal nexus test)
- People v. Blakely, 225 Cal.App.4th 1042 (2014) (trial court may examine record of conviction to determine Proposition 36 disqualifying factors)
- People v. Guerrero, 44 Cal.3d 343 (1988) (addressed limits on increasing punishment; inapposite to resentencing eligibility)
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (Sixth Amendment rule on facts that increase statutory maximum; not applicable to Proposition 36 eligibility)
- People v. Woodell, 17 Cal.4th 448 (1998) (trial court may consider record of conviction when resolving collateral matters)