THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LORENZO STEVENS, Defendant and Appellant.
No. S158852
Supreme Court of California
Nov. 5, 2009.
47 Cal.4th 625
Alan Charles Dell‘Ario, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Assistant Attorney General, Rene A. Chacon, Stan Helfman, Laurence K. Sullivan and Arthur P. Beever, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
CORRIGAN, J.—We hold here that the stationing of a courtroom deputy next to a testifying defendant is not an inherently prejudicial practice that must be justified by a showing of manifest need. Defendant Lorenzo Stevens attempts to bring his case under the exacting manifest need standard by asserting that the deputy‘s presence is akin to a “human shackle.” A divided Court of Appeal rejected this argument, and we do so as well. This conclusion is consistent with our explicit and unanimous holding in People v. Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th 197, 222–224 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 252, 72 P.3d 1222] (Marks). Because defendant has not shown actual prejudice, and the record supports the trial court‘s exercise of discretion, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
BACKGROUND
On July 13, 2004, 14-year-old R.D. was riding the bus home when defendant, her father, called her cellular phone. R.D. lived with her grandmother and had not seen her father in a month or two. At defendant‘s request, R.D. met him at a nearby Taco Bell. From there, they walked about 30 minutes to an alley. Defendant said he was living in a truck, which appeared to have been parked in the alley for a long time. The windshield was covered with dirt, and the windows were obscured with hanging pieces of cloth. They talked about why defendant was living in a truck, and defendant asked R.D. if she would help him make money. He said he wanted to take her to a hotel, and R.D. believed he was suggesting prostitution. Defendant told R.D. she should use a more exotic, grownup name at the hotel. He told her to say her name was “Joy.” Defendant asked R.D. if she was sexually active with her boyfriend, and he looked through her purse for condoms.
While they sat inside the truck, defendant smoked something he called “crystal” from a glass pipe. He then lay back and told R.D. to take off her pants. When she refused, defendant placed a small rock of the “crystal” in her mouth, telling her to suck on it and relax. The rock made R.D.‘s tongue numb. While defendant‘s eyes were closed, she took the rock out of her mouth and placed it in her bra. Defendant later asked for the rock back, but R.D., to his substantial annoyance, claimed she had swallowed it. Defendant pulled his daughter onto his lap and told her to dance. As she sat there, she felt his pelvis moving against her bottom. She told him she wanted to leave, but defendant would not release her. She began to cry and scream. Defendant continued to hold her down and then sucked the side of her neck. He threatened to hit her if she did not quiet down. Then he pulled his pants down, pulled R.D.‘s head toward his penis, and told her to orally copulate him.
Officer Valerga of the Oakland Police Department responded and took possession of the bag containing the “crystal” rock, which was later determined to be cocaine base. The officer asked to see where the incident occurred and then drove R.D. and her grandmother to the Taco Bell. While she was in the squad car, Beal received a call from R.D.‘s mother, who reported that she had seen defendant and that her brother (R.D.‘s uncle) was chasing him. Officer Valerga went to the mother‘s location and called for backup.
Several officers chased defendant through backyards. Eventually, he jumped onto the roof of a house. As approximately 10 to 15 officers surrounded the house and began to establish a perimeter, defendant took a running leap onto another rooftop. He paced continually, looking over the edges of the roof. During an hour-long standoff with the officers, defendant was agitated and threatened suicide. He said he was upset about the sexual way his friends had been looking at his daughter. He said that, although nobody would believe him, he did not touch her. When one officer urged defendant to come down, he refused, saying, “They‘re going to look at me differently.” At one point, defendant sat and smoked what appeared to be crack cocaine from a glass pipe. While on the roof, he began interacting with the crowd of spectators that had gathered.
Officers found a ladder in the yard and leaned it against the house. However, to the great amusement of the crowd, defendant pulled the ladder onto the roof, leaving the officers on the ground. Eventually, Oakland Fire Department personnel arrived with a ladder. When officers began climbing to the roof, defendant jumped off the opposite side. He was taken into custody on the ground and later transported to a hospital for a sexual assault exam. He was combative and uncooperative at the hospital and had to be placed in restraints.
Defendant was charged with assault with intent to commit rape, sodomy, or oral copulation; furnishing a controlled substance to a minor; and administering a drug to aid in the commission of a felony. The information also alleged defendant had a prior serious felony conviction. Early in the trial, the court
Defendant testified that he called R.D. on July 13, 2004, because he was concerned about rumors he had heard about her grades and bad behavior and because he was considering moving away. As they walked to the truck where he was living, defendant said he noticed a “hickey” on R.D.‘s neck. When they were sitting in the truck, he confronted her about the hickey and asked if she was sexually active or using drugs. Defendant claimed R.D. began crying during this conversation and told him she had been raped. After she stopped crying, defendant walked her to the bus stop. Defendant saw her off, then retrieved some supplies and began washing someone‘s car. As he did so, a friend approached and warned him that R.D. had reported a sexual assault. Distressed, defendant called his sister, asking her to come and talk to him. When she arrived, R.D.‘s mother and a man jumped out of the car and began an attack that included beating him with a stick. Defendant ran. He continued running even after he saw the police because he was afraid. Defendant admitted that he smoked crack cocaine while he was on the roof.
Defendant attended his trial unshackled and wearing civilian clothing. During R.D.‘s testimony, a support person sat next to her and, without defense objection, was introduced as a “victim witness advocate.” (See
Before defendant took the stand, his attorney stated that he had been informed by the court and by courtroom deputies that if his client testified, “it is policy—I‘m not sure whose policy, but it is policy to have a deputy sit with him at the witness stand while my client testifies.” Counsel objected to this procedure, arguing the placement of a deputy at the witness stand “is, basically, a human shackle” that must be justified by good cause. In response, the court observed that a deputy had been “sitting right behind” defendant “throughout the entire trial,” and the court reasoned, “Having a deputy in, basically, the same proximity . . . will be no more prejudicial.” The court remarked that “the Alameda County Sheriff‘s Department policy of having a
Defendant was convicted as charged and sentenced to prison. A divided panel of the Court of Appeal affirmed his conviction. We granted review to determine whether the placing of a deputy sheriff at the witness stand while defendant testified was an abuse of discretion or required a specific showing of need. Defendant claims this procedure violated his right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. He also argues the trial court abused its discretion by deferring to a sheriff‘s department policy instead of reaching its own determination about security needs.
DISCUSSION
We begin with the familiar principle that a “trial court has broad power to maintain courtroom security and orderly proceedings. [Citations.]” (People v. Hayes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1211, 1269 [91 Cal.Rptr.2d 211, 989 P.2d 645].) For this reason, decisions regarding security measures in the courtroom are generally reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Ibid.; People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 253 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 682, 1 P.3d 3]; People v. Duran (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282, 293, fn. 12 [127 Cal.Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322] (Duran).)
However, despite our traditional deference to the trial court in this area, some extraordinary security practices carry an inordinate risk of infringing upon a criminal defendant‘s right to a fair trial. These exceptional practices must be justified by a particularized showing of manifest need sufficient to overcome the substantial risk of prejudice they pose. For example, visible physical restraints like handcuffs or leg irons may erode the presumption of innocence because they suggest to the jury that the defendant is a dangerous person who must be separated from the rest of the community. (Deck v. Missouri (2005) 544 U.S. 622, 630 [161 L.Ed.2d 953, 125 S.Ct. 2007]; see Duran, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 290.) The same problem arises if the defendant
Because physical restraints carry such risks, the United States Supreme Court has long considered their use inherently prejudicial. (Deck v. Missouri, supra, 544 U.S. at pp. 626–629; Illinois v. Allen (1970) 397 U.S. 337, 343–344 [25 L.Ed.2d 353, 90 S.Ct. 1057]; see Holbrook v. Flynn (1986) 475 U.S. 560, 568–569 [89 L.Ed.2d 525, 106 S.Ct. 1340] (Holbrook).) Thus, a criminal defendant may not appear before the jury in shackles unless the trial court has found that the restraints are justified by a state interest specific to the particular trial. (Deck v. Missouri, at pp. 629, 632.) The court‘s determination may “take into account the factors that courts have traditionally relied on in gauging potential security problems and the risk of escape at trial.” (Id. at p. 629.)
For similar reasons, we too have concluded that visible physical restraints must survive heightened scrutiny and be justified by a particular need. In Duran, supra, 16 Cal.3d at pages 290–291, we held that “a defendant cannot be subjected to physical restraints of any kind in the courtroom while in the jury‘s presence, unless there is a showing of a manifest need for such restraints.” While the court retains discretion to order restraints when they are needed to protect against courtroom violence or other disruptions, we cautioned that imposing visible physical restraints without a record showing violence, a threat of violence, or other nonconforming conduct, “will be deemed to constitute an abuse of discretion.” (Id. at p. 291.) No formal hearing is necessary to fulfill the mandate of Duran; however, the record must show the court based its determination on facts, not rumor and innuendo. (People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 1032 [47 Cal.Rptr.3d 467, 140 P.3d 775]; People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 651–652 [280 Cal.Rptr. 692, 809 P.2d 351]; see also People v. Hayes, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1268.)
But the stringent showing required for physical restraints like shackles is the exception, not the rule. Security measures that are not inherently prejudicial need not be justified by a demonstration of extraordinary need.
In Duran, we specifically distinguished shackling from the use of armed guards in the courtroom. (Duran, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 291, fn. 8.) We explained that unless the guards “are present in unreasonable numbers, such presence need not be justified by the court or the prosecutor. [Citations.]” (Ibid.) California courts have long maintained this distinction between the presence of security officers and the imposition of physical restraints. In People v. David (1939) 12 Cal.2d 639, 644 [86 P.2d 811], after a sheriff and his deputies accompanied the defendant into the courtroom, one deputy followed the defendant inside the rail and took a seat immediately behind him. The defendant claimed this action biased the jury in the same manner as shackling, but we disagreed, finding “nothing to show that [the deputy‘s] conduct prejudiced the defendant in any way.” (Ibid.) In People v. Stabler (1962) 202 Cal.App.2d 862, 863 [21 Cal.Rptr. 120], a defendant with a history of escaping from prison relied on shackling authorities in objecting to the presence of eight armed law enforcement officers in the courtroom. The Court of Appeal rejected his claim, noting the defendant “was under no close or obvious personal restraint in the presence of the jury.” (Id. at p. 864.) The court observed, “Mere increase in the number of guards was by no means unreasonable in view of the indications that defendant sought to become the Houdini of Humboldt.” (Ibid.) In People v. Ainsworth, supra, 45 Cal.3d at page 1003, the defendant objected to the presence of four to six uniformed, armed sheriff‘s deputies, including two posted behind him. He claimed their number and placement were unconstitutional without a particularized showing of manifest need. We upheld the stationing of these deputies as a reasonable exercise of the trial court‘s discretion. (Id. at pp. 1003–1004.)
When the United States Supreme Court addressed a claim challenging the presence of armed guards in the courtroom, it explained in detail why the
Indisputably, events in recent years have resulted in security guards becoming even more ubiquitous than when Justice Marshall made his observations in 1986. As the Chief Justice of this court pointed out in People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at page 998, the presence of security guards in the courtroom “is seen by jurors as ordinary and expected.” Following the high court‘s holding that the stationing of identifiable security officers in the courtroom is not inherently prejudicial, we have examined claims of excessive security to determine whether the defendant was actually prejudiced by the officers’ presence. (Ibid.; People v. Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 115.) Defendant has not cited, nor, after a nationwide search, have we found, a single conviction that has been reversed under Holbrook based on the presence of excessive security in the courtroom.3
We considered a very similar claim in Marks, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pages 222–224. The trial court in Marks initially declined to impose physical restraints requested by the defendant‘s own attorneys due to his violent outbursts. It revisited the issue upon learning that the defendant intended to testify. The witness stand was located only four feet from the jury box. (Id. at pp. 222–223.) As an alternative to having the defendant testify from his position at counsel‘s table, the trial court allowed the defendant to take the witness stand but “position[ed] a marshal in a chair next to defendant on the raised platform that was parallel to Juror No. 7.” (Id. at p. 223.) It appeared from the record that “the marshal sat four or five feet from defendant‘s side (facing his ear) next to and slightly behind Juror No. 7.” (Id. at p. 223, fn. 5.)5 At the defendant‘s request, the court admonished the jury not to
Defendant‘s attempt to distinguish Marks is unpersuasive. Defendant argues our rejection of the manifest need requirement should be disregarded as dicta because the record of Mr. Marks‘s violent behavior was sufficient to meet the heightened standard. However, Marks did not rely on the defendant‘s conduct or the courtroom‘s configuration to conclude that the manifest need standard was satisfied in that particular case. Marks held that the higher showing of manifest need was not required. (Marks, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 224.) Of course, even where a showing of manifest need is not required to justify a security practice, the practice remains subject to review for abuse of discretion. (See, e.g., People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 998–999; People v. Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 115.) Although we suggested the result would be the same in Marks “[u]nder any standard of review,” our discussion of facts supporting the trial court‘s decision was merely an application of this deferential review. (Marks, at p. 224.)
The dissent below cited the factual discussion in Marks as “just the type of case-by-case approach deemed ‘appropriate’ by the United States Supreme Court in Holbrook, supra, 475 U.S. at page 569.” The dissent misreads Holbrook and ignores the express holding of Marks. These cases do not turn on individualized trial court determinations, but on whether the security practice is so inherently prejudicial that it must be subject to stricter scrutiny. Any discretionary ruling must take into account the particular circumstances of the individual case and will be reviewed in that context. However, if a practice is not inherently prejudicial, it need not be justified by a compelling case-specific showing of need. (Holbrook, at pp. 568–569; People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 997.) As the high court explained in
The practice at issue here was very similar to that in Marks. A deputy sheriff was stationed at the witness stand near defendant throughout his testimony. In deciding whether this arrangement was inherently prejudicial, we must evaluate the likely effects of the procedure “based on reason, principle, and common human experience” (Estelle v. Williams, supra, 425 U.S. at p. 504) to determine “whether ‘an unacceptable risk is presented of impermissible factors coming into play.‘” (Holbrook, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 570.)
Defendant argues a uniformed deputy‘s presence at the witness stand converts a neutral security measure into one that is impermissibly defendant focused. He contends the deputy serves as a constant reminder of the defendant‘s custodial status, like prison clothing or visible physical restraints, thus implying that the defendant is dangerous or untrustworthy. (See Holbrook, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 569.)
We conclude a deputy‘s presence at the witness stand during a defendant‘s testimony is not inherently prejudicial. As the United States Supreme Court observed over 20 years ago, jurors have become accustomed to seeing security officers in public places such as the courtroom (Holbrook, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 569), and there is a wide range of inferences they may draw from an officer‘s presence near a testifying defendant. Because security officers are now “ordinary and expected” in the courtroom (People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 998), jurors may view the sight of an officer accompanying the defendant to the witness stand as nothing more than a routine measure. (Holbrook, at p. 569; see People v. Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 115.) Although a deputy‘s presence next to a testifying defendant may be viewed as a defendant-focused practice when officers do not accompany other witnesses to the stand, the Supreme Court has made it clear that not “every practice tending to single out the accused from everyone else in the courtroom must be struck down.” (Holbrook, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 567.) “Recognizing that jurors are quite aware that the defendant appearing before them did not arrive there by choice or happenstance,” the high court stressed that it has “never tried, and could never hope, to eliminate from trial procedures every reminder that the State has chosen to marshal its resources against a defendant to punish him for allegedly criminal conduct.” (Ibid.) That a security practice seems to focus attention on the defendant is not enough, without more, to render the practice inherently prejudicial.
The Supreme Court of Illinois previously announced the same conclusion we reach here. In People v. Peeples (2002) 205 Ill.2d 480, 526 [275 Ill.Dec. 870, 793 N.E.2d 641, 669], two uniformed deputy sheriffs sat within arm‘s reach behind the defendant while he was seated at the defense table. When, in the presence of the jury, the defendant was called to testify, one of the deputies “‘escorted him to the witness stand, stood behind him while he testified, and then escorted him back to the defense table.‘” (Ibid.) On appeal, the defendant claimed this practice was inherently prejudicial because it could raise no inference other than that he was a dangerous person who
The circumstances of this case do not support defendant‘s claims of prejudice, inherent or otherwise. Although defendant argues the jury may have viewed him as dangerous, this possibility is undercut by the fact that he was monitored by a single deputy. Indeed, given the undisputed evidence that defendant was physically attacked by members of the victim‘s family when
Defendant also claims he was prejudiced by the contrast between his law enforcement escort and his accuser‘s accompaniment by a person the prosecutor described as a “victim witness advocate.”
Finally, defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion by deferring to a sheriff‘s department policy rather than reaching its own conclusion about whether to post a deputy at the witness stand. In the shackling context, we have explained that it is the function of the trial court, not the prosecutor or law enforcement personnel, to determine whether manifest need supports the
Although we conclude that a heightened showing of manifest need is not required to justify the stationing of a security officer near the witness stand, the responsibility of the trial court remains the same. The court may not defer decisionmaking authority to law enforcement officers, but must exercise its own discretion to determine whether a given security measure is appropriate on a case-by-case basis. (Spivey v. Head (11th Cir. 2000) 207 F.3d 1263, 1271–1272; cf. People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 841–842.) Under Holbrook, supra, 475 U.S. at page 570, the trial court has the first responsibility of balancing the need for heightened security against the risk that additional precautions will prejudice the accused in the eyes of the jury. “It is that judicial reconciliation of the competing interests of the person standing trial and of the state providing for the security of the community that, according to [Supreme Court precedent], provides the appropriate guarantee of fundamental fairness.” (Lopez v. Thurmer (7th Cir. 2009) 573 F.3d 484, 491.) The trial court should state its reasons for stationing a guard at or near the witness stand and explain on the record why the need for this security measure outweighs potential prejudice to the testifying defendant. In addition, although we impose no sua sponte duty for it to do so, the court should consider, upon request, giving a cautionary instruction, either at the time of the defendant‘s testimony or with closing instructions, telling the jury to disregard security measures related to the defendant‘s custodial status. (See, e.g., Marks, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 223.)
The record in this case could be clearer, but, overall, it demonstrates that the trial court came to its own conclusion about the stationing of the deputy and did not abdicate control to law enforcement. Before defendant testified, defense counsel said that he had heard secondhand about a “policy” of posting a deputy near the defendant at the witness stand, and he set forth his objections to this procedure.9 In response, the trial court mentioned a sheriff‘s department “policy of having a deputy at the stand with an in-custody [defendant] for safety purposes, or even to prevent escape.” However, the court‘s full response indicates it was not blindly adhering to a law enforce-
Although not a model of clarity, these observations indicate the trial court exercised its own judgment, on a case-specific basis, when it ordered a deputy to be stationed near the witness stand. The court weighed the matter and concluded the procedure was appropriate under the circumstances. The trial court was well aware of defendant‘s volatility, having heard testimony from numerous witnesses about defendant‘s dramatic attempt to escape from the police, his erratic behavior during the standoff, and his combativeness after he was taken into custody. The court had also recently been informed about phone calls defendant had arranged from jail trying to persuade the victim and her mother to drop the charges against him. The court had concluded these improper contacts represented an attempt to suborn perjury and were “clearly an implied threat” against the victim and her family. This record reflects no abuse of discretion.
In summary, we hold as follows. Trial court decisions regarding courtroom security continue to be reviewed for abuse of discretion. Any exercise of discretion must be informed by the particular circumstances of a given case. Many security and decorum procedures are routine and do not run the risk of prejudice. However, when the court imposes a measure that is inherently prejudicial to the defendant‘s right to assist in his defense, competently present his own testimony, or enjoy the presumption of innocence, the trial court must take particular care. In order to employ an inherently prejudicial procedure, the court must find a manifest need sufficient to justify the risk of prejudice. When an inherently prejudicial procedure is employed, a reviewing court will inquire whether, based on the record below, the trial court reasonably balanced the need for heightened security against the constitutional rights afforded the defendant. Only a showing of
DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
George, C. J., Baxter, J., Werdegar, J., and Chin, J., concurred.
MORENO, J., Dissenting.—Defendant‘s daughter accused him of sexually assaulting her and giving her drugs; defendant denied doing either. Their testimony constituted the only direct evidence of what actually occurred. Thus, as Justice Ruvolo aptly noted in his dissent below, “The jury‘s decision necessarily turned on whether it believed the version of events testified to by the victim, or by the [defendant]—a classic ‘she said/he said’ trial.” “[T]he evidence presented at trial, although consistent with guilt, was equivocal and inconclusive. On the one hand, if the victim were believed, then appellant would be doubtlessly found guilty of the charges. On the other hand, if appellant were believed, a not guilty verdict was inevitable. [[] . . . Therefore, the state of the evidence rendered it critical for the trial judge not to allow the demeanor, and thus the credibility, of either of the two key witnesses to be enhanced or diminished unfairly.”
In this case, we consider whether defendant‘s rights were violated when the trial court permitted a uniformed deputy sheriff to escort defendant to the witness stand and then sit next to him as he testified. This procedure was not followed for any other witness. In affirming the Court of Appeal‘s judgment that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, the majority reasons the security arrangement in this case was legally indistinguishable from the routine deployment of security personnel in a courtroom. I disagree.
As with the use of physical restraints (Deck v. Missouri (2005) 544 U.S. 622 [161 L.Ed.2d 953, 125 S.Ct. 2007] (Deck)) or prison attire (Estelle v. Williams (1976) 425 U.S. 501 [48 L.Ed.2d 126, 96 S.Ct. 1691] (Estelle)) in front of a jury, the stationing of a uniformed officer next to a defendant as he or she testifies is the kind of government action that constitutes an “unmistakable indication[] of the need to separate a defendant from the community at large”
I.
As the majority relates the facts of this case, I do not repeat them, and instead focus on the security arrangement at issue here.
Throughout the trial, while defendant was at the defense table, an Alameda County deputy sheriff sat behind him. During a recess on the day defendant testified, defense counsel indicated that the trial court and the courtroom deputies had informed him that, pursuant to policy, a deputy sheriff would accompany defendant to the witness stand and sit next to him as he testified. Defense counsel objected to the arrangement, arguing that stationing a deputy next to defendant on the stand would be tantamount to a “human shackle” which, absent a determination of good cause specific to the trial, would violate both the federal and state Constitutions. Defense counsel further pointed out that there was no evidence suggesting defendant posed a safety or flight risk.
The trial court overruled the objection. In explaining its ruling, the trial court equated a deputy sitting next to defendant as he testified with a deputy sitting behind defendant while at the defense table; the court stated the former would “be no more prejudicial” than the latter. The trial court also indicated the “Sheriff‘s Department policy of having a deputy at the stand with an in-custody [defendant] for safety purposes, or even to prevent escape, is certainly reasonable . . . .” Finally, the trial court commented that a previous juror had expressed discomfort “with a police officer in full uniform with a weapon sitting at the witness stand. And I don‘t want the jury in any way to be distracted by those concerns . . . .”1 A uniformed deputy
On appeal, a divided Court of Appeal affirmed defendant‘s conviction. The majority concluded the security arrangement was comparable to the routine stationing of security personnel in a courtroom and is therefore reviewed for abuse of discretion. On the other hand, the dissent reasoned that having a deputy escort defendant to the stand and then, in the jury‘s direct view, sit next to defendant as he testified implicates the same concerns cited in federal and state shackling cases; thus, adoption of the security measures should have been preceded by a finding of a case-specific state interest.
II.
I begin by briefly discussing the well-established law governing, on the one hand, inherently prejudicial measures such as the use of prison attire or physical restraints during a criminal trial and, on the other hand, the general deployment of courtroom security personnel.
A.
The United States Supreme Court has closely scrutinized courtroom practices that risk undermining the fairness of the criminal factfinding process by diluting the presumption of innocence. For example, in Estelle, supra, 425 U.S. at pages 504 to 505, the court held that compelling a defendant to wear prison garb in front of the jury could infect the jury‘s judgment and posed an
Similarly, both the high court and this court have closely examined the use of physical restraints visible to the jury during a criminal trial, requiring a trial court to first determine that their use was justified by a state interest specific to the trial. (Deck, supra, 544 U.S. at p. 629; Duran, supra, 16 Cal.3d at pp. 290–291.) This rule has long been in effect in this state. (See People v. Harrington (1871) 42 Cal. 165, 168 [finding prejudicial error where physical restraints were used without a finding of “evident necessity“].) One reason for the “[j]udicial hostility” to physical restraints is that, as with prison attire, the use of such measures “undermines the presumption of innocence and the related fairness of the factfinding process. [Citation.] It suggests to the jury that the justice system itself sees a ‘need to separate a defendant from the community at large.’ [Citations.]” (Deck, at pp. 630–631; see Duran, at p. 290 [A defendant‘s “appearance before the jury in shackles is likely to lead the jurors to infer that he is a violent person disposed to commit crimes of the type alleged. [Citations.]“].)
Despite these concerns, like the high court, we have nevertheless acknowledged that there are occasions when trial judges may be warranted in restraining defendants, for example, when a defendant poses a safety or flight risk or when a defendant disrupts the proceedings or otherwise engages in nonconforming behavior. (Deck, supra, 544 U.S. at p. 632; Duran, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 291.) However, we have emphasized that the need for using physical restraints must appear as a matter of record and that the restraints should be as unobtrusive as possible, although as effective as necessary under the circumstance. (Duran, at p. 291.)
B.
In contrast to the scrutiny applied to inherently prejudicial practices, the United States Supreme Court and this court have been more deferential to the general deployment of security personnel in a courtroom, concluding that
In Holbrook, uniformed security personnel were seated in the first row of the courtroom‘s spectator section. (Holbrook, supra, 475 U.S. at pp. 568–569.) The high court concluded the arrangement did not violate the defendant‘s federal constitutional rights because such a deployment is not “the sort of inherently prejudicial practice that, like shackling, should be permitted only where justified by an essential state interest specific to each trial.” (Ibid.) The court explained that, “[w]hile shackling and prison clothes are unmistakable indications of the need to separate a defendant from the community at large, the presence of guards at a defendant‘s trial need not be interpreted as a sign that he is particularly dangerous or culpable. Jurors may just as easily believe that the officers are there to guard against disruptions emanating from outside the courtroom or to ensure that tense courtroom exchanges do not erupt into violence. Indeed, it is entirely possible that jurors will not infer anything at all from the presence of the guards. If they are placed at some distance from the accused, security officers may well be perceived more as elements of an impressive drama than as reminders of the defendant‘s special status.” (Id. at p. 569.)
In Marks, the trial court stationed a deputy sheriff next to and slightly behind Juror No. 7, “four or five feet” away from the witness stand, as the defendant testified. (Marks, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 223 & fn. 5.) Before doing so, the trial court noted the defendant had assaulted an attorney in court and a deputy sheriff during the case, had violated court orders, and had been removed from the courtroom for being verbally disruptive during the trial.5 (31 Cal.4th at p. 223.) The defendant appealed, arguing the trial court was required to identify a manifest need justifying the security arrangement. (Ibid.) We rejected the claim, concluding that stationing security personnel to monitor a defendant does not require a showing of manifest need. (Id. at pp. 223–224Holbrook, we reasoned “courtroom monitoring by security personnel does not necessarily create the prejudice created by shackling.” (Ibid.) Unlike the use of restraints, we concluded, “‘it is entirely possible that jurors will not infer anything at all from the presence of the guards . . . so long as their numbers or weaponry do not suggest particular official concern or alarm.’ ([Holbrook, supra, 475 U.S.] at p. 569.)” (Marks, at p. 224.)
Notes
The majority also indicates the record is silent as to where the deputy was stationed during defendant‘s testimony. (maj. opn., ante, at p. 636, fn. 4.) To the contrary, when objecting to the arrangement, defense counsel stated the deputy would be seated next to defendant on the witness stand. And, after defendant testified, counsel stated for the record that the officer had been “with [defendant] up on the stand next to him . . . .” Neither the trial court nor the prosecutor disagreed with defense counsel‘s characterization of the security arrangement. Nor does the Attorney General contest defendant‘s description of the layout. I therefore find no reason to quibble with Justice Ruvolo‘s conclusion that the deputy “s[a]t right beside the accused” in full view of the jury.