People v. Clark
2016 IL 118845
| Ill. | 2016Background
- Fred Clark was indicted for aggravated vehicular hijacking with a firearm and armed robbery with a firearm, among other charges, after witness Tyronn Wise testified Clark held a 9mm handgun to his head, pistol‑whipped him, and accomplice drove off in Wise’s car; the gun was later recovered from that car.
- At a bench trial the court found Wise credible, accepted that a gun was used, but orally stated the weapon had been used as a bludgeon and announced convictions for aggravated vehicular hijacking and armed robbery "without a firearm," i.e., under statutory subsections excluding firearms.
- The written judgment and sentencing order, however, reflected convictions for the firearm variants as charged; the trial court imposed concurrent 17‑year terms.
- On appeal the First District held the trial court’s oral pronouncements amounted to an acquittal of the charged firearm offenses, that the uncharged "other than a firearm" variants are not lesser‑included offenses of the firearm variants under the charging‑instrument approach, and reduced convictions to simple vehicular hijacking and robbery with remand for resentencing.
- The Illinois Supreme Court granted leave, affirmed the appellate court, and (1) held the "other than a firearm" offenses are not lesser‑included offenses of the firearm offenses, (2) agreed the trial court’s oral statements constituted acquittals of the charged firearm offenses, and (3) affirmed reduction of convictions to lesser offenses the evidence supported.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Clark) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether offenses charged as committed "with a dangerous weapon other than a firearm" are lesser‑included offenses of the same crimes charged "with a firearm" | The charging instrument can be read broadly so the non‑firearm variants are lesser‑included of the firearm variants | Defendant argued the statutes distinguish firearm vs non‑firearm and the indictment charged only the firearm variants, so no notice of non‑firearm variants | Held: Not lesser‑included; statutory language makes the variants mutually exclusive and an indictment alleging a firearm does not reasonably include "other than a firearm" variants |
| Whether the trial court’s oral findings that defendant was guilty of the non‑firearm variants (contradicting the written judgment) constituted acquittals of the charged firearm offenses, barring retrial or correction | People argued the oral statements could be disregarded in favor of the written judgment/sentence reflecting firearm convictions | Clark argued the oral pronouncements were acquittals and thus immune from review; convictions must conform to charges | Held: Oral pronouncement controls over conflicting written order; the oral findings constituted an acquittal of the firearm offenses, which cannot be reviewed or retried |
| Whether entry of convictions for uncharged, non‑lesser offenses is remediable as second‑prong plain error despite forfeiture | People contended appellate court misapplied plain‑error doctrine and that second‑prong plain error is limited to a small set of structural errors | Clark argued the unauthorized convictions violated due process and the integrity of the judicial process, justifying plain‑error relief | Held: Second‑prong plain error applies; unauthorized convictions that are not lesser‑included offend due process and integrity of the process, so appellate court properly reduced convictions to supported lesser offenses under Rule 615(b)(3) |
| Whether ineffective assistance of counsel claim required relief because trial counsel failed to object to improper convictions | People urged appellate disposition on plain‑error grounds; alternatively challenged ineffective‑assistance claim | Clark alternatively argued counsel’s failure to object was ineffective | Held: Court did not resolve ineffective‑assistance claim because plain‑error relief was available and dispositive |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Rey, 136 Ill. App. 3d 645 (Ill. App. Ct.) (acquittal bars appeal regardless of legal or factual mistake)
- People v. Williams, 188 Ill. 2d 293 (Ill. 1999) (definition of acquittal where court resolves factual elements)
- Evans v. Michigan, 568 U.S. 313 (U.S. 2013) (acquittal due to insufficient evidence precludes retrial even if court erred in law)
- People v. Kolton, 219 Ill. 2d 353 (Ill. 2006) (charging‑instrument approach for lesser‑included offenses)
- People v. Glasper, 234 Ill. 2d 173 (Ill. 2009) (discussion of plain‑error doctrine)
- People v. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598 (Ill. 2010) (plain‑error test articulation)
- In re Samantha V., 234 Ill. 2d 359 (Ill. 2009) (unauthorized convictions affect integrity of judicial process)
- People v. Artis, 232 Ill. 2d 156 (Ill. 2009) (improper convictions can cause future prejudice despite sentence)
- People v. Harvey, 211 Ill. 2d 368 (Ill. 2004) (one‑act, one‑crime and integrity concerns)
- People v. Roberson, 401 Ill. App. 3d 758 (Ill. App. Ct.) (oral pronouncement controls over written order when conflict exists)
