People v. Arbuckle
2016 IL App (3d) 121014-B
Ill. App. Ct.2016Background
- Aaron M. Arbuckle pled guilty to aggravated domestic battery (Class 2) and aggravated battery (Class 3) for striking Kayla Zimmerlein and stabbing Nicole Reuter with a broken golf club. Zimmerlein’s arm was shattered, required multiple surgeries, and sustained nonunion and ongoing pain.
- PSI showed a prior Class 2 burglary conviction (2005), prior domestic battery convictions, DUI, bipolar diagnosis, and alcohol dependence; letters and testimony described chronic alcohol problems.
- At plea admonitions the court (before plea) told Arbuckle he was extended-term eligible on both counts due to the prior Class 2 conviction; at sentencing the State argued extended-term eligibility on both counts but the court never expressly adopted that view.
- The court considered intoxication as mitigation, weighed victim injury and defendant’s criminal history as aggravation, and denied impact-incarceration recommendation because of likely early release and severity of injuries.
- Sentenced to 5½ years on aggravated domestic battery and 4 years on aggravated battery, ordered consecutive; motion to reconsider arguing improper double enhancement (considering great bodily harm) and unconsidered mitigation was denied.
- Defendant appealed, arguing (1) trial court plainly erred by sentencing under a mistaken belief of extended-term eligibility on the Class 3 count, (2) counsel was ineffective for failing to object, and (3) improper double enhancement / failure to consider mitigating factors.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Extended-term eligibility / plain error | State argued defendant was extended-term eligible on both counts due to prior Class 2 conviction | Arbuckle argued the two offenses arose from a single course of conduct, so extended-term could apply only to the most serious offense (Class 2); court plainly erred by believing he was extended-term eligible on the Class 3 | Court assumed arguendo no extended-term eligibility but found no clear or obvious error: record shows court likely understood nonextended 2–5 year range and imposed a 4-year nonextended sentence |
| Ineffective assistance for failing to challenge extended-term eligibility | N/A (prosecution opposed) | Arbuckle argued counsel was ineffective under Strickland for not objecting to extended-term eligibility representation | Rejected: defendant failed prejudice prong—no reasonable probability of a lesser sentence given aggravating factors and sentence imposed within nonextended range |
| Double enhancement (consideration of great bodily harm) | N/A | Arbuckle argued court improperly used ‘great bodily harm’ (an element of aggravated domestic battery) as an aggravating factor | Rejected: Court relied on Saldivar principle that degree/quantum of harm can vary; Zimmerlein’s shattered, nonunion arm and ongoing impairment justified consideration as aggravation |
| Failure to consider mitigating factors / excessive sentence | N/A | Arbuckle claimed court ignored lack of intent to cause harm, employment/family ties, and intoxication as mitigating | Rejected: Sentencing court explicitly reviewed PSI and factors; intoxication and recidivism were properly considered and could support aggravation; no abuse of discretion in sentencing |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Bell, 196 Ill. 2d 343 (Illinois 2001) (extended-term sentences allowed only for offenses within most serious class absent unrelated courses of conduct)
- People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551 (Illinois 2007) (plain-error first-step: determine clear or obvious error)
- People v. Hurley, 277 Ill. App. 3d 684 (Ill. App. 1996) (trial court misapprehension of sentencing range may require resentencing when it arguably influenced decision)
- People v. Eddington, 77 Ill. 2d 41 (Illinois 1979) (same principle regarding sentencing misapprehensions and prejudice)
- People v. Saldivar, 113 Ill. 2d 256 (Illinois 1986) (degree of harm may be considered as an aggravating factor even when harm is implicit in offense)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (two-prong ineffective-assistance test)
- People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504 (Illinois 1984) (adoption of Strickland standard in Illinois)
- People v. Howery, 178 Ill. 2d 1 (Illinois 1997) (presumption that trial court knows and applies the law)
- People v. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d 539 (Illinois 2010) (preservation rules for sentencing errors)