People v. Amezcua & Flores
243 Cal. Rptr. 3d 842
Cal.2019Background
- Defendants Oswaldo Amezcua and Joseph Conrad Flores, members of ESBP gang, were convicted by jury of multiple first-degree murders, attempted murders, hostage-taking, weapons offenses, and gang enhancements; both sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed.
- Prosecutions relied on eyewitnesses, physical and ballistic evidence, recorded admissions by defendants (during periods of self-representation), and gang-expert testimony describing motive and benefit to ESBP.
- Incidents at issue include multiple drive-by shootings and targeted killings (April–June 2000), an armed freeway shooting at a deputy (June 24–25), and a Santa Monica Pier hostage/shooting incident (July 4) during which hostages were held for hours.
- Pretrial and trial security measures and in-custody misconduct (contraband, assaults, shanks) led the court to permit a visible security presence and physical restraints for the defendants in court.
- At the penalty phase both defendants refused to allow counsel to present mitigating evidence or argue on their behalf; the court conducted extensive colloquies and honored their decisions.
Issues
| Issue | People’s Argument | Defendants’ Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Voir dire question re: automatic death for multiple murders | Modified question (included mitigation reference) adequately elicits prejudgment and is within court’s discretion | Original defense wording was necessary to detect jurors who would always vote death; modification blurred inquiry | No reversible error; claim forfeited by lack of timely objection and voir dire overall was adequate |
| Excusal of Prospective Juror No. 74 for cause | Juror later stated she could not realistically return a death verdict; excusal appropriate | Juror’s questionnaire and early responses were equivocal; excusal improper | Court’s for-cause removal sustained; juror’s equivocation and final statement provided substantial evidence supporting excusal |
| Courtroom security and visible restraints (bailiffs, partial shackling) | Security measures justified by documented custodial violence and contraband; not an abdication of judicial authority | Measures were excessive, prejudicial, and lacked case-specific justification | No abuse of discretion; security and shackling supported by particularized jail incidents; any error harmless absent showing jury observed or was affected |
| Admission of defendants’ recorded statements made during meetings with prosecutor | Statements were voluntary, not part of plea negotiations; admissible; even if Confrontation or settlement-rules issue existed, any error was harmless | Statements arose during plea/settlement discussions (restitution/leniency) and should be excluded under Evidence Code §1153 and Penal Code §1192.4 | Statements admissible; not part of plea bargaining that would trigger exclusion; no reversible error |
| Admission of autopsy-report testimony by a different medical examiner (Confrontation Clause) | Testimony relaying autopsy findings was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given overwhelming corroborating evidence and defendants’ admissions | Testimony violated Crawford confrontation rights because the performing pathologist was unavailable | Claim forfeited by failure to object; in any event any Confrontation error harmless beyond reasonable doubt |
| Use of unmodified CALJIC No. 3.00 (principals equally guilty) | Instruction correctly stated joint liability where defendants shared intent and participated jointly | Could mislead jurors where aider/abettor might have different mens rea than actual killer | No error: evidence supported shared intent for each charged theory and other instructions clarified mens rea requirements |
| Prosecutor’s guilt-phase victim-empathy appeals | Arguments were within permissible advocacy and relevant to gravity of crimes | Prosecutor improperly invited jurors to ‘‘view through victims’ eyes,’’ appealing to sympathy and inflaming emotions | Remarks crossed impropriety line but were brief and harmless in light of overwhelming evidence; forfeited by no contemporaneous objection |
| Defendants’ refusal to allow counsel to present penalty-phase mitigation | People argued court must respect defendants’ autonomy; long-standing state precedent allows defendant control over penalty objective | Defendants argued attorneys should control strategic penalty decisions and that acquiescence violated right to counsel and reliability | Court upheld defendants’ right to refuse penalty-phase presentation after thorough colloquy; McCoy and California precedent support result |
Key Cases Cited
- Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (juror qualification and adequate voir dire)
- Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (for-cause exclusion when views impair duties)
- Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (juror exclusion for death-penalty opposition)
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (Confrontation Clause and testimonial hearsay)
- Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (forensic reports and confrontation)
- Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (confrontation and surrogate testimony)
- Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard)
- Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 (presence of courtroom security vs. shackling)
- Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1 (deference to trial court demeanor findings in juror removal)
- McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500 (client’s right to control objective of defense)
- People v. Sanders, 51 Cal.3d 471 (defendant’s control over penalty-phase presentation)
- People v. Bloom, 48 Cal.3d 1194 (same)
- People v. Stevens, 47 Cal.4th 625 (courtroom security and shackling analysis)
- People v. Bryant, Smith & Wheeler, 60 Cal.4th 335 (aiding-and-abetting instruction and unanimity issues)