People v. Buffkin, 55 N.E.3d 47

In 2007 Buffkin pleaded guilty to aggravated discharge of a firearm and was sentenced to 15 years plus various fines, fees, and credit for 279 days served.
In 2012 Buffkin filed a pleading treated initially as habeas corpus; this court later held it should have been treated as a postconviction petition and remanded; the trial court dismissed on remand and Buffkin appealed.
On collateral appeal Buffkin raised for the first time two sentencing-related claims: (1) entitlement to presentencing custody credit against two fines totaling $60 under 725 ILCS 5/110-14; and (2) vacatur of a successive DNA analysis fee as unauthorized under People v. Marshall.
The State confessed error on both claims; the appellate court accepted the confession and considered whether procedural doctrines permitted relief on the late-raised claims.
The court held the 110-14 credit could be granted because Caballero allows such credit to be requested at any time; but after Castleberry a successive DNA fee is only voidable (not void) and generally not subject to collateral attack.
The revestment doctrine (with the State’s confession) restored jurisdiction so the court could vacate the DNA fee and apply the $60 credit; the case was remanded for recalculation and collection adjustments.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether defendant is entitled to presentencing custody credit against $60 in fines under 725 ILCS 5/110‑14	State concedes error and supports granting credit	Buffkin argues 110‑14 permits credit at any time and he is entitled to apply it now	Granted; Caballero allows 110‑14 credit to be awarded at any stage, including collateral appeal
Whether successive DNA analysis fee must be vacated as unauthorized under Marshall	State concedes fee was unauthorized and asks vacation	Buffkin relies on Marshall to treat the successive fee as void and subject to collateral attack	Vacated, but only because revestment via the State’s confession restored jurisdiction; after Castleberry such fees are voidable and generally not subject to collateral attack

People v. Caballero, 228 Ill. 2d 79 (2008) (defendant may apply for presentencing-custody credit under section 110‑14 at any time)
People v. Marshall, 242 Ill. 2d 285 (2011) (successive DNA fee held statutorily unauthorized and vacated as void)
People v. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d 107 (1995) (prior rule treating statutorily unauthorized sentences as void)
People v. Owens, 129 Ill. 2d 303 (1989) (in collateral proceedings, forfeited claims may be reviewed for cause and prejudice under fundamental fairness)
People v. Rigsby, 405 Ill. App. 3d 916 (2010) (discussing unauthorized sentencing and voidness)
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (cause-and-prejudice standard for procedural default)