People v. Adams
179 Cal. Rptr. 3d 644
Cal.2014Background
- In 1994 Marcus Dorwin Adams (Six Deuce Brim Bloods) was tried for three first‑degree murders, an attempted murder, and a carjacking; a jury found true firearm and multiple‑murder special‑circumstance allegations and returned death for the murders. The trial court denied penalty‑phase relief and sentenced him to death; this appeal is automatic.
- Guilt‑phase evidence included eyewitness identifications (Dyer, Meeks, others), gang‑related motive and admissions/bragging by Adams and associates, ballistics tying a 1994 attempted‑murder to a gun seized from Adams (but not the triple homicide weapon), and statements by Adams claiming knowledge or partial involvement.
- Witnesses initially were uncooperative or recanted due to fear/intimidation; later they cooperated and identified Adams. The prosecutor, in opening and closing, explained the delay as resulting from threats, fear, and intimidation and argued consciousness‑of‑guilt evidence.
- Penalty phase: prosecution presented extensive aggravation—prior violent juvenile carjackings, credit union robberies (one with an associated murder), numerous violent acts in custody, a 1993 conviction for discharging a firearm, and victim‑impact testimony (including for victims of uncharged crimes).
- Defense mitigation: family dysfunction, childhood abuse, learning disabilities/ADD, neuropsychological evidence, and genetic susceptibility (MAOA 3‑repeat allele) combined with maltreatment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility and prosecutor comment on witness intimidation (guilt phase) | Prosecutor may explain witness delays/inconsistencies by presenting evidence of threats/fear; can preview this in opening and argue it in closing. | Comments impermissibly vouched for witnesses and linked Adams to intimidation without proof; prosecutorial misconduct and prejudicial. | Forfeited (no timely objection) and meritless: witness fear/intimidation testimony admissible to assess credibility; prosecutor's statements were supported by evidence and constitutional. |
| Jury instruction re: consciousness of guilt (CALJIC No. 2.06) | Instruction properly permitted jury to consider attempts to suppress evidence/intimidate as consciousness of guilt. | Instruction was improper in light of contested evidence of intimidation. | Properly given; Dyer’s jail encounter with Adams supported instruction. |
| Admission of victim‑impact testimony for uncharged crimes (penalty phase) | Such testimony about the impact of uncharged violent acts is relevant aggravation under §190.3, factor (b). | Admission is unduly prejudicial and should be excluded under Payne v. Tennessee. | Admissible; not so prejudicial as to render trial fundamentally unfair. |
| Prosecutorial argument in penalty phase (including “freebie” and comments about uncorroborated family witnesses) | Argued that cumulative aggravation (including uncharged crimes) supports death; suggested life without parole would be a "freebie" for other violent acts; challenged defense corroboration. | Misconduct: improperly argued false inference about uncalled witnesses and mischaracterized purpose of factor (b) evidence by urging punishment for other crimes; deprived Adams of confrontation and fairness. | Forfeited by failure to object; even assuming error, harmless given the extensive aggravation and jury instructions; arguments were within permissible advocacy. |
| Constitutionality / adequacy of penalty‑phase instructions (CALJIC Nos. 8.85, 8.88; no Simmons instruction) | Instructions adequately guided jury on weighing aggravating/mitigating factors and did not require burden or unanimity or a Simmons‑type explanation of life‑without‑parole. | Instructions are vague, shift burdens, or fail to explain the true meaning of life‑without‑parole, violating federal due process/Eighth/Sixth Amendment rights. | Rejected: precedent upholds CALJIC 8.85/8.88 and no requirement to instruct that life‑without‑parole means inevitable execution of that sentence; Apprendi/Ring line does not change penalty phase allocation. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Linton, 56 Cal.4th 1146 (Cal. 2013) (timely objection requirement and forfeiture rule for prosecutorial misconduct claims)
- People v. Mendoza, 52 Cal.4th 1056 (Cal. 2011) (witness fear/retaliation admissions are relevant to credibility)
- People v. DeHoyos, 57 Cal.4th 79 (Cal. 2013) (penalty‑phase instruction issues and intercase proportionality)
- People v. Hovarter, 44 Cal.4th 983 (Cal. 2008) (CALJIC No. 8.88 constitutionality and burden issues)
- Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (U.S. 1991) (victim‑impact evidence standard: unconstitutional only if so unduly prejudicial as to render trial fundamentally unfair)
- Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (U.S. 2000) (statutory‑facts‑increase‑punishment doctrine)
- Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (U.S. 2002) (capital sentencing factfinding and Sixth Amendment principles)
- Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (U.S. 1994) (limited rule on informing jury about parole ineligibility)