People v. Brooks, 233 Cal. Rptr. 3d 606

Defendant Justin Brooks was convicted by a jury of first‑degree residential burglary for a May 25, 2015 break‑in of Mona Greathouse's home in Concord; a latent fingerprint from broken window glass was forensically matched to Brooks.
Brooks made post‑identification admissions to police acknowledging entering the home, pulling glass from the window, being high on meth, and possessing the victim’s iPad earlier.
The trial court admitted evidence of two uncharged prior burglaries (April 2 and April 6, 2012) to prove intent, common plan, and identity over Brooks’s objections.
In closing and rebuttal the prosecutor repeatedly implied more than one fingerprint expert had verified the identification; defense objected but objections were overruled.
At sentencing the court ordered $2,351.34 in direct victim restitution, which included amounts for installation of a home alarm and replacement/adjustment of locks and deadbolts; Brooks argued on appeal restitution for security improvements is authorized only when the conviction is for a “violent felony.”

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Admissibility of uncharged prior burglaries and impact of prosecutorial rebuttal comments	Prior acts were admissible to show intent, common plan, and identity; prosecution relied on both fingerprint evidence and prior acts.	Admission of uncharged prior crimes and prosecutor’s repeated suggestion of multiple expert confirmations was prejudicial and warranted reversal.	Even if admission and remarks were erroneous/misconduct, any prejudice was minimal because independent, definitive fingerprint identification and defendant’s admissions linked Brooks to the crime; conviction affirmed.
Restitution for security improvements when conviction is for nonviolent felony	The People (and statute) permit restitution for economic losses proved to result from the defendant’s conduct; listed items in §1202.4(f)(3) are illustrative and do not preclude awards for nonviolent felonies.	Brooks argued §1202.4(f)(3)(J) expressly conditions restitution for security installation on a conviction for a “violent felony,” so restitution for security costs after a nonviolent felony is barred (expressio unius).	The court rejected Brooks’s narrow reading: §1202.4(f) is broad and constitutional in origin; subsection (f)(3)(J) sets a floor for violent felonies but does not preclude restitution for security improvements after nonviolent felonies; restitution award not precluded as a matter of law.

Giordano v. Superior Court, 42 Cal.4th 644 (explains constitutional origins of California restitution rights and consolidation into §1202.4)
Henderson v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.App.5th 467 (holds trial court may award restitution for security systems regardless of crime of conviction)
Salas v. Superior Court, 9 Cal.App.5th 736 (contrasting authority that construed §1202.4(f)(3)(J) narrowly)
Moore v. Superior Court, 177 Cal.App.4th 1229 (permits restitution for economic losses not specifically enumerated if shown to result from defendant’s conduct)
McCarthy v. Superior Court, 244 Cal.App.4th 1096 (supports enlarging restitution availability and rejecting implied prohibitions)