*1 false remarks was to attempt thwart Anderson’s employment obtain at the YMCA. To claim that Vanden Dorpel’s might remarks relating understood simply to Anderson’s abilities in the particular limited of her job circumstances at Northwestern only unreasonable, therefore not patently it is ridicu- lous.
Admittedly, precedent can be found to support position. Just because other courts have time, abused the innocent construction rule from time to however, does not mean that should In we do so now. Witous, Mittelman v. 220, (1989), court observed that the innocent construction rule had "spawned a morass of case law in consistency harmony long ago have disappeared.” The court there attempted to rise above the confusion and some provide guidance sensible cases. future We should do that here, Instead, too. we have back slipped into quagmire. joins
JUSTICE FREEMAN this dissent.
(Nos. 78726, 78730 cons. al., TRENT et BARBARA RALPH Appellants, v. WINNINGHAM, SAMUEL Appellee.
Opinion June 1996. filed *2 McMORROW,J., BILANDIC,C.J., joined by dissenting. (Sharon O’Malley, Attorney, Chicago Jack State’s of Coleman, Johnson Robert F. Leonard N. Fos- Lyons and counsel), Attorneys, appel- ter, Assistant State’s of lant. (Todd Fry, Chicago Avery Defender,
Rita A. Public of counsel), ap- Shanker, Defender, Assistant Public of pellee. Ryan, Attorney Springfield General,
James E. (Barbara Mary Preiner, General, A. Solicitor E. Attorney Chicago, Welsh, General, Assistant counsel), intervenor-appellant. opinion
JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the court: containing
This is from a circuit court order part, provision which, declared a Illinois Act of 1984 unconstitutional. See 134 302(a). Ill. 2d R. We remand the cause with directions.
BACKGROUND paternity against In 1991 Barbara Trent filed suit Ralph Winningham. alleged, Winningham Trent conceded, later that he fathered a son born to Trent *3 years sought four earlier. Part of the relief that Trent 14(b) support was retroactive child under section of the 45/14(b) (West 1992)). Parentage Act ILCS judge support The trial denied retroactive for three it; reasons: Trent was not entitled to Trent’s claim was 14(b) time-barred; and section was unconstitutional anyway equal because it violated federal and state protection guaranties. judge sug- The trial himself had gested parties might that the section be unconsti- tutional and asked them to brief the His issue. reason- ing: the section caused unwed fathers to be treated differently who, from divorced fathers under the Illinois Marriage Marriage Act, and Dissolution of did not have pay to similar grounds the denial of did not support other finding
turn Denial of section unconstitutional. claim actually Trent’s on the merits followed consider- 14(b). being ation of factors directed As by time-barred, judge the trial characterized Trent’s claim child-rearing as one for her own reimbursement ex- penses, a claim which the Act required years have been made within two of her son’s birth. 750 (West 1992). ILCS 45/8 County
The Cook Attorney, argued State’s who had on Trent’s behalf for the constitutionality of section 14(b), appealed. So did the Illinois Attorney General (see 19) who had intervened 134 Ill. 2d R to represent upholding State’s interest the section. Both as serted that a direct appeal lay to this court because sec had been held See 134 Ill. unconstitutional. 2d R 302. Attorney’s
The State’s opening argues brief not that the judge wrong trial was to find the section uncon- stitutional but also that retroactive relief should not been have denied for either given. alternative reason challenges The brief also a different aspect of the trial judge’s order. support only part Retroactive child was sought. relief Trent had The order also contains a current support award. The Attorney argues State’s the level of current support set too was low because the judge trial failed to consider the child’s best interests. Winningham has moved strike part of the State’s Attorney’s brief. decided dispose We motion the course of this appeal.
ANALYSIS Winningham right argue that whether the trial judge ignored some factor in awarding current support nothing has to do with Trent’s retroactive claim. And it is the claim for that spurred 14(b)’s consideration of section validity constitutional *4 jurisdiction hinges. Winningham’s which our upon But argument suggests larger procedural concerns. The concerns would indicate that the motion should be except disposition denied the same concerns make of the motion itself in the unnecessary end.
Supreme principal Court Rule 302 is a means which supervisory this court fulfills its constitutional role; the rule in certain kinds of calls for direct review VI, (granting See Ill. cases. Const. art. § through court supervisory authority to be exercised rules); 302(a), court’s own see 134 Ill. 2d R. Committee Comments, (stating at 233 be the "should important questions forum for the decision of which af fect public importance interest or are otherwise of general applicability”). Jurisdiction here is based 302(a), "[ajppeals” on Rule which commands from judgments "final of circuit courts shall be taken” *** directly to this "in cases statute of 302(a). this State has been held invalid.” 134 Ill. 2d R. 302(a) triggering technically Circumstances Rule ex- 14(b) ist: section was held to be unconstitutional jurisdiction final of a circuit court. Our would nonproblematic only had the case involved denial of ruled support solely because the section was unconstitutional. matters are the alterna- Complicating tive, given denying reasons concerning aspect and the of the case current designed to confer inter- expressly is not scope intended locutory jurisdiction. And so the issues, as really particular review is not one tailored to 304(a); under Rule extends jurisdiction with Rule case, exists particular jurisdiction to "cases.” In this the trial order hold- part judge’s because of the ing jurisdiction, to be unconstitutional. however, encompasses issue but is not limited to *5 set in the circuit court judgment the entire final as out 14(b) here Finding to be unconstitutional order. nose into the letting proverbial like the camel’s was done, tent; impossible keep it is out the rest of retroac- denying the beast. The alternative reasons for argument judge that the trial tive as well ignored setting sup- a factor the amount of current port unavoidably presents. are issues that the order fact, is, or
Whether not section unconstitu- True, dispose tional would not concerns. if the sec- all were, ruled, unconstitutional, judge as the trial it would be immaterial that alternative reasons existed denying Those reasons could be ignored. argument concerning But the current support If would remain. the section turned out to be constitu- tional, might necessary to consider one of the two denying alternative reasons for retroactive support But, of the dispose again, argument case. respect- ing situation, current support would remain. In either might by issues be addressed invoking the judicial economy. interests of
There are better reasons not to do so. The primary
purpose of Rule
preserve stability
is to
in our
legal system;
legislation
when
has been held unconstitu
tional,
provides
the rule
for immediate review
authority
ultimate
in this state on the law. But courts
are
compromise
cautioned not to
stability
first place by declaring legislation
unconstitutional
See,
when the particular
require
case does not
it.
e.g.,
People
Bronco,
ex rel. Waller v. 1990 Ford
158 Ill. 2d
460,
(1994),
464
citing
National Bank v. Lawn
Exchange
(1968).
Bank,
316,
all,
dale National
41 Ill. 2d
321
After
existing legislation enjoys
presumption
of constitu
R.L.,
432,
tional validity. See
v.
158 Ill. 2d
People
(1994).
though facially
And even
unconstitutional
(see
legislation is void when enacted
In re Contest
Election
Governor & Lieutenant
Offices of
(1983))
Governor,
ought
and bad law
stand,
not be allowed to
the fact of the matter
is that
resolving
operate only
courts
in the context of
lawsuits.
a judgment
Whenever
circuit
unconstitutional,
grounded upon finding legislation
parties
bypass
mandate of Rule
forces the
appellate
process.
normal
When the same
grounds,
contains alternative
or even addresses other is
sues,
disposition
largely negative way—
affects —in a
appellate
supreme
the scheme of
arid
court review. This
court,
review,
must
permissive
otherwise
court of
issues,
might
contend with those
ones the court
have
elected not to address in deference to our
appellate
*6
where the issues would have been reviewable as a mat
right.
(outlining
2d R. 315
generally
ter of
See
155 Ill.
granting
various factors material
to
leave to
to
court).
14(b)
case,
unnecessary
In this
it was
to find section
dispose
sup
unconstitutional
to
of Trent’s
though it
port
against Winningham.
claim
And
is the
need for us to
linchpin
jurisdiction,
for our
there is no
ex rel. Sklodowski
People
consider
the issue either. See
Illinois,
citing Sti
117,
(1994),
v. State
of
(1971).
gler
City
v.
Chicago,
Cause with directions. McMORROW, dissenting: JUSTICE Today’s appellate decision watershed marks unprecedented review: dilution of this court’s willingness review a final the circuit an legislation wherein act of was held unconstitu- tional. In what can only unexpected be described as an repudiation legal indefensible the ma- precedent, jority has seen fit to its responsibility judicial abdicate 302(a). Supreme Therefore, review under Court Rule I must respectfully dissent. 29, 1987, April gave
On Trent birth Barbara out of son, Winningham. wedlock to a Soon Alexander after birth, child, Barbara informed father of *7 Ralph Winningham, neither she nor Alexander Nevertheless, required any financial ap assistance. later, four proximately years Barbara instituted a paternity action on Alexander’s behalf in the circuit seeking County, of Cook both retroactive and cur rent child based Barbara these claims sec (Ill. Illinois Act of 1984 Rev. 40, 2514, now codified at 750 ILCS par. Stat. ch. 45/14(b) (West 1992)), in provides pertinent part:
"(b) support payments, The court shall order all child guidelines set forth [the in accordance with determined Marriage Dis- and 505.2 of the Illinois sections (West (750 5/505(a), Marriage 505.2 Act ILCS solution 1992))], *** with the date summons served. to commence any payments may child
The Court order period prior to the commencement be made for action, any public including payments to reimburse granted on behalf of the child.” 750 agency for assistance (West 1992). 45/14(b) ILCS determining provides The Act further whether are to be made payments and to what extent such i.e., child the court support, retroactive any prior period, all facts. These include not shall consider relevant Mar- of the Illinois the factors listed Act, "equi- other Marriage and Dissolution of but riage factors such as: table”
"(1) knowledge cir- prior of the fact and the father’s birth; of the child’s cumstances (2) help willingness raise prior or refusal the father’s child; or
(3) public agency or the the extent to which the mother father of the bringing previously action informed the help in require his attempted or to seek or child’s needs child; raising supporting or (4) public agency did not mother or the the reasons the earlier; action file the
(5) prejudiced father the extent to which the would 45/14(b) bringing ILCS delay in the action.” 750 (West 1992). action, circuit court of this
During the pendency constitutionality the issue of the sponte sua raised result, Illinois At support. As child pursuant intervene granted leave to torney General was 19). matter R. Rule 19 Ill. 2d Court Supreme trial. proceeded Alexander’s denied circuit court
Subsequently,
429 grounds. for child on three request support retroactive First, held that for retroactive petition court an support brought by essence action Barbara was for her than an expenses reimbursement of own rather Accordingly, action Alexander’s behalf. 8(a)(2) untimely
found the claim section under (West 45/8(a)(2) 1992)), Parentage Act ILCS than requires actions on behalf of a other person brought child years to be no later than two after the birth of the child.
Second, that, request the court ruled if for even support timely, retroactive child were equities lay Ralph’s Applying above-quoted favor. used in factors determining whether retroactive child should support awarded, be found that Barbara never in- Ralph formed monetary to Alexander’s needs. The court also found that Barbara attempted never to locate despite Ralph remaining in with Ralph’s contact mother throughout period. the entire
Finally, the circuit court declared a portion sec violative of the federal and state constitutional guarantees of equal Const., XIV; protection. U.S. amend. Ill. I, Const. art. 2. The court found that unmar § ried fathers were treated differently from married fathers in that unwed fathers were liable potentially support retroactive to the birth of the 750 child. ILCS /14(b) (West 1992). finding Contrarily, correspond no ing provision Marriage in the Illinois and Dissolution of (see (West 5/505(a), Marriage Act ILCS 1992)), 505.2 the court believed that fathers who were once married could never liable As the explained, circuit court court finds that there is "[the] no question rational basis in the statute or relation ship right physical, mental, between child’s monetary emotional and parents the child’s justifies unwed fathers to be ordered to retroac pay filing tive child to the date of the prior where the purposes action state of both the Illinois [szc] Marriage Marriage and Dissolution of Act and the Il linois Act are so similar and substantially same, legislation yet married fathers are not Accordingly, to do so.” the court held required 14(b) unconstitutional the extent an permitted *9 support. award of retroactive child sought, As to the other relief the circuit Ralph ordered to current child as pay support mandated 14(b). indicated, in As previously elsewhere section 14(b) part: states in first sentence section relevant support payments, all "The court shall order child guidelines in [the determined accordance with set forth in 505(a) Marriage and sections and 505.2 of the Illinois Dis- Act], Marriage solution of to commence with the date sum- added.) 45/14(b) (Emphasis mons is served.” 750 ILCS 1992). (West 505(a) guidelines graduated a provide further
Section determining used in the minimum amount of schedule involved, as in only child Where one child is case, supporting to contribute party required equal an amount to 20% of his or her net income unless deviating a reason for from expressly the court finds guidelines. factors statutory Some listed include the financial resources child as well and needs of the custodial and financial resources 1992). 5/505(a) (West parent. ILCS In noncustodial case, Ralph an amount less pay ordered large expen- due in part than 20% of his net income attendance Iowa State Univer- associated with his at ses seemingly The court noted that Barbara had sity. also further orders monthly expenses. inflated her own No entered. were held the circuit court
Due to the fact 14(b) invalid, ap- General Attorney and the Barbara Supreme in with directly to this court accordance pealed 2d R. (providing Court Rule Ill. direct final appeals judgments from cases where invalid)). fully statute has been held The matter was parties. briefed Included for our review was (i) finding whether the circuit court erred in the action (ii) holding merits, untimely, Ralph on the favor (iii) declaring part unconstitutional, of section (iv) ordering current child in an amount less 5/505(a) (West guidelines. than the statutory 750 ILCS 1992). Ralph thereafter filed motion strike the cur grounds rent issue ap that was "never pealed by Supreme under [Barbara] Court 302.” Both Barbara the Attorney responded General writing. taking case, After the motion with the we then proceeded argument. to entertain full oral A motion for leave to file supplemental authority response and a thereto during were filed subsequently pendency Thus, our advisement. remaining matter was the issuance of our decision.
However, any forewarning without parties, the majority has now chosen instead embark an upon *10 obtuse, unnecessarily interpretive journey into the otherwise plain simple language 302(a), and of only Rule to conclude that the instant matter should disposed of without reaching any of the presented issues to this Having court. "technically” jurisdiction found that ex (see 424), Ill. at ists 2d the a majority does surpris ingly abrupt jurisdiction about-face and declines simply parties because the have a presented single, more than result, constitutional for issue our review. As the court proceeds in the vacating unusual course of portion that of the circuit court’s order which held section un constitutional —a course is that unusual in that a court will ordinarily dismiss if appeal an the court has jurisdiction. declined
The majority further complicates matters re- by to the manding amputated now order back circuit (once again having after for jurisdiction) declined order, reentering prior the needless task of its as modi majority apparently doing fied. The believes that so it sleight-of-hand long can by judicial —the resuscitate — rights since under Court Rule expired appeal Supreme (134 303). However, majority Ill. 2d R. does not explain why through it ad requires parties jump summarily procedural hoops ditional instead of transfer ring directly appellate the matter court under 365). Ill. 2d A Supreme simple Court Rule 365 R. would, course, of the case of obviate the need transfer second, refiling unnecessary and paying the record filing permit It also a more review expeditious fee. would of how reads Regardless and resolution the issues. one little been opinion, precious accomplished. has shortsightedness of the machinations The upon examination pronounced becomes even more majority support of its the reasons offered According jurisdiction. majority, declination jurisdiction nonproblematic had case "Our would be solely of retroactive because involved denial Complicating mat ruled unconstitutional. the section was alternative, given are the reasons ters aspect case denying concern ing at support.” current 424. is not majority expressly continues "Rule
designed
interlocutory
jurisdiction”
to confer
not be decided.
therefore this
should
ap-
dispositive
Aside from the rather
fact
interlocutory
jurisdiction,
not even involve
peal does
majority
apparently
is somewhat
surprising
silentio,
sub
overrule,
precedent
of recent
prepared to
ap-
ago, this court allowed an
vintage. Only two months
interlocutory
Supreme
under
Court
an
order
peal 302(a),
appealed from
noting
"where the order
*11
unconstitutionality,
this
finding
rests
of a statute’s
302(a),
jurisdiction
court has assumed
under Rule
finality requirement.”
notwithstanding
Desnick v.
Department
Regulation,
of Professional
(1978).
(1996), citing
v. Tully,
Garcia
Nevertheless,
majority
further
that
submits
our
scope of
is
particular
review
not "to be tailored to
is
precisely
sues.” Yet it is
because this
has not
issue,
a particular
i.e.,
tailored
been
the constitution
14(b),
ality
jurisdic
that the majority
declines
("Our jurisdiction
tion. See
The majority asserts existence of non- constitutional issue of current child well support, as grounds the alternative nonconstitutional for disposing of the issue of retroactive support, "affects —in an un- negative necessary largely, way of ap- scheme —the pellate supreme court This argument review.” is predicated court, upon fact review,” "otherwise court of permissive "must contend *12 434 issues, might
with those ones the court elected not have 426, citing to Ill. address.” 172 2d at R. 315. states, "[f]inding As the to be un majority letting like proverbial constitutional here was the tent; done, the it impossible camel’s nose into is Ill. 425. out the rest of the beast.” 172 2d at keep Thus, the not majority apparently because would have the issue of current child reviewed —as denying the bases for retroac- well as nonconstitutional in a peti- tive those issues arrived dressed —had 315, elects tion for leave to under Rule it not It any despite of the issues in this case. does so decide held the fact that a statute has been unconstitutional. permissive However, by incorporating analysis present equation, review under Rule 315 into the 302(a) Rule majority has so limited our review under forth, only that, analysis, hence under neatly packaged, single-issue constitutional case review, by a ripe for our absent determination issue is not that consideration the constitutional result, a by in the case. As foreclosed other issues 302(a) Rule has rendered the full measure of majority anemic. approach to Rule
Unfortunately, a narrow such the realities jurisdiction ignores not the fact litigation, disregards but also multifaceted has, occasions, non- reviewed previous this court collateral issues under constitutional and/or 302(a). rel. v. 1990 People ex Waller example, For Bronco, (1994), major cited Ford by Ill. 2d 1.25 of County of Lake held section ity, the circuit court 1.25) (Ill. 61, par. ch. Stat. the Wildlife Code Rev. directly unconstitutional, State appealed determined, we During appeal, the course court. existed sua basis sponte, Contrary court. affirm the circuit which we could today’s decision, Waller, we accepted jurisdiction ground, ruled on the nonconstitutional declined consid issue, eration the constitutional and affirmed circuit court.
Similarly,
may
the fact that a
some
present
case
is
which,
alone,
sues for
are
standing
our resolution
not
themselves reviewable under Rule
does not mean
presence
ju
those issues thwarts this court’s
they
part
risdiction when
are
of final judgment holding
contrary,
statute unconstitutional. To the
in Brown’s
Furniture,
(1996),
Inc. Wagner,
v.
Perhaps troubling aspect the most of today’s deci- sion, however, is the fact the majority does not by define the standards which this court will exercise its discretion under Rule declining jurisdiction us appeals. majority’s opinion The teaches future consideration; that notion has judicial economy is not summarily by the See 172 Ill. 2d rejected majority. been ("the might at be ad nonconstitutional issues by economy. invoking judicial dressed the interests so”). are to do There better reasons not informs us that fairness to the majority The also nothing parties simply is not a consideration. There an which rejection appeal fair about an eleventh hour parties reentry to the circuit court for sends back order, they may scurry appel- off an so that issues, argued already have the briefed late court to court, fact, again. In argued briefed and before remandment, appellate under very reverse the circuit court’s decision on may well as well as the nonconstitu- current child issue proceed- tional issues and remand the matter for further might undertake ings. point, At that circuit court reentering holding its perfunctory task of parties unconstitutional. could then again court under Rule directly laundered all by a new order that has then been with decision, only today’s issues. Under 14(b). constitutionality of section then will we review the parties are judicial economy If and fairness majority’s permissive not to be the benchmark 302(a), what are the standards under then review its ill-defined discretion this court will exercise *14 guidance no to majority offers appeals? future appeal appel- to whether should litigants they involve more to this court in cases which late court or challenge. impor- More than an isolated constitutional why we should tant, explain fails majority simply of a constitutional issue own review frustrate our on all of judgment entered because circuit court has the issues in the case. explanation only
The absence of such an serves to reasoning logic. highlight majority’s the circular its specifically requires ap- terms peals judgmentl be from a the circuit court. ]” "final words, in In other order for an to lie this court 302(a), must, by rule, under Rule the circuit court enter on all of yet the issues the case. And when so, thereby the circuit court does it our precludes review 302(a), according under Rule majority’s approach, precisely because it has ruled on the other nonconstitu- tional This issues. cannot be so.
Therefore,
reasons,
for all of the
I
join
above
cannot
recognition
in the
subsequent declination
Instead,
jurisdiction.
prior precedent,
consistent with
and in
judicial
the interests of
economy, I would have
and,
case,
decided this appeal
as is the usual
ruled first
See,
e.g., People
issues.
ex rel.
(1994).
Bronco,
Waller v.
Ford
Then,
I respectfully dissent.
CHIEF joins JUSTICE BILANDIC in this dissent.