People v. Abarca
2 Cal. App. 5th 475
Cal. Ct. App.2016Background
- In 2013 Willie Abarca entered a U.S. Bank and attempted to cash a forged $300 check; he left when staff checked the signature. He was charged with felony burglary (§ 459) and forgery; pleaded guilty to burglary and admitted priors; forgery was dismissed per plea bargain.
- Sentenced to an aggregate jail term; later Proposition 47 (2014) reclassified certain theft- and forgery-related felonies as misdemeanors when value ≤ $950 and created a resentencing procedure (§ 1170.18).
- In December 2014 Abarca petitioned to recall his felony burglary and be resentenced under Prop. 47, stating under penalty of perjury the check value did not exceed $950.
- The prosecutor opposed only on the ground that a bank is not a “commercial establishment”; did not dispute amount or other eligibility grounds and did not request a hearing.
- The superior court granted the petition, redesignated the conviction as a violation of Penal Code § 459.5 (shoplifting) and resentenced Abarca; the People appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Did petitioner bear an initial evidentiary burden (prima facie) before the court could reach the merits of a § 1170.18 petition? | Abarca failed to attach evidence to show the underlying theft value ≤ $950, so court should not have reached merits. | Abarca’s sworn petition and the record (arrest warrant showing $300) sufficed; People never disputed value below $950 in trial court. | Court: No error; sworn declaration + record and People’s failure to contest sufficed. |
| 2) Is a bank a "commercial establishment" under § 459.5 such that entering with intent to commit larceny ≤ $950 is shoplifting rather than burglary? | Banks are not merchants selling goods; "commercial establishment" should be limited to places selling goods/merchandise, excluding banks. | "Commercial establishment" reasonably means a place of business that exchanges goods or services; banks provide financial services for fees and qualify. | Court: Bank is a commercial establishment; § 459.5 construed broadly to effectuate Prop. 47 purposes. |
| 3) Could Abarca’s conduct have been prosecuted as felony burglary predicated on identity theft, making him ineligible for Prop. 47 relief? | The underlying conduct was identity theft, not theft/forgery—so felony could remain and resentencing was erroneous. | Prosecution never charged or relied on identity theft; burglary plea was predicated on intent to commit theft/forgery; People forfeited the identity-theft argument. | Court: Issue forfeited; on merits, record supports that theft/forgery were predicates and resentencing proper. |
Key Cases Cited
- Paterno v. State of California, 74 Cal.App.4th 68 (1999) (appellate courts need not develop undeveloped claims)
- People v. Rizo, 22 Cal.4th 681 (2000) (de novo review of statutory interpretation)
- Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. County of Riverside, 48 Cal.3d 84 (1989) (use ordinary meaning when term not defined)
- Wasatch Property Management v. Degrate, 35 Cal.4th 1111 (2005) (courts may consult dictionary for ordinary meaning)
- In re J.L., 242 Cal.App.4th 1108 (2015) (treating "commercial establishment" to include places of business)
- Bank of America v. City & County of San Francisco, 309 F.3d 551 (9th Cir. 2002) (banking described as providing services that define the business of banking)
- People v. Superior Court (Pearson), 48 Cal.4th 564 (2010) (use of extrinsic materials when statutory language ambiguous)
- People v. Sullivan, 151 Cal.App.4th 524 (2007) (presumption in favor of upholding judgments; burden on appellant to show error)
- People v. Taylor, 174 Cal.App.4th 920 (2009) (failure to raise an issue at trial/resentencing may result in forfeiture)