People v. Chandler, 60 Cal. 4th 508

Neighbor Ben Chandler allegedly harassed and made explicit death threats to neighbors Jamie Lopez and Deborah Alva in January 2009; victims reported fear, police calls, and one victim moved away.
Chandler was charged with stalking (Pen. Code § 646.9) and criminal threats (Pen. Code § 422) against Lopez and Alva; jury acquitted on completed-threat counts but convicted on lesser-included attempted criminal threat counts for both victims.
Trial court instructed on completed criminal threat and a generic attempt instruction (CALCRIM Nos. 1300 and 460); the jury convicted of attempt without a specific instruction that the intended threat must be objectively sufficient to cause reasonable sustained fear.
On appeal, Chandler argued the attempt crime requires proof the intended threat could reasonably have caused sustained fear (citing People v. Jackson); the Court of Appeal rejected that view and affirmed. The Supreme Court granted review.
The Supreme Court held that attempted criminal threat requires (1) subjective intent to threaten and (2) that the intended threat, under the circumstances, was sufficient to cause a reasonable person to be in sustained fear; it affirmed the convictions as any instructional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether attempted criminal threat requires an objective reasonableness element (i.e., that the intended threat was sufficient under the circumstances to cause a reasonable person sustained fear)	State: Attempt requires subjective intent to threaten; no separate objective element beyond intent is required by statutes or prior precedent	Chandler: Attempt must include objective element so only speech that would reasonably cause sustained fear is criminalized (protect First Amendment)	Held: Attempt requires both subjective intent to threaten and that the intended threat be sufficient under the circumstances to cause a reasonable person sustained fear (to avoid serious First Amendment concerns)
Whether failure to instruct jury on the objective element requires reversal	State: Any instructional omission was harmless because evidence showed threats were plainly sufficient to cause reasonable sustained fear	Chandler: Instructional omission was prejudicial	Held: Any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; convictions affirmed

People v. Toledo, 26 Cal.4th 221 (2001) (recognized existence and constitutionality of attempted criminal threat under §§ 21a and 664)
People v. Jackson, 178 Cal.App.4th 590 (2009) (held attempted criminal threat must be evaluated from reasonable-person perspective)
People v. Lowery, 52 Cal.4th 419 (2011) (construed threatening-speech statute to require an objective true-threat standard to satisfy First Amendment)
Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (distinguished political hyperbole from true threats)
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (true threats not protected; context and threatening effect relevant)
United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008) (inchoate speech-related crimes and limits on overbreadth challenges)
In re M.S., 10 Cal.4th 698 (1995) (reasonable-person view for determining when words amount to a threat)