People v. Banks
61 Cal. 4th 788
| Cal. | 2015Background
- In 2008, an armed robbery at the La Brea Collective medical marijuana dispensary ended when Leon Banks shot and killed security guard Noe Gonzalez during the perpetrators' escape.
- Lovie Troy Matthews served as the getaway driver; GPS and cell records placed him near the scene before and after the shooting and show multiple short calls with Banks.
- Matthews was convicted of first degree (felony‑murder) and a felony‑murder special circumstance (robbery/burglary), and sentenced to life without parole because the People did not seek death.
- On appeal the Court of Appeal upheld the special‑circumstance finding; the California Supreme Court granted review to define the meaning of "major participant" and "reckless indifference" under Penal Code § 190.2(d).
- The Supreme Court compared Matthews’s role to the extremes in Enmund v. Florida and Tison v. Arizona and evaluated whether Matthews’s conduct and mental state met the Tison–Enmund standard incorporated into § 190.2(d).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 190.2(d) permits treating a getaway driver as a "major participant" eligible for death or LWOP | People: knowing participation in an armed robbery and functional role (getaway driver) suffices as major participation | Matthews: his role was that of a passive getaway driver akin to Enmund and thus not a "major participant" | Held: Matthews was at the Enmund pole (minor getaway driver); not a major participant under § 190.2(d) |
| Whether awareness that an accomplice is armed (or that armed robbery carries risk) alone establishes "reckless indifference to human life" | People: advance knowledge of a planned armed robbery implies awareness of the grave risk of death | Matthews: mere awareness of the risk inherent in armed robbery is insufficient for subjective reckless indifference | Held: Knowledge that an accomplice was armed or that armed robberies carry a risk, without more, does not prove the subjective reckless‑indifference required by Tison–Enmund |
| Whether the Tison–Enmund standard (for death eligibility) governs § 190.2(d) eligibility for life without parole when death is not sought | People: § 190.2(d) should be construed broadly to include major facilitators of the felony | Matthews: § 190.2(d) must be limited by federal Eighth Amendment principles | Held: § 190.2(d) incorporates the Tison–Enmund standard; same meaning applies whether the punishment sought is death or LWOP |
| Whether the evidence (GPS, calls, gang membership, proximity, pickup of suspects) was sufficient to support the special‑circumstance finding | People: calls, movements, gang ties and pickup show substantial, significant participation and awareness | Matthews: evidence shows only a routine getaway driver role; no proof of planning, arming, presence at killing, or subjective awareness of a grave risk of death | Held: Evidence was legally insufficient as a matter of law to support the special‑circumstance finding; reversed and remanded for resentencing |
Key Cases Cited
- Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (Eighth Amendment bars death for felony‑murder accomplices who did not kill, attempt to kill, or intend a killing)
- Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (death eligibility for nonkillers requires major participation plus reckless indifference)
- Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (described Tison standard as requiring active, substantial, recklessly indifferent involvement)
- Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (individualized sentencing considerations required in capital cases)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence)