People v. Brown
2017 IL App (1st) 150070
| Ill. App. Ct. | 2017Background
- In 2010 Barron Lewis was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault and sentenced to 15 years; conviction rested on jury finding penis–vagina contact.
- At trial the State moved in limine to bar evidence of the complainant C.H.’s positive chlamydia test under Illinois’ rape‑shield statute; the court excluded it.
- Defense counsel argued to admit evidence that Lewis tested negative for chlamydia to show non‑transmission and support defense that no intercourse occurred; the court nonetheless excluded the complainant’s result.
- Lewis later filed a pro se postconviction petition asserting ineffective assistance: trial counsel failed to investigate/present Lewis’s negative chlamydia results (and other claims later abandoned).
- The trial court summarily dismissed the petition as frivolous and without merit; Lewis appealed the first‑stage dismissal.
Issues
| Issue | People’s Argument | Lewis’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether res judicata bars the postconviction claim | The direct appeal already rejected admitting complainant’s chlamydia result, so this claim is same in different form | The claim is distinct: it challenges trial counsel’s failure to investigate/present Lewis’s own negative test results | Not barred by res judicata; claim is distinct from direct‑appeal issue |
| Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate/present Lewis’s negative chlamydia tests | Counsel cannot be ineffective for not pursuing a meritless theory; no arguable prejudice | Counsel failed to investigate or introduce documentary/medical proof of Lewis’s negative tests to rebut admissibility ruling | No — the record shows counsel raised Lewis’s negative status at the in limine hearing and omission was not deficient |
| Whether the negative test evidence (if offered) was constitutionally required or would have been admissible despite rape‑shield law | Admission would be speculative, marginally relevant, and outweighed by rape‑shield protections | Negative test would be direct medical evidence undermining C.H.’s claim and required under constitutional right to present a defense | No — evidence was marginally probative given transmission rates, condom uncertainty, and prejudice; rape‑shield exclusion was proper absent stronger proof |
| Whether Lewis showed prejudice from counsel’s alleged failure (Strickland prejudice) | Strong trial evidence of guilt; speculative medical evidence would not likely change outcome | Introduction of Lewis’s negative tests would reasonably probably change verdict | No — given corroborating testimony, texts, physical evidence and speculative medical link, no arguable prejudice shown |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (ineffective assistance two‑prong standard)
- People v. Santos, 211 Ill. 2d 395 (rape‑shield statute and limits on admitting complainant’s sexual history)
- People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1 (first‑stage postconviction pleading standard)
- People v. Beaman, 229 Ill. 2d 56 (Post‑Conviction Hearing Act overview)
- People v. Edwards, 195 Ill. 2d 142 (counsel not ineffective for pursuing fruitless arguments)
- Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (constitutional right to present a meaningful defense)