People v. Brown CA2/1, B300031

Background

July 16, 2018: Eyewitness Lexus Scott saw David Lamont Brown punch and eject a female from the back seat of a black Nissan Sentra; 911 call placed and victim (T.J.) taken to ambulance with a severe head wound.
T.J. was 17 at the time (birth certificate admitted) and had been arrested for prostitution one month earlier; sexual-assault exam recovered Brown’s DNA from vaginal and anal swabs.
T.J. did not testify at trial; the prosecution played Scott’s 911 audio and a portion of LAPD Officer Edwards’s body‑worn‑camera recording of her interview with T.J.
Prosecution presented testimony from W.F. and M.W. that, at age 14, each worked for Brown as prostitutes (Evidence Code §1108 evidence), plus an expert on pimping (tattoos, Instagram posts, and the Figueroa area) to link Brown to a pimping modus operandi.
Jury convicted Brown of human trafficking of a minor for commercial sex (Pen. Code §236.1(c)), assault causing likely great bodily injury, and unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor; prior human‑trafficking conviction found true; sentenced to 21 years 8 months to life and a one‑year §667.5(b) enhancement (stayed).

Issues

Issue	People’s Argument	Brown’s Argument	Held
Admission of Scott’s 911 recording (Confrontation Clause)	Recording was nontestimonial—made during an ongoing emergency—so admissible.	Recording was testimonial hearsay and admission violated Crawford.	Statements were nontestimonial (Davis/Bryant framework); even if error, harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Admission of body‑camera portion of Officer Edwards–T.J. interview (Confrontation Clause)	Nontestimonial: emergency ongoing and informal, so admissible.	Testimonial; admission violated Crawford.	Objection forfeited in trial court but, on the merits, statements were nontestimonial; admission proper; any error harmless.
Admission of W.F. and M.W. testimony about working for Brown at 14 (Evidence Code §1108 / due process)	Testimony relevant to propensity, modus operandi, and corroborated location/tattoos; admissible under §1108 unless excluded under §352.	Testimony about two 14‑year‑olds was unduly prejudicial and rendered trial fundamentally unfair.	Trial court did not abuse discretion: probative value (similarity, modus operandi, corroboration) outweighed prejudice; admission was not a due‑process violation.
One‑year enhancement under former §667.5(b) for prior prison term	Enhancement was imposed at sentencing.	SB 136 narrowed §667.5(b); enhancement no longer applicable and must be stricken retroactively for nonfinal judgments.	Enhancement must be stricken; judgment otherwise affirmed and remanded to amend abstract of judgment.

Key Cases Cited

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (Confrontation Clause distinguishes testimonial vs nontestimonial statements)
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (statements made to address an ongoing emergency are nontestimonial)
Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 (2011) (primary‑purpose test for determining testimonial character of statements)
People v. Blacksher, 52 Cal.4th 769 (2011) (six‑factor summary for primary‑purpose analysis in California)
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (harmless‑beyond‑a‑reasonable‑doubt standard for constitutional error)
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986) (factors for assessing prejudice from trial error)
People v. Garton, 4 Cal.5th 485 (2018) (Confrontation Clause error reviewed for Chapman harmlessness)
People v. Falsetta, 21 Cal.4th 903 (1999) (Evidence Code §1108 framework and limits)
People v. Williams, 1 Cal.5th 1166 (2016) (presumption of admissibility under §1108 subject to §352 exclusion)
People v. Hollie, 180 Cal.App.4th 1262 (2010) (prejudice vs probative value under §352 and §1108)
In re Estrada, 63 Cal.2d 740 (1965) (ameliorative statutory changes apply retroactively to nonfinal judgments)
People v. Lopez, 42 Cal.App.5th 337 (2019) (SB 136 applies to nonfinal judgments)