People v. Ashley
162 N.E.3d 200
Ill.2020Background:
- Defendant Marshall Ashley, after a bench trial in McLean County, convicted of stalking under 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3(a)(2),(c)(1) for a course of conduct that allegedly would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress.
- Facts: Ashley and victim Tinch were intimate partners; he sent multiple threatening texts (including a photo of a handgun) and made a phone call heard on speaker where he allegedly threatened to kill her; Tinch and her family fled and contacted police; Ashley was arrested and convicted.
- Circuit court admitted evidence including texts, a gun photograph, victim and mother testimony, and two prior uncharged incidents (gunpoint) over objection; defendant impeached with earlier convictions.
- Defendant appealed, arguing the stalking statute (as amended in 2010) is facially unconstitutional: First Amendment overbreadth (criminalizes protected speech) and substantive due process vagueness/overbreadth; the appellate court affirmed.
- The Illinois Supreme Court granted review and affirmed the appellate court, construing "threatens" to cover only true threats of unlawful violence and ruling parts of the statute that impose a negligence standard for threats unconstitutional as applied to "threatens."
Issues:
| Issue | People’s Argument | Ashley’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the term "threatens" in the stalking statute is limited to unprotected true threats | "Threatens" should be read as true threats (unprotected) and thus the statute is constitutional | "Threatens" is broad and may criminalize nonviolent or lawful-threat speech (overbroad) | Court construed "threatens" to mean true threats of unlawful violence and held the term is not facially overbroad |
| Required mental state for a true threat under the statute (specific intent vs. knowing) | A knowing or intentional mental state in §12-7.3(a) suffices; specific intent to threaten is not required | Black requires specific intent to place victim in fear; statute lacks that specific-intent element | Court held true threats require subjective awareness of the threatening nature and that either intentional or knowing mental state satisfies this requirement |
| Whether negligence ("should know") suffices for threats | The statute’s "knows or should know" language is acceptable for stalking generally | The negligence standard allows conviction for protected speech and is overbroad under the First Amendment | Court held negligence ("should know") does not meet the mental-state requirement for true threats and is unconstitutional as applied to "threatens" |
| Substantive due process / vagueness and standing to challenge other portions of the statute | Statute is sufficiently definite when construed to proscribe true threats; defendant lacks standing to challenge parts not applied to him | Statute criminalizes innocent, nonviolent, or merely distressing conduct; is vague and allows arbitrary enforcement | Court rejected due process and vagueness challenges as to the "threatens" provision (when limited to true threats); defendant lacked standing to attack other provisions not applied to his conviction |
Key Cases Cited
- Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (defines "true threats" and explains their exclusion from First Amendment protection)
- Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (requires that threat statutes be read to include a mental-state element; knowing or purposeful awareness satisfies requirement)
- R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (content- and viewpoint-based restrictions on otherwise unprotected categories of speech are unconstitutional)
- United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (overbreadth doctrine: statute invalid if substantial number of applications are unconstitutional)
- Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973) (overbreadth doctrine should be applied sparingly; statutes may be given limiting constructions)
- People v. Bailey, 167 Ill. 2d 210 (1995) (Illinois stalking statute should be construed to proscribe only speech integral to unlawful conduct)
- People v. Relerford, 2017 IL 121094 (2017) (addressed overbreadth of the "communicates to or about" language; distinguished here)