People v. Austin, 155 N.E.3d 439

Bethany Austin received nude photos and texts sent to her fiancé via a shared iCloud; the sender (victim) believed the images were private.
After the breakup, Austin mailed a letter to family/friends defending herself and attached four of the victim’s nude photos and text messages.
Austin was indicted under 720 ILCS 5/11-23.5(b) (nonconsensual dissemination of private sexual images) and moved to dismiss, claiming the statute is facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause.
The trial court dismissed, finding the statute a content-based speech restriction and overbroad; the State appealed directly to the Illinois Supreme Court.
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed: it construed section 11-23.5(b), held the statute implicates speech but is not categorically unprotected, applied intermediate scrutiny, and found the statute constitutional (not overbroad or unconstitutionally vague); the case was remanded.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether §11-23.5(b) restricts constitutionally protected speech	State: targeted dissemination of truly private facts may be regulated and is not categorically protected	Austin: statute is a content-based speech restriction criminalizing protected expression	Court: statute implicates speech but is not within an established unprotected category; First Amendment applies
Appropriate level of First Amendment scrutiny	State: argued statute is valid under intermediate scrutiny as a privacy regulation	Austin: statute is content-based and must survive strict scrutiny	Court: applied intermediate scrutiny (content-neutral time/place/manner and private-matter regulation)
Whether §11-23.5(b) is narrowly tailored / overbroad	State: statute is narrowly focused (age, identifiability, private sexual content, reasonable expectation of privacy, lack of consent, intentional dissemination)	Austin: statute is overbroad (no malicious intent required; could criminalize innocuous sharing)	Court: statute is narrowly tailored under intermediate scrutiny and not substantially overbroad
Whether §11-23.5(b) is unconstitutionally vague (due process)	Austin: terms like “disseminate” and the “reasonable person” privacy standard are vague	State: ordinary meanings and limiting elements provide fair notice	Held: statute gives fair notice as applied to Austin; not facially vague and not vague as to her conduct

United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (rejects creation of new categorical exceptions to First Amendment protection)
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015) (content-based regulation framework)
Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (time, place, manner analysis; intermediate scrutiny for content-neutral regulations)
City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (regulation aimed at secondary effects can be content-neutral)
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (content neutrality inquiry focuses on government justification)
Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656 (2004) (content-based restrictions presumptively invalid)
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (dissemination of information as protected speech in certain contexts)
Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (First Amendment protection extends fully to Internet communications)
Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011) (distinguishing matters of public concern from private matters)
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010) (heightened vagueness scrutiny when speech is implicated)