People v. Chavez
231 Cal. Rptr. 3d 634
| Cal. | 2018Background
- In 2005 Lorenzo Chavez pleaded no contest to drug-sale and failure-to-appear charges; the court suspended sentence and placed him on four years’ probation, which he completed in 2009.
- In 2013 Chavez, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel and ignorance of immigration consequences, asked the trial court to dismiss his convictions "in the interests of justice" under Penal Code § 1385; the court denied relief as probation had ended and suggested § 1203.4 relief instead.
- Chavez did not seek relief under § 1203.4 because he believed such expungement would not eliminate immigration consequences under prevailing federal and Ninth Circuit authority.
- Lower courts (Court of Appeal) held § 1203.4 is the exclusive post‑probation dismissal mechanism and that § 1385 cannot be used after probation ends.
- The Supreme Court granted review to decide whether a trial court may dismiss under § 1385 after a defendant completes probation and whether § 1203.4 precludes § 1385 relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Chavez) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a trial court may dismiss an action under § 1385 after the defendant’s probation has ended | § 1385 power ends when probation is granted; the action terminates on grant of probation | § 1385 remains available because the court retains fundamental jurisdiction and Chavez can invoke it at any time | Court: § 1385 dismissal power exists while the criminal action is pending, including during probation, but expires when the court’s power to pronounce judgment runs out (i.e., upon completion of probation); trial court lacked § 1385 jurisdiction here |
| Whether § 1203.4 implicitly repeals or supplants § 1385 for post‑probation relief | § 1203.4 provides the post‑probation remedy and therefore extinguishes § 1385 authority after probation | § 1203.4 is not exclusive; § 1385 remains available when action is pending | Court: Did not reach a broad implied‑repeal holding because § 1385 power had already lapsed by statute; on these facts § 1203.4 and § 1385 need not be reconciled because § 1385 no longer applied |
| Whether a defendant barred from habeas/coram nobis has any § 1385 pathway after probation | (implicit) People rely on statutory limits to postjudgment relief | Chavez contends lack of other remedies makes § 1385 the only avenue | Court: Statutory timing controls; lack of other remedies does not expand § 1385 jurisdiction beyond statute |
| Effect of Romero precedent on timing of § 1385 dismissal | Romero limits dismissal to pre‑final‑judgment period | Chavez urges extension because successful probationers may never have a final judgment pronounced | Court: Extends Romero: § 1385 may be used until judgment is pronounceable; when the court’s power to pronounce judgment has lapsed (probation ended), § 1385 authority ends |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Superior Court (Romero), 13 Cal.4th 497 (1996) (recognizes § 1385 dismissal must occur before judgment is final)
- People v. Hernandez, 22 Cal.4th 512 (2000) (§ 1385 authorizes dismissal of a criminal action or parts thereof)
- People v. Flores, 12 Cal.3d 85 (1974) (order granting probation treated as final for limited appeal‑timing purposes in bench‑trial context)
- People v. Espinoza, 232 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1 (2014) (trial court lacked § 1385 jurisdiction where probation had long since expired)
- People v. Picklesimer, 48 Cal.4th 330 (2010) (recognizes that criminal prosecution is final for purposes of seeking relief when no pending action remains)