49 Cal.App.5th 747
Cal. Ct. App.2020Background
- In Feb. 2018 a Chihuahua was killed in a car; security video led to identification of Wakeen Best and she was charged with felony burglary of a vehicle, animal abuse, and vandalism (plus misdemeanors).
- A competence doubt was raised pretrial, experts were appointed, and on April 18, 2018 the court found Best mentally competent to stand trial.
- Best moved to proceed pro se (Faretta). At the June 4, 2018 Faretta colloquy she had initialed a written waiver but gave many confused, rambling answers about legal concepts while correctly acknowledging some basic rights (e.g., subpoenas, cross-examination).
- The trial court denied the Faretta request, citing Best’s apparent lack of understanding of expectations and legal concepts; counsel remained appointed. Best was later tried, convicted of the felonies, and sentenced.
- The Court of Appeal held the trial court erred in denying the timely Faretta motion (ignorance of law alone not a valid basis to deny self-representation), reversed the judgment, and remanded for a new trial; a dissent would have affirmed based on lack of a knowing/voluntary waiver and disruptive conduct.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Best) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial court properly denied Best's Faretta motion | Best’s waiver was not knowing and voluntary because she showed confusion about legal concepts and courtroom procedure | Best made an unequivocal, timely, competent waiver; lack of technical legal knowledge does not bar self-representation | Reversed: denial was reversible per se; ignorance of law/procedure alone does not defeat a knowing, voluntary waiver |
| Whether appellate court may affirm denial on alternate grounds (disruptiveness/untimeliness) | The denial was proper alternatively because the request was untimely or Best was disruptive | Trial court did not rely on untimeliness or disruptiveness; record does not support those bases | Not affirmed on alternate grounds: court will not supply discretionary findings the trial court did not make; record did not show delay or disruptive conduct sufficient to justify denial |
| Standard for competence to waive counsel / self-representation | Court may deny self-rep if defendant suffers severe mental illness preventing basic tasks of self-defense | Best was found competent to stand trial and no evidence of severe mental illness preventing self-representation | Held that competence to stand trial existed and no finding of incapacity to represent oneself; Indiana v. Edwards standard noted but not triggered here |
| Faretta colloquy content (notice of consequences, including punishment) | Failure to advise max punishment not raised by parties but is best practice | If Best again seeks to self-represent she must be fully informed of consequences including maximum prison exposure | Court observed transcript lacked explicit advice on maximum punishment and recommended full advisement on remand |
Key Cases Cited
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (U.S. 1975) (Sixth Amendment right to self-representation; waiver must be knowing and voluntary)
- Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (U.S. 1993) (competence to waive counsel is tied to competence to stand trial)
- Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (U.S. 2008) (States may require a higher standard before allowing self-representation for defendants with severe mental illness)
- People v. Dent, 30 Cal.4th 213 (Cal. 2003) (appellate courts may affirm on alternate grounds if record supports them)
- People v. Silfa, 88 Cal.App.4th 1311 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (denial of Faretta motion was error where defendant knowingly waived despite gaps in legal knowledge)
- People v. Poplawski, 25 Cal.App.4th 881 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (lack of technical legal knowledge is not a basis to deny self-representation)
- People v. Lynch, 50 Cal.4th 693 (Cal. 2010) (untimeliness doctrine for Faretta motions; timeliness assessed under totality of circumstances)
- People v. Welch, 20 Cal.4th 701 (Cal. 1999) (self-representation may be denied for disruptive or obstructionist courtroom conduct)
- People v. Mickel, 2 Cal.5th 181 (Cal. 2016) (discusses competence and standards governing Faretta inquiries)
- People v. Carlisle, 86 Cal.App.4th 1382 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (erroneous denial of a timely Faretta motion is reversible per se)