People v. Canizales
248 Cal. Rptr. 3d 370
Cal.2019Background
- At a Rialto block party, defendants (Ramona Blocc members) and others confronted rival gang members; Windfield fired five 9mm shots from ~100–160 feet toward Pride and Bolden; Cooksey was killed by one shot.
- Defendants were charged with Cooksey’s murder and the attempted murders of Pride and Bolden; jury convicted on murder and both attempted-murder counts; Court of Appeal affirmed attempted-murder convictions but reversed one murder conviction on separate grounds.
- Trial court instructed the jury using CALCRIM No. 600, including a kill-zone paragraph permitting conviction of a nontargeted victim if the defendant intended to kill everyone in a ‘‘particular zone of harm.’’
- Prosecutor argued two theories for Bolden’s attempted-murder charge: (1) Bolden was specifically targeted; or (2) Bolden was within a ‘‘kill zone’’ created by shots aimed at Pride.
- The Supreme Court held the kill-zone instruction is available only when: (1) the circumstances of the attack (weapon, number of shots, distance, proximity, etc.) permit only the reasonable inference that the defendant intended to create a zone of fatal harm to kill everyone there; and (2) the alleged nontargeted victim was within that zone.
- Applying that standard, the Court concluded the record lacked sufficient evidence to support a kill-zone instruction for Bolden (distance, few shots, open area, and lack of hits), and reversal of the attempted-murder conviction as to Bolden was required because the jury may have relied on the improperly given kill-zone theory.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| When may a jury be instructed on the kill-zone theory for attempted murder? | Kill-zone permits inferring intent to kill nontargeted victims when shots create a zone of fatal harm; instruction appropriate here because multiple shots were fired toward victims. | Kill-zone should be limited; instruction improperly given where evidence permits a reasonable alternative inference (e.g., mere risk creation or lack of proximity). | Kill-zone instruction proper only if (1) the only reasonable inference from attack circumstances is intent to create a zone of fatal harm to kill everyone present, and (2) the nontarget victim was within that zone. |
| Did evidence support a kill-zone instruction for Bolden? | Prosecution: multiple shots fired at the primary target justify an inference of a kill zone that included Bolden. | Defense: shots were fired from substantial distance in an open area; few shots, no hits on Bolden/Pride—insufficient to infer intent to kill everyone in a zone. | Evidence insufficient: shots from 100–160 feet, limited number of rounds, open street, and bullets ‘‘going everywhere’’ did not permit only one reasonable inference of a kill zone. Instruction should not have been given. |
| Was the instructional error harmless? (Prejudice standard) | Attorney General: jury could have convicted Bolden on the valid theory that Bolden was specifically targeted; apply Watson harmlessness. | Defendants: erroneous kill-zone instruction combined with prosecutor’s misleading argument could have caused legal confusion and led jury to convict on an invalid theory. | Error prejudicial under Chapman (and thus warrants reversal): reasonable likelihood jury relied on legally improper kill-zone theory; not clear beyond a reasonable doubt verdict would stand absent the instruction. |
| Does CALCRIM No. 600 adequately explain kill-zone theory? | AG: current instruction is standard; sufficient. | Defendants: CALCRIM No. 600’s kill-zone language is vague and risks allowing convictions without true intent-to-kill findings. | Court: when kill-zone instruction is warranted, CALCRIM No. 600 should be revised to reflect the limits articulated; did not resolve the separate constitutional challenge because reversal was required on other grounds. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Bland, 28 Cal.4th 313 (Cal. 2002) (adopted concurrent-intent/kill-zone theory where attack compelled inference defendant intended to kill everyone in victim’s vicinity)
- People v. Smith, 37 Cal.4th 733 (Cal. 2005) (single-bullet case; distinguishes kill-zone applicability and evaluates totality of circumstances)
- People v. Stone, 46 Cal.4th 131 (Cal. 2009) (declined to apply kill-zone instruction where theory was not implicated; defendant could be convicted for intending to kill someone in a group)
- People v. Perez, 50 Cal.4th 222 (Cal. 2010) (reversed multiple attempted-murder convictions where attack did not create a zone of fatal harm)
- Ford v. State, 625 A.2d 984 (Md. 1993) (origin of concurrent-intent/kill-zone discussion; multiple-shot scenarios supporting inference of a kill zone)
- Harrison v. State, 855 A.2d 1220 (Md. 2004) (adopted concurrent-intent framework and articulated focus on means employed and zone of harm)
- People v. Guiton, 4 Cal.4th 1116 (Cal. 1993) (discusses prejudice inquiry for instructions presenting unsupported or legally inadequate theories)