People v. Brown, 2022 IL 127201

Vivian Brown was charged (2017) with possessing a firearm in Illinois without a FOID card (430 ILCS 65/2(a)(1)).
Brown moved to declare section 2(a)(1) unconstitutional as applied, admitting she possessed a .22 rifle in her home and lacked a FOID card but claiming she was otherwise eligible and used the rifle for self‑defense.
The White County circuit court (Feb. 2018 / Oct. 2018) found the statute unconstitutional as applied and alternatively dismissed on a statutory (legislative‑intent) ground.
This court in People v. Brown, 2020 IL 124100, vacated the constitutional ruling and remanded with directions to modify the judgment to dismiss on the nonconstitutional statutory ground only, so normal appellate review could proceed.
On remand the circuit court entered the modified order (June 4, 2020) but then, after a defense motion to reconsider, vacated that order (June 15, 2020), reinstated the information, and later (Apr. 26, 2021) again found the statute unconstitutional as applied.
The Illinois Supreme Court held the circuit court lacked authority to vacate the order entered pursuant to this Court’s mandate, vacated the June 15, 2020 and April 26, 2021 orders, and remanded with directions to reenter the June 4, 2020 modified order.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Brown)	Held
Whether the circuit court could entertain a motion to reconsider and vacate the modified order that this Court directed the court to enter on remand	The circuit court had no authority to set aside or modify an order entered pursuant to this Court’s mandate; mandate must be followed and is final on matters remanded with specific directions	The circuit court may reconsider its own orders and correct legal error; the prior modified order did not provide Brown “complete relief” on the merits and was subject to further review	Held for Plaintiff: circuit court lacked authority; June 15, 2020 and Apr. 26, 2021 orders vacated; court must reenter the June 4, 2020 modified order and take no other action on remand
Whether this Court should (or could) reach the merits of the circuit court’s later-as‑applied constitutional ruling	The Court cannot review the Apr. 26, 2021 ruling because the circuit court had no authority to enter it after disobeying the mandate; therefore the merits need not be reached	Brown (and dissent) urged review of merits and argued the trial court properly reconsidered the statutory basis and thus merits remain open	Held: Court declined to reach merits; remanded for ministerial reentry of the modified order and prohibited further merits proceedings on remand

People v. Brown, 2020 IL 124100 (2020) (prior Supreme Court decision vacating constitutional finding and directing entry of a nonconstitutional dismissal)
Price v. Philip Morris, Inc., 2015 IL 117687 (2015) (when reviewing court remands with directions, lower court must follow mandate; order entered pursuant to mandate is judgment of reviewing court)
Smith v. Dugger, 318 Ill. 215 (1925) (decree entered under mandate is the reviewing court’s judgment and is final and conclusive)
Trent v. Winningham, 172 Ill. 2d 420 (1996) (direct appeal unavailable where trial court provides both constitutional and alternative nonconstitutional grounds)
Hearne v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 185 Ill. 2d 443 (1999) (same principle restricting direct supreme court review when nonconstitutional alternative exists)
PSL Realty Co. v. Granite Inv. Co., 86 Ill. 2d 291 (1981) (mandate controls; trial court may do only what mandate directs)
Fisher v. Burks, 285 Ill. 290 (1918) (lower court must execute precise and unambiguous mandate)
Boggs v. Willard, 70 Ill. 315 (1873) (early articulation that trial court must carry out specific directions from appellate court)
Gospel Army v. Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 543 (1947) (orders entered pursuant to an appellate mandate are ministerial acts of implementing the reviewing court’s judgment)
Noble v. Tipton, 222 Ill. 639 (1906) (distinguishes when a reviewing court has decided merits versus when questions remain open on remand)