People of Michigan v. Shawn Loveto Cameron Jr, 330876

Background

Defendant Shawn Cameron Jr. was convicted of assault with intent to do great bodily harm and sentenced as a fourth habitual offender; the trial court ordered $1,611 in court costs.
On initial appeal, this Court remanded for the trial court to establish whether the assessed costs were "reasonably related to actual costs incurred by the trial court" under MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii).
On remand the trial court explained its methodology: it used a 10-year average court budget, multiplied by the percentage of filings that are felonies, divided by average annual felony filings, then subtracted state costs to arrive at $1,611 per felony.
Defendant challenged MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii) as unconstitutional: arguing the assessment is a tax (not a fee) that violates the Distinct‑Statement Clause (Const 1963, art 4, § 32) and that the statutory delegation violates separation of powers (Const 1963, art 3, § 2).
The Court analyzed whether the charge is a tax or fee using the Westlake three‑factor test (regulatory vs revenue, proportionality, ability to refuse) and whether the statute satisfies the Distinct‑Statement Clause and separation‑of‑powers constraints.
The Court concluded the assessment is a tax but upheld MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii) as constitutional: it is not obscure or deceitful and provides adequate standards and procedural safeguards (factual basis requirement, reporting, sunset) so delegation is permissible.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Is the court cost under MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii) a tax or a fee?	Prosecution conceded it is a tax; statute intended to raise revenue for courts.	Costs are involuntary and benefit public, not defendant, so constitute a tax not a fee.	Tax: statute is revenue‑generating; factors (Westlake) point to tax.
If a tax, does MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii) violate the Distinct‑Statement Clause?	The statute and accompanying reporting/sunset provisions adequately disclose purpose and limits.	Statute fails to state the tax distinctly, has no rate or cap, and is obscure/deceitful.	No violation: language, factual‑basis requirement, reporting and sunset show statute is not obscure.
Does delegation to trial courts to set amounts violate separation of powers?	Legislature provided standards ("reasonably related," examples, factual‑basis requirement), so delegation is permissible.	Delegation of taxing authority to courts is an unconstitutional transfer of legislative taxing power.	No violation: delegation contains sufficient guidance and safeguards; not an unlawful surrender of legislative power.
Were the specific costs ($1,611) reasonably related to actual costs?	Trial court used an average‑cost formula consistent with SCAO guidance and Konopka requirement to establish a factual basis.	Defendant argued proportionality requires case‑specific calculation and that benefits accrue to public, not defendant.	Held reasonable: court established factual basis; proportionality requires reasonable relation, not exactitude.

Key Cases Cited

Dukesherer Farms, Inc. v. Ball, 405 Mich. 1 (definition of tax as involuntary exaction)
Westlake Transp., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 255 Mich. App. 589 (three‑factor test for fee vs tax; proportionality standard)
People v. Konopka, 309 Mich. App. 345 (trial court must establish factual basis for costs under MCL 769.1k)
Gillette Com. Ops. N. Am. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 312 Mich. App. 394 (Distinct‑Statement Clause purpose and test)
Makowski v. Governor, 495 Mich. 465 (separation‑of‑powers doctrine need not create airtight boundaries)