People v. Bullard, 460 P.3d 262

In 2012 Julian Bullard pleaded guilty to felony unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle (Veh. Code §10851(a)) after taking his girlfriend’s 1993 Lincoln Town Car (value ≈ $500) without permission, later returning it and being arrested; he was sentenced to 16 months in county jail.
In 2014 voters enacted Proposition 47, adding Penal Code §490.2 (reducing theft of property ≤ $950 to a misdemeanor) and §1170.18(f) (procedure to redesignate past felonies as misdemeanors when Prop. 47 would have made them misdemeanors).
Bullard petitioned under §1170.18(f) to redesignate his §10851 conviction; the trial court denied relief and the Court of Appeal affirmed, reasoning §10851 can criminalize non-theft takings.
This Court previously decided in People v. Page that §490.2 applies to §10851 convictions that are based on taking a vehicle with intent to permanently deprive (i.e., theft), but reserved whether relief must be limited to permanent takings and not temporary ones.
The question here: Does Proposition 47 require courts to treat §10851 takings that lack intent to permanently deprive (temporary borrowings/joyriding) differently for resentencing? The Court held no: except for posttheft driving, unlawful takings of low-value vehicles under §10851 are eligible for misdemeanor treatment under Prop. 47 when the vehicle is ≤ $950; the matter is remanded to resolve valuation.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Prop. 47’s §490.2 excludes §10851 takings when defendant lacked intent to permanently deprive	Prop. 47 should not create a harsher penalty for temporary takings; low-value takings should be eligible	Excluding temporary takings would be absurd and inconsistent with Prop. 47’s purpose	Court: Prop. 47 does not require subdividing §10851 into misdemeanor permanent takings and felony temporary takings; low-value takings are eligible for reduction absent posttheft driving
Whether any driving (as opposed to posttheft driving) defeats Prop. 47 relief	AG: driving at any point could disqualify relief (distinguishing certain ‘‘taking’’ conduct)	Defendant: taking by driving is still a taking; driving should not automatically bar relief	Court: Only posttheft driving (a driving offense separated from the taking by a substantial break) remains ineligible; taking accomplished by driving is covered by §490.2 if vehicle ≤ $950

People v. Page, 3 Cal.5th 1175 (Cal. 2017) (held §490.2 applies to §10851 convictions based on permanent-intent vehicle theft)
People v. Lara, 6 Cal.5th 1128 (Cal. 2019) (addressed Prop. 47 applicability to §10851 and post-Prop. 47 sentencing burdens)
People v. Garza, 35 Cal.4th 866 (Cal. 2005) (distinguished §10851’s taking form from posttheft driving for double-conviction rules)
People v. Jaramillo, 16 Cal.3d 752 (Cal. 1976) (discussed §10851’s coverage of a range of vehicle-taking conduct)
People v. Kehoe, 33 Cal.2d 711 (Cal. 1949) (explained difference between temporary use and permanent theft intent)
People v. King, 5 Cal.4th 59 (Cal. 1993) (statutory interpretation to avoid absurd harsher punishment for lesser included offense)
People v. Jenkins, 10 Cal.4th 234 (Cal. 1995) (avoidance of absurd sentencing outcomes in statutory construction)
People v. Franco, 6 Cal.5th 433 (Cal. 2018) (applied rule against literal application producing absurd results in Prop. 47 context)
West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (U.S. 1991) (court’s role is to interpret statutes sensibly rather than produce nonsense)