People v. Burns
2016 IL 118973
| Ill. | 2016Background
- Police received an anonymous Crimestoppers tip (Nov. 29, 2012) alleging Burns sold ~2 lbs. of marijuana weekly and received shipments from California; tip did not give Burns’s address.
- Detective Mecum confirmed Burns lived at 409 W. Elm #10 and observed a package addressed to that unit from California in the locked apartment building common area.
- At ~3:20 a.m. police entered the locked building (admitted by a tenant/sergeant) and Officer Cervantes brought a drug‑detection dog to the third‑floor landing; the dog alerted at Burns’s apartment door.
- Detective Mecum relied on the dog alert (and tip/history/social‑media observations) in an affidavit; a warrant issued and police seized ~1012 g of marijuana during the search.
- Burns moved to suppress; trial court granted suppression (citing Trull and Jardines reasoning); the appellate court affirmed and this appeal followed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a warrantless canine sniff at the apartment door in the locked common landing was a Fourth Amendment search | State: landing is a common area, not curtilage; sniff occurred outside the home so no search | Burns: landing and doorway are curtilage/home entry; Jardines requires a warrant for a dog sniff at the door | Court: landing is curtilage here; warrantless dog sniff at 3:20 a.m. violated the Fourth Amendment |
| Whether the good‑faith exception admits the evidence despite the illegal sniff | State: officers reasonably relied on Supreme Court and Illinois precedent that dog sniffs aren’t searches and common areas carry no expectation of privacy | Burns: no binding precedent authorized canine sniff here (Trull prohibited entry into locked common areas) | Court: good‑faith exception does not apply—no binding precedent authorized the conduct and Trull was binding Fourth District authority prohibiting it |
| Whether the remaining (untainted) affidavit facts established probable cause for the warrant | State: tip, prior drug contacts, social‑media posts, and observed package suffice | Burns: once dog sniff is excised, affidavit is insufficient—tip uncorroborated, package details vague | Court: absent the dog sniff, affidavit lacked probable cause; warrant was not supportable |
| Remedy: whether seized evidence must be suppressed | State: evidence should be admissible (good faith or independent probable cause) | Burns: suppression required as fruit of poisonous tree | Held: evidence suppressed; conviction cannot stand; suppression affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013) (warrantless use of a drug‑detection dog on a home’s front porch is a Fourth Amendment search)
- United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987) (four‑factor curtilage test: proximity, enclosure, use, steps to protect from observation)
- Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (reasonable‑expectation‑of‑privacy test)
- Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (use of technology not in general public use to explore the interior of the home is a search)
- People v. Trull, 64 Ill. App. 3d 385 (1978) (Fourth District: warrantless entry into locked apartment building common areas violated Fourth Amendment)
- Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011) (good‑faith exception can apply when officers reasonably rely on binding precedent later overruled)
- United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (exclusionary rule: objectively reasonable reliance on a magistrate’s warrant may bar suppression)