People v. Crouse
2017 CO 5
Colo.2017Background
- In 2011 Colorado police seized ~55 marijuana plants and ~2.9 kg of marijuana from Robert Crouse; he was tried on state felony cultivation and possession-with-intent-to-distribute charges and was acquitted.
- Colorado Constitution art. XVIII, § 14(2)(e) directs state/local officers to return marijuana and paraphernalia seized from a patient immediately upon dismissal or acquittal.
- The federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA) makes manufacture, distribution, and possession with intent to distribute marijuana unlawful (Schedule I) and contains § 885(d), which immunizes officers "lawfully engaged in the enforcement" of controlled-substance laws.
- District court ordered return of Crouse’s marijuana; Colorado appealed arguing the state return requirement is preempted by the CSA because returning constitutes federal "distribution."
- Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on § 885(d) to conclude officers returning marijuana would be "lawfully engaged" and thus immune; the Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari.
- The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding § 14(2)(e) is preempted because compliance requires officers to violate the CSA and § 885(d) does not protect conduct unlawful under federal law.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Crouse) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether art. XVIII, § 14(2)(e) is preempted by the federal CSA | Return of seized marijuana constitutes distribution, which federal law forbids, so the state provision conflicts and is preempted | Colorado’s return provision is valid; officers can comply without federal liability because § 885(d) immunizes lawful enforcement conduct | Held preempted: returning marijuana necessarily violates CSA distribution ban, creating a positive conflict so state provision is void |
| Whether § 885(d) immunizes officers who return marijuana under § 14(2)(e) | § 885(d) applies; officers enforcing a state law are "lawfully engaged" and thus immune | "Lawful" must mean compliance with both state and federal law; because return violates federal law officers are not "lawfully engaged" | Held § 885(d) does not apply: an act is "lawful" only if lawful under both state and federal law, so officers returning marijuana would not be "lawfully engaged" |
| Whether returning seized medical marijuana constitutes "distribute" or "deliver" under the CSA | (implicit) returning under court order is enforcement, not unlawful distribution | Returning is an affirmative transfer and fits CSA definitions of "deliver"/"distribute" | Held it is a distribution/delivery under CSA definitions, so compliance would violate § 841 |
| Standard of preemption analyzed | CSA § 903 requires a "positive conflict" such that the two laws cannot consistently stand together | Same framing; no simultaneous compliance problem if § 885(d) immunizes officers | Held a "positive conflict" exists because simultaneous compliance is impossible; § 885(d) does not remove the conflict |
Key Cases Cited
- Coats v. Dish Network, LLC, 350 P.3d 849 (Colo. 2015) (defining "lawful" activity as activity not forbidden by federal law when state and federal conflict exists)
- Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (CSA applies to locally grown marijuana even for medical use; no federal exception for state medical-marijuana schemes)
- Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012) (framework for conflict and field preemption analysis under Supremacy Clause)
- FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994) (interpret federal statutory terms by their ordinary meaning when undefined)
- United States v. Cortes-Caban, 691 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012) (discussing lawfulness of sting operations and law-enforcement immunities)
- City of Garden Grove v. Superior Court, 157 Cal.App.4th 355 (2007) (state court concluding federal immunity provisions can cover officers returning medical marijuana under state law)