People v. Costner
870 N.W.2d 582
Mich. Ct. App.2015Background
- Defendant (born Feb 21, 1991) pleaded guilty to attempted 3rd-degree CSC for consensual intercourse when he was 18 and the victim (born Mar 16, 1995) was 14; age gap = 4 years, 23 days.
- Defendant initially received HYTA probation; HYTA status was later revoked after multiple probation violations, and the trial court ordered compliance with SORA.
- Defendant petitioned for removal from the sex-offender registry under MCL 28.728c(14)(a)(ii) (the "Romeo and Juliet" exception), which requires the petitioner be "not more than 4 years older than the victim."
- Defendant argued he met the four-year limit (relying on MCL 8.3j’s definition of “year” as “calendar year” and the birthday rule from People v Woolfolk). Prosecution and trial court relied on actual elapsed time (months/days) and denied the petition.
- On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed: it held MCL 8.3j’s "calendar year" definition does not apply to the statute’s time-measurement context, and that a person 4 years and 23 days older is "more than 4 years older," rendering defendant ineligible for removal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether defendant was "not more than 4 years older" under MCL 28.728c(14)(a)(ii) | Prosecution: calculate actual elapsed time between birthdates; 4 years+23 days > 4 years, so ineligible | Defendant: use MCL 8.3j ("year" = calendar year) and birthday-rule age calculation (Woolfolk) to show only a 4-year difference, so eligible | Court: MCL 8.3j definition inapplicable here; "year" as 12 months measure controls; 4 years and 23 days is "more than 4 years" — petition denied |
| Whether MCL 8.3j requires treating "year" as calendar-year for age-difference calculation | Prosecution: MCL 8.3j definitions apply only when referring to a particular year, not a unit of time | Defendant: MCL 8.3j is controlling statutory definition and should govern construction | Court: MCL 8.3j’s calendar-year meaning would yield absurd results; statute uses "year" as a 12‑month measure, so MCL 8.3j does not apply |
| Whether the SORA registration requirement, as applied, violates cruel and unusual punishment | Prosecution: registration is regulatory, not punitive | Defendant: SORA registration as applied to him is cruel and unusual | Court: Registration is remedial/regulatory (citing Fonville/Golba); defendant’s unpreserved constitutional claim fails; no plain error |
| Whether Dipiazza supports relief for defendant | Defendant: Dipiazza suggests cruel/unusual result in similar HYTA contexts | Prosecution: Dipiazza is distinguishable because Dipiazza involved dismissal under HYTA; here HYTA was revoked | Court: Dipiazza is distinguishable; HYTA status was revoked here, so Dipiazza does not apply |
Key Cases Cited
- People v Woolfolk, 304 Mich. App. 450 (Mich. Ct. App.) (addressing birthday rule for computing age)
- Bay Trust Co. v. Agricultural Life Ins. Co., 279 Mich. 248 (Mich.) (holding 60 years, 2 months, and 10 days is "over the age of 60")
- State v Marcel, 67 So. 3d 1223 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (rejecting birthday-rule approach for age-difference statutory limit)
- State v Parmley, 325 Wis. 2d 769 (Wis. Ct. App.) (calculating time between birthdates; more than four years difference)
- People v Fonville, 291 Mich. App. 363 (Mich. Ct. App.) (SORA registration is regulatory, not punitive)
- People v Golba, 273 Mich. App. 603 (Mich. Ct. App.) (same: SORA is remedial)
- People v Dipiazza, 286 Mich. App. 137 (Mich. Ct. App.) (distinguishable decision finding cruel/unusual where HYTA dismissal created no conviction)
- McAuley v General Motors Corp., 457 Mich. 513 (Mich.) (statutes should be construed to avoid absurd results)