971 N.W.2d 692
Mich. Ct. App.2021Background
- This is Justice Shapiro’s dissent in People v. Travis Michael Johnson (Mich. Ct. App.), challenging MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii), which authorizes courts to assess “any cost in addition to the minimum state cost” in criminal cases.
- Since 2005 (2005 PA 316) courts have been authorized to impose undefined additional court costs on convicted defendants; amounts have risen well above historically de minimis fees.
- The dissent describes a system in which judges effectively assess, collect, and benefit institutionally from these costs, creating potential conflicts of interest and political pressure on judges to generate revenue.
- Enforcement can include automatic penalties and arrest/incarceration for nonpayment; many affected defendants are indigent and lack political influence.
- Shapiro argues the assessments function as punitive fines or an unconstitutional tax: they are not distinctly stated, vary by locality/judge, and fund judicial operations (including salaries), contrary to constitutional limitations on penal fines.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Characterization: Are the assessments "costs" or punitive "fines"? | The assessments are court costs reasonably related to court operation, not fines. | Labeling cannot change substance; targeting convicted persons makes them punitive. | Dissent: Would treat them as fines and thus unconstitutional. |
| Separation of powers / conflict of interest | Legislature may delegate; judges do not personally pocket funds; delegation is permissible. | Judges acting as assessor, collector, and institutional beneficiary creates conflict and threatens impartiality. | Dissent: Would find separation/conflict concerns meriting invalidation. |
| Distinct Statement Clause / vagueness | Amounts must be reasonable; local variation is permissible. | Statute does not distinctly state a tax; it permits variable, undefined assessments county-to-county and judge-to-judge. | Dissent: Would hold statute fails the distinct-statement requirement and is unconstitutional. |
| Due process, indigency, and public-policy effects | Collection enforces lawful obligations; prior cases (e.g., Sanders) upheld high costs as not obviously unreasonable. | Enforcement is coercive, expensive to collect, and disproportionately burdens indigent convicts, undermining rehabilitation and fairness. | Dissent: Would conclude the scheme is punitive, coercive, and constitutionally infirm. |
Key Cases Cited
- People v Konopka (On Remand), 309 Mich App 345 (Mich. Ct. App. 2015) (statute language construed as imposing costs, not punishment)
- People v Barber, 14 Mich. App. 395 (Mich. Ct. App. 1968) (legislative labeling does not foreclose judicial determination of a statute's true nature)
- Bd of Library Comm'rs of the Saginaw Pub Libraries v Judges of the 70th Dist. Ct., 118 Mich. App. 379 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (historic limit on de minimis court fees; larger fees may offend constitutional provisions)
- People v Sanders, 296 Mich. App. 710 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012) (court costs of $1,000 held not "obviously unreasonable")
- People v Cunningham, 496 Mich. 145 (Mich. 2014) (overruled Sanders on other grounds)
- Tumey v Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (U.S. 1927) (disqualifies adjudicators with a direct financial interest; appearance of bias)
- Harmelin v Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (U.S. 1991) (state financial benefit from penalties warrants closer scrutiny)