People v. Aguayo, 13 Cal.5th 974

Defendant Veronica Aguayo struck her 72‑year‑old father during a yard altercation, using a bicycle chain/lock and (allegedly) throwing a ceramic pot; both parties offered conflicting accounts and claimed self‑defense and varying numbers of strikes.
An amended information charged two aggravated assaults under Penal Code § 245: (a)(1) assault with a deadly weapon (deadly weapon/lock/chain) and (a)(4) assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury.
A jury convicted Aguayo of both counts and found true a deadly‑weapon enhancement; the trial court imposed concurrent sentences and stayed the (a)(4) sentence under § 654.
On appeal the Court of Appeal affirmed both convictions (but remanded on diversion eligibility); Aguayo argued the (a)(4) conviction must be vacated as a different statement of the same offense or lesser‑included offense of (a)(1).
The Supreme Court granted review to decide whether §245(a)(1) and §245(a)(4) are different offenses or different statements of the same offense under Penal Code §954, and whether both convictions may stand when based on the same act or course of conduct.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether §245(a)(1) (deadly‑weapon) and §245(a)(4) (force likely to produce great bodily injury) are separate offenses under §954 or different statements of the same offense	They are separate: different elements, separate self‑contained subparagraphs, different legislative placement in 2011, and (a)(1) is a §1192.7 serious felony	They are alternative means of a single aggravated‑assault offense: historical statutory text and case law (pre‑2011) treated the clauses as one offense; the 2011 split was technical to clarify strike consequences, not to create a new crime	The clauses are different statements (alternative means) of the same offense for §954 purposes; dual convictions based on the same act/course of conduct are impermissible
Whether the convictions here were based on separate acts (so both could stand)	Evidence supported multiple distinct assaults (many strikes with chain; throwing the pot) so jury could have relied on different acts for each count	Jury never identified which act supported which conviction; prosecution did not differentiate counts; reasonable probability jury convicted both based on the same act; appellate factfinding cannot supply missing jury findings	The record shows a reasonable probability the jury relied on the same act/course of conduct for both convictions; convictions cannot both stand absent jury allocation; case remanded for proceedings consistent with this holding

People v. Vidana, 1 Cal.5th 632 (principle that §954 prohibits multiple convictions when charges are different statements of the same offense and based on the same act or course of conduct)
People v. Gonzalez, 60 Cal.4th 533 (§954 analysis turns on legislative intent; same act can support multiple charges unless Legislature intended a single offense)
People v. Aguilar, 16 Cal.4th 1023 (explaining overlap between the ‘deadly weapon’ and ‘force likely’ clauses and their functional similarity)
In re Mosley, 1 Cal.3d 913 (historical treatment: former §245 described a single aggravated‑assault offense combining the clauses)
People v. Ledesma, 16 Cal.4th 90 (presumption that Legislature is aware of and acquiesces in judicial construction absent a clear statutory change)
People v. White, 2 Cal.5th 349 (framework for assessing whether statutory provisions are different statements of the same offense under §954)