[¶ 1] Craig Backlund appealed from a conviction entered upon a conditional guilty plea to the charge of luring a minor by computer in violation of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-20-05.1. We hold North Dakota had jurisdiction to prosecute Backlund, N.D.C.C. § 12.1-20-05.1 does not violate the Commerce Clause or the First Amendment, and the registration and notification provisions of N.D^C.C. § 12.1-32-15 do not violate procedural due process or double jeopardy. We affirm.
I
[¶ 2] In March 2002, Backlund, using the screen name “baekdaddyO”, participated in an Internet chatroom from his computer in Moorhead, Minnesota. He exchanged computer messages containing sexual references with an individual using the screen name “Fargobabe22.” “Fargo-babe22” identified herself as a 14-year-old girl, but was actually West Fargo police officer A1 Schmidt. Backlund solicited “Fargobabe22” to engage in a sexual act and offered to pick her up and bring her home when they were done. Backlund arranged to meet “Fargobabe22” at a convenience store in West Fargo. The police observed Backlund at the designated convenience store. He was arrested in West Fargo and admitted he was the person who had been communicating with “Fargo-babe22.”
[¶ 3] Backlund was charged with luring a minor by computer in violation of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-20-05.1. The trial court rejected Backlund’s pretrial jurisdictional and constitutional challenges to the prosecution, and he entered a conditional guilty plea under N.D.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(2). Back-lund appealed from the resulting conviction.
II
[¶ 4] Our analysis of the issues raised by Backlund requires a brief description of the Internet, which:
is a decentralized, global, and interactive communications medium that connects individuals and commercial, as well as, nonprofit and public interest groups. Users disseminate and maintain dialogues about a wide range of information, in the form of text, images, sound, and video through cyberspace. The content of the disseminated information is wide-ranging and includes academic essays, art, music, humor, literature, medi *434 cal information, and sexually explicit material. The Internet connects millions of residents from over 150 countries through individual computers as well as massive networks. Chat rooms, online discussion groups, newsgroups, and the World Wide Web are just some of the Internet methods by which information is exchanged. Users are frequently anonymous, which allows for free exchange of information and ideas. Messages are sent to an electronic address, rather than a geographic address and users frequently have no idea in what country or state a message originates or terminates. Similarly, it is not always technologically possible for a user to determine the age of a user who is accessing the communications.
Annot.,
Validity of State Statutes and Administrative Regulations Regulating Internet Communications Under Commerce Clause and First Amendment of Federal Constitution,
[¶ 5] In 2001 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 134, § 4, the North Dakota Legislature enacted N.D.C.C. § 12.1-20-05.1, which provides:
An adult is guilty of luring minors by computer when:
1.The adult knows the character and content of a communication that, in whole or in part, implicitly or explicitly discusses or depicts actual or simulated nudity, sexual acts, sexual contact, sadomasochistic abuse, or other sexual performances and uses any computer communication system that allows the input, output, examination, or transfer of computer data or computer programs from one computer to another to initiate or engage in such communication with a person the adult believes to be a minor; and
2. By means of that communication the adult importunes, invites, or induces a person the adult believes to be a minor to engage in sexual acts or to have sexual contact with the adult, or to engage in a sexual performance, obscene sexual performance, or sexual conduct for the adult’s benefit, satisfaction, lust, passions, or sexual desires.
3. A violation of this section is a class A misdemeanor, but if the adult is twenty-two years of age or older or the adult reasonably believes the minor is under the age of fifteen, violation of this section is a class C felony.
As originally introduced, N.D.C.C. § 12.1-20-05.1 proscribed luring “a minor,” but was amended during the legislative process to criminalize luring “a person the adult believes to be a minor” to deal with situations where minors misrepresent their age to adults engaged in Internet solicitation of sexual acts. Hearing on S.B.2035 Before Senate Judiciary Committee, 57th N.D. Legis. Sess. (Jan. 16, 2001) (oral testimony of Ladd Erickson, Assistant Morton County State’s Attorney).
[¶ 6] Under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-20-05.1, an adult is guilty of luring a minor by computer when (1) the adult knows the character and content of a communication that explicitly or implicitly discusses or depicts actual or simulated nudity, sexual acts, sexual contact, sadomasochistic abuse, or other sexual performances, 2) the adult uses any computer communication system to initiate or engage in such communication with a person the adult believes to be a minor, and (3) the adult’s communication importunes, invites, or induces the person the adult believes to be a minor to engage in sexu&l acts or to have sexual contact with the adult, or to engage in a sexual performance or sexual conduct
*435
for the adult’s benefit, satisfaction, lust, passions, or sexual desires. Section 12.1-20-05.1, N.D.C.C. requires the adult to “know” the character and content of the communication that explicitly or implicitly discusses or depicts actual or simulated nudity, sexual acts, or sexual contact, but does not explicitly describe the degree of culpability necessary for the adult’s use of the computer system to engage in the communication, or for the adult’s importuning, inviting, or inducing the person the adult believes to be a minor. Under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-02-02(2), if a statute defining a crime does not specify any culpability and does not provide explicitly that a person may be guilty without culpability, the required culpability is “willfully,” which is defined in N.D.C.C. § 12.1-02-02(l)(e) as engaging in conduct intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly. Section 12.1-20-05.1, N.D.C.C., does not explicitly specify it is a strict liability offense, and the requisite culpability for the conduct proscribed by that statute is “willfully.”
See State v. Knowels,
[¶ 7] We therefore construe N.D.C.C. § 12.1-20-05.1 to provide that an adult is guilty of luring a minor by computer when (1) the adult knows the character and content of a communication that implicitly or explicitly discusses or depicts actual or simulated nudity, sexual acts, sexual contact, sadomasochistic abuse, or other sexual performances, (2) the adult willfully uses any computer communication system to initiate or engage in such communication with a person the adult believes to be a minor, and (3) by means of that communication, the adult willfully importunes, invites, or induces the person the adult believes to be a minor to engage in sexual acts or have sexual contact with the adult, or to engage in a sexual performance, obscene sexual performance, or sexual conduct for the adult’s benefit, satisfaction, lust, passions, or sexual desires. We address the issues raised by Backlund under that interpretation of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-20-05.1.
Ill
[¶ 8] Backlund argues North Dakota lacks jurisdiction to prosecute him under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-20-05.1 because he committed the offense at his computer in Moorhead, Minnesota. Backlund argues North Dakota cannot criminalize lawful Minnesota speech simply because one of the innumerable people able to access the Internet happens to be a North Dakota police officer. He argues the language of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-20-05.1 indicates a crime is committed, if at all, at the keyboard and no further overt acts are required by the statute.
[¶ 9] In
People v. Ruppenthal,
Although the offense of solicitation is complete upon the utterance of words of solicitation, no solicitation can occur unless the offending words are heard by another person. Defendant attempted to solicit sexual activity with a girl under the age of 17 living in Illinois, and he *436 traveled to Illinois with the admitted intent of engaging in the sexual acts. The result of defendant’s solicitation brought him within Illinois’ borders. As with the telephone harassment discussed in [People v.]Baker [205 Ill. Dec. 335 ,643 N.E.2d 286 (1994)], Illinois has a valid public interest in protecting minor children in this state from individuals who seek underage sexual partners using the Internet. We find that Illinois had proper jurisdiction over this case.
Id. at 1008.
[¶ 10] Under N.D.R.Crim. P. 18, criminal prosecutions shall be heard in the county in which the offense was committed, except as otherwise provided by law or the rules of criminal procedure. Under N.D.C.C. § 29-03-01.1, a person who, while outside this state, solicits criminal action within this state and is thereafter found in this state may be prosecuted under North Dakota law.
[¶ 11] Although Backlund argues N.D.C.C. § 29-03-01.1 clearly does not apply to the conduct which N.D.C.C. § 12.1-20-05.1 proscribes, Backlund pled guilty to “importuning], invit[ing], or inducting]” a person he believed to be a minor to engage in a sexual act with him. Backlund importuned, invited, or induced “Fargobabe22” while he was at his computer in Moorhead, and “Fargobabe22” received the communication at a computer in West Fargo.
Cf. Wagner v. Miskin,
IV
[¶ 12] Relying on
American Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki,
[¶ 13] The Commerce Clause, U.S. Const, art. I, § 8, cl. 3, grants Congress the power “[t]o regulate interstate commerce ... among the several States” to prevent the economic balkanization that had plagued the colonies and the states under the Articles of Confederation.
D.D.I., Inc. v. State ex rel. Clayburgh,
[¶ 14] In
Pataki,
First, the Act represents an unconstitutional projection of New York law into conduct that occurs wholly outside New York. Second, the Act is invalid because although protecting children from indecent material is a legitimate and indisputably worthy subject of state legislation, the burdens on interstate .commerce resulting from the Act clearly exceed any local benefit derived from it. Finally, the Internet is one of those areas of commerce that must be marked off as a national preserve to protect users from inconsistent legislation that, taken to its most extreme, could paralyze development of the Internet altogether. Thus, the Commerce Clause ordains that only Congress can legislate in this area, subject, of course, to whatever limitations other provisions of the Constitution (such as the First Amendment) may require.
Pataki, however, did not involve a challenge to N.Y. Penal Law § 235.22, a New York statute that prohibited adults from using the Internet to lure children into sexual contact. Pataki, at 179.
[¶ 15] In
People v. Foley,
Penal Law § 235.22 does not discriminate against or burden interstate trade; it regulates the conduct of individuals who intend to use the Internet to endanger the welfare of children. Although Penal Law § 235.22 contains some of the same language as the provision in Penal Law § 235.21(3) struck down in [Pa- taki], the statute challenged here contains the additional “luring” prong. We are hard pressed to ascertain any legitimate commerce that is derived from the intentional transmission of sexually graphic images to minors for the purpose of luring them into sexual activity. Indeed, the conduct sought to be sanctioned by Penal Law § 235.22 is of the sort that deserves no “economic” protection (see, New York v. Ferber, supra,458 U.S. 747 , 761-762,102 S.Ct. 3348 ,73 L.Ed.2d 1113 ). Thus, we conclude that Penal Law § 235.22 is a valid exercise of the State’s general police powers (see Lewis v. BT Inv. Mgrs.,447 U.S. 27 , 36,100 S.Ct. 2009 ,64 L.Ed.2d 702 ).
[¶ 16] In
People v. Hsu,
Under the Pike [v. Bruce Church, Inc.,397 U.S. 137 ,90 S.Ct. 844 ,25 L.Ed.2d 174 (1970) balancing] test, section 288.2, subdivision (b) does not violate the commerce clause. Statutes affecting public safety carry a strong presumption of validity (Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines (1959)359 U.S. 520 , 524,79 S.Ct. 962 ,3 L.Ed.2d 1003 ), and the definition and enforcement of criminal 'laws lie primarily with states. (United States v. Lopez (1995)514 U.S. 549 , 561, fn. 3,115 S.Ct. 1624 ,131 L.Ed.2d 626 .) States have a compelling interest in protecting minors from harm generally and certainly from being seduced to engage in sexual activities. (See Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC (1989)492 U.S. 115 , 126,109 S.Ct. 2829 ,106 L.Ed.2d 93 (Sable); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court (1982)457 U.S. 596 , 607,102 S.Ct. 2613 ,73 L.Ed.2d 248 .) Conversely, it is difficult to. conceive of any legitimate *438 commerce that would be burdened by penalizing the transmission of harmful sexual material to known minors in order to seduce them. To the extent section 288.2, subdivision (b) may affect interstate commerce, its effect is incidental at best and far outweighed by the state’s abiding interest in preventing harm to minors.
[¶ 17] Section 12.1-20-05.1, N.D.C.C. includes both a dissemination prong in subsection (1) and a luring prong in subsection (2), and, in that respect, is similar to the statutes involved in Foley and Hsu. We agree with the statements in Foley and Hsu that it is difficult to ascertain any legitimate commerce that is derived from the willful transmission of explicit or implicit sexual communications to a person believed to be a minor in order to willfully lure that person into sexual activity. We conclude N.D.C.C. § 12.1-20-05.1 does not violate the Commerce Clause.
V
[¶ 18] Backhand argues N.D.C.C. § 12.1-20-05.1 violates the free speech provisions of the federal and state constitutions. Relying on
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,
[¶ 19] The First Amendment is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, and precludes states from enacting laws “abridging the freedom of speech.”
Bolinske v. North Dakota State Fair Ass’n,
[¶ 20] In
Ashcroft,
[¶ 21] In
Reno,
[¶ 22] Although both
Ashcroft
and
Reno
involved First Amendment challenges to statutes that prohibited the dissemination or production of certain materials, neither case involved challenges to statutes that prohibited speech used to lure a minor to engage in sexual acts. In
Foley,
“A person is guilty of disseminating indecent material to minors in the first degree when:
“1. Knowing the character and content of the communication which, in whole or in part, depicts actual or simulated nudity, sexual conduct or sado-masochistic abuse, and which is harmful to minors, he intentionally uses any computer communication system allowing the input, output, examination or transfer, of computer data or computer programs from one computer to another, to initiate or engage in such communication with a person who is a minor, and
“2. By means of such communication he importunes, invites or induces a minor to engage in sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse, or sexual contact with him, or to engage in a sexual performance, obscene sexual performance, or sexual conduct for his benefit.
[¶ 23] The New York Court of Appeals distinguished N.Y. Penal Law § 235.22 from the two provisions of the Communications Decency Act at issue in
Reno,
because the New York statute was not directed solely at the mere transmission of communications over the Internet and included an additional requirement for luring conduct, which the court concluded was distinguishable from pure speech.
Foley,
[¶ 24] The court rejected the defendant’s argument the statute affected constitutionally protected speech on the Internet because the statute did not require individuals to know they were communicating with a minor.
Foley,
[¶ 25] The court also rejected the defendant’s argument the statute was an unconstitutional content-based restriction, concluding the statute curtailed the use of speech in a way which did not merit First Amendment protection and was a carefully
*440
tailored means of serving a compelling state interest.
Foley,
[¶ 26] Other courts have considered comparable luring statutes and concluded the First Amendment does not protect speech used in conjunction with the conduct of child solicitation.
See United States v. Bailey,
[¶ 27] In
Powell,
The First Amendment guarantees the right to freedom of expression; however, the Supreme Court has stated, “[i]t rarely has been suggested that the constitutional freedom for speech and press extends its immunity to speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute. We reject the contention now.” Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.,336 U.S. 490 , 498,69 S.Ct. 684 ,93 L.Ed. 834 (1949).
In Bailey,228 F.3d at 639 , the court upheld 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), stating:
The statute only applies to those who “knowingly” persuade or entice, or attempt to persuade or entice, minors. Thus, it only affects those who intend to target minors: it does not punish those who inadvertently speak with minors or who, as in Reno, post messages for all internet users, either adults or children, to seek out and read at their discretion. Any limited or incidental effect on speech does not infringe on any constitutionally protected rights of adults. Put another way, the Defendant simply does not have a First Amendment right to attempt to persuade minors to engage in illegal sex acts.
[¶ 28] In
Ruppenthal,
It would be impossible for the act of solicitation to occur without the exchange of words between offender and victim, and defendant’s “beliefs” and his discussions with children or those he believes to be children regarding sexual activity do not rise to the level of constitutionally protected speech. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Powell, ...315 Ill.App.3d 1136 ,248 Ill.Dec. 799 ,735 N.E.2d 119 , 126-27 (2000); People v. Bailey, ...167 Ill.2d 210 ,212 Ill.Dec. 608 ,657 N.E.2d 953 , 961 (1995) (in stalking case, “[wjhere speech is an integral part of unlawful conduct, it has no constitutional protection”); People v. Williams, ...133 Ill.2d 449 ,141 Ill.Dec. 444 ,551 N.E.2d 631 , 634 (1990) (in case involving child abduction statute, the State may “validly proscribe the luring or attempted luring of children into motor vehicles for criminal purposes, although that attempt may involve speech”).
The Williams court further discussed the necessarily inchoate nature of the child abduction statute:
“[T]he luring or attempted luring of a child into an automobile for a criminal purpose is in no way protected by the first amendment.... Once a child is taken into a vehicle and whisked away by a person harboring a criminal motive, it becomes exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, for law enforcement personnel to intervene for the protection of the child. The State undoubtedly has broad powers to avert such potentially dangerous situations.” Williams, ...141 Ill.Dec. 444 ,551 N.E.2d at 634 .
That principle also can be applied to the indecent solicitation statute. Furthermore, we reject defendant’s protests that he was the victim of a- Cook County sheriffs department “thought patrol” that polices beliefs that defendant contends are “beyond the reach of the legislature.” Officers did not invade defendant’s home during his on-line conversation with “Stacy” and arrest him based upon the contents of that conversation. Indeed, hundreds of similarly inappropriate exchanges undoubtedly take place every day on the Internet. Those discussions, although disturbing, are not illegal if not acted upon. Defendant, however, demonstrated his intent to commit the sexual acts by traveling to Illinois to meet “Stacy,” whom he believed to be under the age of 17, at an arranged time and place.
Ruppenthal,
[¶ 29] The common thread in the cases involving First Amendment challenges to luring statutes is that freedom of speech does not extend to speech used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute. In
Ashcroft,
[¶ 30] Here, we have construed N.D.C.C. § 12.1-20-05.1 to mean an adult is guilty of luring a minor by computer when (1) the adult knows the character and content of a communication that explicitly or implicitly discusses or depicts actual or simulated nudity, sexual acts, sexual contact, sadomasochistic abuse, or other sexual performances, (2) the adult willfully uses any computer communication system to initiate or engage in such communication with a person the adult believes to be a minor, and (3) by means of that communication, the adult willfully importunes, invites, or induces the person the adult believes to be a minor to engage in sexual acts or have sexual contact with the adult, or to engage in a sexual performance, obscene sexual performance, or sexual conduct for the adult’s benefit, satisfaction, lust, passions, or sexual desires. Section 12.1-20-05.1, N.D.C.C., is geared toward an adult’s willful solicitation of sexual acts or sexual contact with a person believed to be a minor, and North Dakota law separately prohibits sexual contact or sexual acts with a minor.
See e.g.,
N.D.C.C. §§ 12.1-20-03; 12.1-20-04; 12.1-20-05; and 12.1-20-07. Merely because Backlund’s communications were transmitted to an adult does not negate his belief he was communicating with a minor, which is an aspect of the culpability defined by the statute.
See Ruppenthal,
[¶ 31] Backhand attempts to distinguish Foley by relying on differences between the New York statute and N.D.C.C. § 12.1-20-05.1. Backhand argues N.D.C.C. § 12.1-20-05.1 “does not simply prohibit ‘depictions’ of certain sexual activity, but rather prohibits ‘implicit or explicit discussions’ ” of sexual activity, and that distinction implicates pure speech. Backhand argues N.D.C.C. § 12.1-20-05.1 “allows a charge to be filed based upon ‘pure’ speech, merely a ‘discussion’ of sexual activity, as opposed to the New York statute’s requirement that a depiction, or picture, be forwarded in connection with the communications.”
[¶ 32] Section 12.1-20-05.1, N.D.C.C. is not identical to the New York statute in
Foley.
Contrary to BacMund’s assertion, however, N.D.C.C. § 12.1-20-05.1, as we have construed it, proscribes the willful solicitation of a person believed to be a minor to engage in a sexual act or sexual contact and does not authorize a criminal charge to be filed based upon “poore” speech. Rather, N.D.C.C. § 12.1-20-05.1, like the statutes at issue in
Foley, Ruppenthal, Powell,
and
Bailey,
is premised on criminalizing “luring” conduct and is “a preemptive strike against sexual abuse of children by creating criminal liability for
conduct
directed toward the ultimate acts of abuse.”
Foley,
V
[¶ 33] Relying on the dissent in
State v. Burr,
[¶ 34] Under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-15(2)(a), a court shall require an individual to register with the appropriate law enforcement entity if the individual “[h]as pled guilty ... to, or been found guilty as a felonious sexual offender.” As relevant to this case, a person who has pled guilty to a violation of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-20-05.1 is a “sexual offender” under N.D.C.C. § 12.1 — 32—15(l)(e). Other provisions authorize the court to deviate from requiring an individual to register in certain circumstances. See N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-15(2)(b), (c), and (d). Backlund pled guilty to a felony charge of violating N.D.C.C. § 12.1-20-05.1, and he is subject to mandatory registration for ten years under N.D.C.C. § 12.1 — 32—15 (2) (a) and (8)(a). Under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-15(12) the attorney general shall develop guidelines for the risk assessment of sexual offenders who are required to register, with either a low-risk, moderate-risk, or high-risk assigned to each offender. Under N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-15(13), law enforcement agencies must disclose registration information to the public if the individual is assessed as moderate-risk or high-risk and the agency determines that disclosure of the conviction and registration information is necessary for public protection. However, upon request law enforcement agencies may release conviction and registration information regarding low-risk, moderate-risk, or high-risk offenders. N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-15(13).
A
[¶ 35] In
Burr,
[¶ 36] Backlund is subject to mandatory registration under N.D.C.C. § 12.1 — 32—15(l)(e) and (2)(a), and his criminal conviction effectively provided him with procedural due process.
See Connecticut Dep’t. of Pub. Safety v. Doe,
[¶ 37] Although Backlund raised a procedural due process argument in the trial court, he did not marshal a separate substantive due process argument in that court. Other than conclusory claims that North Dakota’s statutory scheme violates his substantive due process rights, Back-lund has not developed a substantive due process challenge to N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-15 in this Court.
See, e.g., Reno v. Flores,
*444
[¶ 38] We have said a party raising a constitutional challenge “should bring up the heavy artillery or forego the attack entirely.”
State v. Norman,
B
[¶ 39] Backlund also argues the cumulative effect of the registration and notification requirements are punitive and violate double jeopardy.
[¶ 40] The double jeopardy clause, found in the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, protects against successive prosecutions and punishments for the same criminal offense.
State v. Kelly,
[¶ 41] Relying on the dissent in
Burr,
[¶ 42] Backlund was ordered to register as a sexual offender and subject to the notification requirements in the context of an original criminal sentence for violating N.D.C.C. § 12.1-20-05.1. The registration requirement was part and parcel of the conviction for the singular offense of luring a minor by computer and was not a separate proceeding.
See State v. Kelly,
VII
[¶ 43] We affirm Backhand's conviction.