928 N.W.2d 267
Mich. Ct. App.2018Background
- Defendant Wood attended a pretrial hearing in a citizen's environmental case (People v. Yoder) and later stood outside the courthouse on the scheduled trial date distributing FIJA pamphlets about jurors voting conscience.
- He handed pamphlets to two persons summoned for jury duty (Johnson and DeVries); he was charged with misdemeanor jury tampering under MCL 750.120a(1) and obstruction (obstruction later dismissed).
- At trial, the jury found Wood willfully attempted to influence jurors in that case; he argued statutory ambiguity and First Amendment violations on appeal.
- Trial and circuit courts held that "juror" includes persons summoned for jury duty (even if not sworn) and that application of the statute to Wood’s conduct did not violate the First Amendment.
- The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, rejecting as-applied and facial (overbreadth/vagueness) First Amendment challenges and concluding the statute is a narrowly tailored regulation serving the compelling interest of protecting jury impartiality.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether "juror" in MCL 750.120a(1) includes persons merely summoned for jury duty | State: ordinary meaning and dictionaries show "juror" covers summoned persons | Wood: "juror" means only those selected, empaneled, and sworn; summoned-only persons are not jurors | Court: "juror" includes persons summoned for jury duty (dictionary and statutory context support) |
| Whether MCL 750.120a(1) applied to Wood’s pamphlet distribution violates the First Amendment (as-applied) | State: statute validly targets attempts to influence jurors; compelling interest in protecting jury impartiality | Wood: pure speech (pamphleteering) on public sidewalk; strict scrutiny required and statute not least restrictive means | Court: as-applied challenge fails — jury found specific intent to influence jurors; statute narrowly tailored to compelling interest |
| Whether MCL 750.120a(1) is unconstitutionally overbroad (facial First Amendment challenge) | Wood: statute could criminalize a wide range of protected communications with "potential jurors" | State: statute requires willful intent to influence a juror; innocuous communications lack requisite intent | Court: not substantially overbroad; intent element limits reach; hypotheticals insufficient to show realistic danger to protected speech |
| Whether statute is void for vagueness or deprived Wood of a fair trial (due process) | Wood: lacks notice that "juror" includes summoned persons; arbitrary enforcement; trial rulings limited his defense and cross-examination | State: meaning ascertainable from dictionaries and context; arrest/prosecution justified by evidence of intent; any exclusion of cross-examination was harmless | Court: statute not vague; no reversible trial error; cross-examination limits harmless given cumulative evidence |
Key Cases Cited
- Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357 (public sidewalks are traditional public forum; leafletting is highly protected speech)
- Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (freedom of speech is not absolute; certain categories of speech may be regulated)
- Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (States may adopt safeguards to keep administration of justice free from outside influence; protest regulation near courthouses can be upheld)
- Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (content-based speech restrictions are presumptively unconstitutional and trigger strict scrutiny)
- Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (government regulation motivated by disagreement with message requires heightened scrutiny)
- McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464 (content-neutral time, place, manner restrictions must be narrowly tailored and leave open alternative channels)
- Turney v. Pugh, 400 F.3d 1197 (9th Cir.) (upholding jury-tampering statute against First Amendment overbreadth challenge where communications targeted jurors)