People v. Bonan
2014 COA 156
Colo. Ct. App.2014Background
- In 1988 Philip Michael Bonan was tried and convicted of multiple counts of sexual assault on children and related assault charges based on allegations by his ex‑girlfriend’s children; experts for the prosecution testified that behavioral indicators supported findings of sexual abuse.
- Bonan repeatedly sought postconviction relief claiming newly discovered scientific research undermined the reliability of children’s statements and the prosecution experts’ methods; he filed multiple Crim. P. 35(c) (and related) motions between 1998 and 2011.
- Trial and intermediate courts denied relief as untimely, successive, or lacking an evidentiary hearing; earlier appeals partially remanded ineffective‑assistance claims but rejected the newly discovered evidence theory.
- In 2011 Bonan again asserted that accumulating psychological studies showed suggestive interviewing and behavioral indicators can produce false reports, characterizing those studies as newly discovered evidence warranting a new trial.
- The trial court denied the 2011 motion as successive and time‑barred; the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed, holding academic theories in research are not "new evidence" unless applied to the trial evidence by an expert and do not excuse untimely or successive filings.
Issues
| Issue | Bonan's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timeliness of Crim. P. 35(c) motion | The research relied upon did not exist within the 3‑year statutory period, so delay is justified until an "unassailable mass" of studies accumulated | Bonan failed to plead justifiable excuse or excusable neglect under §16‑5‑402 and Wiedemer | Motion untimely; Bonan did not establish justifiable excuse or excusable neglect |
| Whether academic research constitutes "new evidence" | Psychological studies showing suggestive interviewing and unreliable behavioral indicators are newly discovered evidence undermining the experts who testified at trial | Theories in academic studies are not evidence unless applied to the case by an expert who links the theory to the actual trial evidence | Academic theories alone are not "new evidence"; they must be applied to existing evidence to qualify |
| Successive‑claims bar | Waiting to amass studies was reasonable; allowing each new study to trigger relief is necessary | Allowing every new research finding to reopen convictions would permit repeated successive motions; prior rulings already addressed similar claims | Motion properly denied as successive; studies were not newly discoverable evidence under Crim. P. 35(c) |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Wiedemer, 852 P.2d 424 (Colo. 1993) (factors for excusable neglect/justifiable excuse for untimely Crim. P. 35(c) filings)
- People v. Muniz, 667 P.2d 1377 (Colo. 1983) (standards for newly discovered evidence in Crim. P. 35(c))
- State Dep't of Labor & Emp't v. Esser, 30 P.3d 189 (Colo. 2001) (definition of "evidence" for evidentiary purposes)
- People v. Close, 180 P.3d 1015 (Colo. 2008) (standard of review for timeliness determinations)
- People v. Shreck, 22 P.3d 68 (Colo. 2001) (reliability requirement for expert scientific testimony under CRE 702)
- Commonwealth v. LeFave, 714 N.E.2d 805 (Mass. 1999) (academic studies by themselves are not newly discovered evidence)
- Schwab v. State, 969 So.2d 318 (Fla. 2007) (declining to treat new research articles as newly discovered evidence)