Background - Defendant Edward Duane Pointer-Bey pleaded guilty to armed robbery, two conspiracies (armed robbery and bank robbery), bank robbery, two counts of felonious assault, felony-firearm, and felon-in-possession based on a February 20, 2015 bank robbery; plea was entered September 21, 2015 under a negotiated agreement. - Prosecutor agreed, as part of the plea, not to charge a separate January 20, 2015 bank robbery and to reduce habitual-offender exposure from fourth-offense (claimed 25-year mandatory) to third-offense. - At the plea hearing the court and prosecutor discussed sentencing; prosecutor misstated or omitted certain maximums (failed to state maximum for felon-in-possession and misrepresented felony-firearm enhancement exposure). - Defendant was sentenced as a third-offense habitual offender to concurrent terms (longest minimum 15 years) plus a consecutive 5-year felony-firearm term (total minimum 20 years). - Defendant moved to withdraw his plea twice; trial court denied both motions. On appeal, the Court of Appeals found defects in the plea colloquy and sentencing enhancements and vacated denial of motions to withdraw, remanding for MCR 6.310(C) proceedings. ### Issues | Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held | |---|---:|---|---| | 1) Adequacy of plea advisement re: maximum sentence for felon-in-possession | Prosecutor asserted plea was proper and sentenced accordingly | Pointer-Bey argued he was not advised of the maximum for felon-in-possession, so plea was not understanding | Court: Plea defective under MCR 6.302(B)(2); defendant not informed of felon-in-possession maximum — entitled to withdraw plea under MCR 6.310(C) | | 2) Felony-firearm: factual basis and enhancement to second-offender | Prosecution maintained second-offender enhancement valid (relied on prior federal firearm conviction) | Pointer-Bey: no prior conviction under MCL 750.227b, so cannot be second-offender; plea lacked accurate sentencing info | Court: Factual basis for felony-firearm (possession) satisfied, but statutory enhancement to 5 years (second offender) requires a prior conviction under MCL 750.227b — federal conviction does not qualify; 5-year sentence invalid; plea defective for misinformation | | 3) Habitual-offender (25-year MCL 769.12(1)(a)) — illusory plea? | Prosecution argued prior out-of-state/federal felonies could count; offered benefit of foregoing 25-year exposure | Pointer-Bey: he never actually faced 25-year listed-prior exposure because his priors are not Michigan "listed prior felonies"; bargain was illusory | Court: Statute’s "listed prior felonies" are limited to specific Michigan statutes; defendant was not subject to the 25-year listed-prior minimum, so prosecutor’s promise added no value — but overall plea was not illusory because defendant received other concrete benefits (reduction to third-offender status; dropped charge) | | 4) Cobbs preliminary sentencing evaluation (judge’s 20-year comment) | Court/prosecution implied 20-year minimum appropriate | Pointer-Bey argued he relied on judge’s comment and sentence exceeded Cobbs evaluation | Court: The judge’s remark was a preliminary evaluation noting a 20-year minimum would be appropriate; the sentence imposed (15-year concurrent minimum + 5-year consecutive felony-firearm = 20-year minimum) matched the evaluation; no Cobbs-based withdrawal allowed | ### Key Cases Cited People v Brown, 492 Mich 684 (plea-withdrawal standard; plea must be knowing, voluntary, accurate) People v Blanton, 317 Mich App 107 (defendant must be advised of maximum and mandatory minimum sentences) People v Miles, 454 Mich 90 (elements of felony-firearm; prior felony-firearm conviction not an element but affects sentencing) People v Cobbs, 443 Mich 276 (preliminary judicial sentencing evaluation grounds for plea withdrawal) People v Meeks, 293 Mich App 115 (specific statutory definitions control over general language) People v Carruthers, 301 Mich App 590 (courts will not add statutory provisions beyond plain language) * People v Thompson, 101 Mich App 428 (illusory plea doctrine)