People v. Cook
F070733M
| Cal. Ct. App. | Mar 10, 2017Background
- Defendant Stanley Cook filed a Penal Code §1170.126 petition seeking recall and resentencing under Proposition 36 (Three Strikes Reform Act) while serving a third‑strike term for commercial burglary.
- Cook’s prior strikes included an 1987 conviction for assault with intent to commit rape (Pen. Code §§220, 261).
- The People opposed resentencing, arguing that assault with intent to commit rape is a "sexually violent offense" under Welf. & Inst. Code §6600(b) because its elements necessarily involve force or fear, rendering Cook ineligible.
- At the hearing, the trial court found Cook ineligible based solely on the prior conviction’s categorical elements; the court did not review the factual record of the prior conviction.
- On appeal the main issues were (1) whether the trial court’s ruling could be presumed to have considered the record of the prior conviction and (2) whether assault with intent to commit rape necessarily includes force, violence, duress, menace, fear, or threats for purposes of §6600(b) and thus necessarily bars §1170.126 relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court should be presumed to have considered the factual record of the prior conviction | The court should presume the records were considered because the petition referenced the court’s records | Cook argued the record shows the court only decided the legal question and did not review prior-conviction facts | No presumption; record indicates court decided only the categorical legal question and did not examine prior-conviction facts |
| Whether assault with intent to commit rape is necessarily committed by force, violence, duress, menace, fear, or threats (so as to fit §6600(b)) | The People: the elements of assault with intent to commit rape necessarily involve willful application of force or fear, making the offense per se a §6600(b) sexually violent offense and rendering Cook ineligible | Cook: assault is an attempt (no contact required) and intent to rape is a mens rea element; force or fear are not elements and must be shown from the particulars of the prior conviction | The court: assault is an inchoate attempt offense and need not include actual force or fear; the elements alone cannot establish that the prior offense met §6600(b) criteria |
| Remedy / next steps on remand | People: (implicitly) court’s ruling should stand if prior conviction is treated categorically | Cook: trial court should examine the record of the prior conviction to determine if force/fear were present | Reversed and remanded: trial court must consider the record of the prior conviction(s) to determine whether, case‑specific facts show force, fear, or threats; if not, court must assess whether resentencing would pose an unreasonable risk to public safety |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Colantuono, 7 Cal.4th 206 (1994) (assault defined as attempt with present ability; distinguishes assault from battery)
- People v. Maury, 30 Cal.4th 342 (2003) (mens rea element for assault with intent to commit rape concerns intent to commit the underlying sex offense)
- People v. Soto, 51 Cal.4th 229 (2011) (explains incapacity to consent for minors and contextually discusses assault and resistance; court did not hold that assault requires completed application of force)
- People v. Peckham, 249 Cal.App.2d 941 (1967) (discusses meaning of "force" in assault with intent to commit rape as physical power to overcome resistance, not necessarily bodily injury)
- People v. Blakely, 225 Cal.App.4th 1042 (2014) (trial court may consult the record of conviction and relevant portions to determine §1170.126 eligibility)
- People v. Bradford, 227 Cal.App.4th 1322 (2014) (similar holding permitting use of conviction record when adjudicating §1170.126 petitions)
- People v. Guilford, 228 Cal.App.4th 651 (2014) (same)