People v. Boles
2011 WL 3851648
Colo. Ct. App.2011Background
- Defendant Giel Boles, online in an adult chat room, communicated with an undercover agent posing as a 14-year-old girl named Trista for over a month with numerous sexual exchanges.
- Defendant sent a sexual joke with a pornographic image and repeatedly acknowledged Trista’s stated age; they discussed meeting in person and travel logistics from Denver to Colorado Springs.
- Detective confirmed defendant’s identity via Internet and phone records; defendant was charged with Internet luring of a child, obscenity, and criminal attempt to commit Internet sexual exploitation of a child.
- Defendant moved to dismiss the luring and obscenity charges as unconstitutional; the trial court denied the motions in two written orders.
- At trial, the detective testified in detail; the communications were admitted; defendant claimed the activity was role-play with an adult, and an expert testified the transcripts reflected fantasy role-play.
- Jury convicted defendant of criminal attempt to commit Internet sexual exploitation of a child; defendant argued insufficiency of the evidence and appellate courts addressed multiple constitutional challenges.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Constitutionality of the Internet luring statute | Statute is overbroad and violates First Amendment protections. | Statute chills protected speech and is vague. | Statute not overbroad or vague; constitutional. |
| As-applied challenge to the luring statute | Constitutional limits should not extend to this conduct as applied to defendant. | Statements describing explicit sexual conduct to a minor were not obscene. | Evidence supports statute’s application; not unconstitutional as applied. |
| Vagueness of the luring statute | Term 'in connection with' is vague and susceptible to misinterpretation. | Language is impermissibly vague as to scope and meaning. | Statute easily understood; not vague. |
| Dormant Commerce Clause | Regulation of Internet activity burdens interstate commerce. | Regulation unnecessarily burdens interstate commerce without legitimate local purpose. | Statute does not discriminate against or unduly burden interstate commerce. |
| Sufficiency of evidence for substantial step toward Internet sexual exploitation | Defendant’s claimed role-play negates a substantial step toward exploitation. | Defendant believed it was role-play and not intended to meet; no substantial step. | Evidence, viewed in light most favorable to the prosecution, supports a substantial step. |
| Vagueness of obscenity statute | Promote may be vague and open to multiple interpretations. | Promote’s definitions render the statute vague. | Promote is sufficiently definite within statutory context; not void for vagueness. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Hickman, 988 P.2d 628 (Colo.1999) (overbreadth standard for First Amendment challenges)
- People v. Ford, 773 P.2d 1059 (Colo.1989) (Miller test context and obscenity standard references)
- New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (U.S. 1982) (obscenity standards adjusted for child exploitation)
- State v. Backlund, 672 N.W.2d 431 (N.D.2003) (dormant Commerce Clause and Internet regulation discussion)
- Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (U.S. 1997) (overbreadth and speech restrictions on communications via the Internet)