People of Michigan v. Michael Dwayne Carver
328157
| Mich. Ct. App. | Aug 29, 2017Background
- Defendant Michael Carver was convicted by a jury of first-degree criminal sexual conduct based primarily on the testimony of a then-five-year-old victim; sentence 25–50 years.
- Victim initially gave a different account (blaming her three-year-old brother) after mother saw a speck of blood; mother’s repeated questioning led the victim to identify defendant, who lived in the home.
- Defense at trial highlighted inconsistencies among the victim’s statements and elicited testimony from the forensic interviewer (Westfall) and lead detective (Higby); Higby testified she was "comfortable" an assault occurred.
- On appeal the court remanded for an evidentiary hearing limited to whether trial counsel (Jones) provided ineffective assistance by failing to consult or call an expert on child suggestibility; Dr. Daniel Swerdlow-Freed testified for the defense on suggestibility, source-monitoring, false memories, and risk factors for taint.
- The trial court found Jones lacked sufficient knowledge of child-memory science, unreasonably declined to consult an available expert, and that this failure prejudiced the defense; it granted a new trial.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed: counsel’s limited investigation fell below professional norms and there is a reasonable probability the outcome would have been different with expert evidence explaining suggestibility and false-memory risk factors.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Carver) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to consult/call a child-suggestibility expert | Trial court erred: counsel’s investigation was adequate; jury instructions and cross-examination sufficed; no prejudice. | Counsel should have consulted/called an expert to explain suggestibility, source-monitoring, and false memories; failure prejudiced the defense. | Held for Carver: counsel’s failure to investigate and consult an available expert fell below objective standards and created a reasonable probability of a different outcome. |
| Whether expert testimony on child suggestibility was necessary or cumulative given standard credibility instructions | Expert unnecessary; credibility instruction (M Crim JI 3.6) and cross-examination were adequate. | Expert needed because suggestibility and false-memory phenomena are beyond common knowledge and could materially affect assessment of a very young witness. | Held for Carver: such topics are beyond common knowledge; expert testimony would have materially aided the jury. |
| Whether inconsistencies in victim’s statements alone provided an adequate defense strategy without expert support | Defense strategy to highlight inconsistencies was reasonable and sufficient. | Strategy was inadequate because inconsistencies did not negate central allegation and left defense forced to argue the child lied absent evidence of motive. | Held for Carver: without expert support counsel’s strategy was objectively unreasonable given the facts and available expert. |
| Whether prejudice was shown under Strickland (reasonable probability of different result) | No: jury believed victim; other evidence (phone records, medical exam) undermined parts of victim’s account; outcome not plausibly different. | Yes: expert testimony could have explained how a young child might form a false belief after suggestive questioning, supplying a non-lying explanation and materially altering juror evaluation. | Held for Carver: reasonable probability of different outcome—new trial warranted. |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishing ineffective-assistance standard)
- People v. Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich. 38 (counsel unreasonable for failing to investigate multiple interviews/leading questioning; new trial warranted)
- People v. Ackley, 497 Mich. 381 (failure to seek available expert left defense unsupported)
- People v. Gioglio (On Remand), 296 Mich. App. 12 (standard of review for ineffective-assistance mixed question)
- People v. Grissom, 492 Mich. 296 (abuse-of-discretion review for new-trial rulings)
- People v. Pickens, 446 Mich. 298 (permissible trial strategies and limits of strategic choices)
- People v. Grant, 470 Mich. 477 (reasonableness of strategy measured against adequate investigation)
- People v. Bynum, 496 Mich. 610 (expert testimony may be necessary when matters are beyond common knowledge)
- People v. Christel, 449 Mich. 578 (recognizing need for expert testimony to explain behaviors of very young victims)
