People of Michigan v. Michael Dwayne Carver, 328157

Background

Defendant Michael Dwayne Carver convicted of sexual assault based largely on a young child victim’s disclosures and later moved for a new trial claiming ineffective assistance of counsel.
Trial counsel (Jones) did not pursue in-depth investigation into child-suggestibility research or call a forensic-psychology expert at trial.
At issue: whether counsel’s decision not to investigate or present expert testimony fell below objective standards and whether any deficiency was prejudicial.
The victim’s disclosures occurred after the mother directly asked, “Has anybody touched you?” and the child initially implicated her brother before naming defendant; multiple non-forensic interviews (family, ER physician, confrontation) occurred within hours.
The child’s accounts varied across interviews (timing, clothing/undressing, whether defendant spoke); there was no physical evidence and some testimony that the child may have recanted.
The trial court granted a new trial; Judge Talbot concurred that investigation was inadequate but dissented that prejudice was not shown and would reverse the new-trial order.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether counsel’s failure to investigate child-suggestibility science was objectively unreasonable	Jones lacked adequate investigation into suggestibility and should have consulted experts	Jones’s choice reflected a strategic decision for a direct, fact-based defense and avoiding potentially harmful expert exchanges	Talbot: Investigator deficiency existed but could be a reasonable strategic choice; not necessarily prejudicial
Whether expert testimony on child suggestibility was necessary/helpful to jury	Expert needed to explain unique issues of very young children and risks of leading questions	Jury could understand suggestibility from common sense and testimony already presented; expert might invite damaging rebuttal	Talbot: Expert not necessarily required because subject within jurors’ common knowledge and defense highlighted risk factors via other witnesses and argument
Whether counsel’s limited knowledge prejudiced defendant’s trial outcome	Had counsel investigated, he likely would have called an expert and the result likely would differ	Even with proper investigation, counsel likely would have chosen a "straight line" defense; not reasonably probable outcome would change	Talbot: No reasonable probability of a different result—no prejudice shown; would reverse new-trial order
Admissibility standard for expert on child suggestibility	Expert testimony would be admissible and helpful given specialized science	Expert inadmissible if it addresses matters within jurors’ common knowledge (People v Bynum)	Talbot: Bynum standard supports that such expert testimony may be unnecessary here; trial evidence already exposed suggestibility factors

Key Cases Cited

People v Ackley, 497 Mich 381 (court used child-suggestibility science to evaluate counsel performance)
People v Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich 38 (counsel ineffective-assistance standards applied in child-sexual-abuse context)
People v Bynum, 496 Mich 610 (expert testimony admissible only if helpful beyond jurors’ common knowledge)