People v. Blackwell
A144424M
| Cal. Ct. App. | Sep 29, 2016Background
- In 2007, 17‑year‑old Bradley Blackwell participated in a burglary/attempted robbery in which Uriel Carreno was shot and killed; Blackwell was directly filed as an adult.
- A jury convicted Blackwell of first‑degree murder with robbery/burglary special circumstances; he was originally sentenced to LWOP and after appellate remand under Miller v. Alabama the trial court again resentenced him to LWOP.
- Evidence included admissions to companions and his girlfriend that he shot the victim, forensic evidence tying a single 9mm weapon to the five wounds, concealment/burial of clothing and ammunition, and a pattern of juvenile offenses involving weapons.
- The jury rejected allegations that Blackwell personally used and intentionally discharged a firearm; nevertheless the jury found the special‑circumstance predicate for LWOP.
- At resentencing the trial court considered Miller/Gutierrez factors and Blackwell’s postconviction CDCR records, concluded he was among the rare juveniles reflecting "irreparable corruption," and exercised its discretion to impose LWOP.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Blackwell) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Apprendi requires a jury finding of "irreparable corruption" before a juvenile can receive LWOP | No — once jury finds first‑degree murder with special circumstances, LWOP is the statutory maximum and the judge may exercise sentencing discretion and consider Miller factors | Apprendi and Miller/Graham require a jury finding before imposition of LWOP (judge cannot elevate beyond 25‑to‑life absent jury finding) | Court: No. Apprendi does not apply; section 190.5(b) and Gutierrez leave judge discretion to impose LWOP after considering youth factors. |
| Whether Miller/Graham categorically bar LWOP for juveniles who did not personally kill or intend to kill | LWOP can be imposed after individualized sentencing considering youth; Miller does not create a categorical bar beyond Graham’s nonhomicide rule | Graham’s reasoning should extend so juveniles who did not kill or intend to kill cannot constitutionally receive LWOP | Court: Declined to extend Graham. Miller requires individualized consideration but does not categorically forbid LWOP for non‑killer/ non‑intender juveniles. |
| Whether resentencing judge improperly relied on factual findings inconsistent with jury acquittal on firearm use, violating Sixth Amendment | Judge may consider evidence (including conduct underlying acquitted allegations) in exercising sentencing discretion | Judge impermissibly "elevated" punishment based on his belief Blackwell was the shooter despite jury acquittal on firearm use | Court: No Sixth Amendment violation. Sentencing factfinding within statutory range may rely on preponderance evidence and need not duplicate jury findings; Towne/Coley support judge consideration. |
| Whether trial court abused discretion or violated Miller by (a) overweighting offense gravity vs youth and (b) considering postconviction CDCR records | Weighting and consideration of postconviction conduct were proper; CDCR records relevant to rehabilitation prospects | Court gave insufficient weight to youth; CDCR records improperly considered | Court: No abuse of discretion. Court properly weighed Miller/Gutierrez factors, considered postconviction conduct as relevant to rehabilitation, and reasonably imposed LWOP. |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory LWOP for juveniles violates Eighth Amendment; individualized sentencing required)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (LWOP unconstitutional for juvenile nonhomicide offenders)
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (death penalty unconstitutional for offenders who were juveniles at time of crime)
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (any fact increasing penalty beyond statutory maximum must be submitted to jury)
- Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (jury must find aggravating facts that make defendant death‑eligible)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016) (Miller announced substantive rule with retroactive effect; LWOP unconstitutional for most juvenile offenders)
- Gutierrez, People v., 58 Cal.4th 1354 (2014) (Cal. Supreme Court: §190.5(b) gives trial court discretion to impose LWOP or 25‑to‑life and requires Miller factors be considered)
- Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160 (2009) (Apprendi does not displace traditional sentencing discretion about consecutive terms)
- Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007) (California’s prior determinate sentencing law violated Sixth Amendment as it allowed judge to increase sentence based on facts not found by jury)
- Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S. 376 (1986) (Eighth Amendment proportionality limits need not be enforced by jury; judge may make findings relevant to disproportionality)