People v. Blackwell
3 Cal. App. 5th 166
| Cal. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- In 2007, 17-year-old Bradley Blackwell participated in a burglary/attempted robbery during which Uriel Carreno was shot and killed; Blackwell was tried in adult court and convicted of first-degree murder with robbery-murder special circumstance.
- Blackwell was originally sentenced in 2009 to life without the possibility of parole (LWOP); the case was remanded for resentencing in light of Miller v. Alabama.
- At resentencing the trial court considered Miller/Gutierrez factors, probation reports, and Blackwell’s CDCR records showing institutional misconduct, and again imposed LWOP.
- Blackwell appealed, arguing (inter alia) that imposition of LWOP violated the Sixth Amendment (Apprendi/Ring), the Eighth Amendment (Miller/Graham), that the court improperly relied on factual findings inconsistent with the jury verdict, abused its discretion, and wrongly considered postconviction CDCR records.
- The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding: (1) section 190.5(b) and precedent allow the judge to exercise discretion between LWOP and 25-to-life after Miller-based individualized sentencing; (2) no jury finding of “irreparable corruption” is required under Apprendi/Ring; (3) Graham does not categorically bar LWOP for juveniles who did not personally kill or intend to kill; (4) the court permissibly considered evidence (including postconviction CDCR records) by a preponderance of the evidence at resentencing; and (5) the LWOP sentence was not an abuse of discretion nor grossly disproportionate.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Blackwell) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Whether a jury must find “irreparable corruption” before LWOP can be imposed on a juvenile convicted of special-circumstance murder | A judge may sentence to LWOP once jury found special circumstance; judge may consider Miller factors and choose within statutory range | Apprendi/Ring require a jury finding that defendant is irreparably corrupt (so 25-to-life is the statutory maximum unless jury finds otherwise) | Rejected Blackwell. Section 190.5(b) and Gutierrez vest sentencing discretion in the judge; Apprendi/Ring do not require jury findings of irreparable corruption |
| 2. Whether Miller/Graham categorically bar LWOP for a juvenile who did not personally kill or intend to kill | LWOP is permissible where sentencer considers youth; no categorical bar beyond Graham’s nonhomicide rule | Graham bars LWOP for juvenile homicide defendants who did not kill or intend to kill | Rejected Blackwell. Graham’s categorical bar is limited to nonhomicide offenses; Miller does not adopt a categorical rule that only juveniles who killed or intended to kill may receive LWOP |
| 3. Whether the trial court violated Sixth/Eighth Amendments by relying on factual findings (e.g., that Blackwell was the shooter) inconsistent with jury acquittals on firearm enhancements | Court may consider evidence bearing on sentencing, even if jury acquitted on related allegations; sentencing facts need only be proved by preponderance where within statutory range | Judge impermissibly elevated punishment based on findings conflicting with jury verdict | Rejected Blackwell. Court may rely on sentencing factfinding independent of jury verdict (Towne, Coley); Apprendi inapplicable in this context |
| 4. Whether consideration of postconviction CDCR records at resentencing was improper and whether the LWOP sentence was an abuse of discretion | Postconviction conduct is relevant to rehabilitation prospects at resentencing; trial court considered Miller/Gutierrez factors and explained reasons for LWOP | Considering prison records and reimposing LWOP was improper and disproportionate given youth | Rejected Blackwell. Postconviction conduct is properly considered on resentencing; trial court gave required individualized consideration and did not abuse discretion or impose a grossly disproportionate sentence |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory LWOP for juveniles violates Eighth Amendment; individualized sentencing required)
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (LWOP categorically prohibited for juvenile nonhomicide offenders)
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (death penalty unconstitutional for crimes committed as a juvenile)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016) (Miller announced a substantive rule that must be given retroactive effect)
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (any fact that increases penalty beyond statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, except prior convictions)
- Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (jury must find aggravating factors that make defendant eligible for death penalty)
- Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160 (2009) (limits of Apprendi in sentencing; some sentencing determinations remain judicial)
- Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007) (California sentencing law violated Sixth Amendment when judge made facts increasing sentence beyond statutory maximum)
- In re Coley, 55 Cal.4th 524 (2012) (trial court may rely on sentencing findings by preponderance even if related counts resulted in acquittal)
- People v. Towne, 44 Cal.4th 63 (2008) (sentencing judge may consider conduct underlying acquitted counts when selecting sentence)