People of Michigan v. David Allen Hill, 350546

Background:

Defendant David Allen Hill was accused by his biological daughter of multiple sexual assaults beginning when she was eight in Lapeer County and continuing in Macomb County and Tennessee.
Lapeer prosecution (alleging digital vaginal penetration) resulted in acquittal; those proceedings produced transcripts and testimony that the Macomb prosecutor did not seek to admit as other-acts evidence but allowed for impeachment use.
Macomb charges included CSC-I, two counts CSC-II, two counts CSC-IV, and assault with intent; jury convicted on two CSC-II and two CSC-IV, acquitted on assault charge, and deadlocked on CSC-I (later dismissed).
Trial court precluded introduction of the prior Lapeer acquittal itself as evidence but permitted prior Lapeer testimony for impeachment; trial counsel did not use the Lapeer transcripts to impeach, later claiming he misunderstood the ruling.
Defendant moved for a new trial alleging ineffective assistance and other errors; after a Ginther hearing the trial court found no prejudice and denied relief; the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Issues:

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Double jeopardy (issue preclusion)	Lapeer verdict did not resolve issues in Macomb; charges different.	Prior acquittal in Lapeer precludes relitigation of same issues in Macomb.	Rejected — Lapeer concerned digital penetration there; Macomb allegations were different, so issue preclusion did not apply.
Exclusion of prior acquittal / right to present a defense	Acquittal evidence irrelevant and would confuse/unduly prejudice jury.	Excluding acquittal deprived Hill of a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.	Rejected — exclusion was within trial court discretion; acquittal had limited probative value and risked juror confusion; defendant still presented robust defense.
Confrontation Clause	Trial limits on cross-examination were permissible where topic was irrelevant.	Excluding questioning about the acquittal violated Hill’s confrontation/right to cross-examine.	Rejected — Confrontation guarantees effective cross-examination but not on irrelevant matters; no constitutional violation.
Ineffective assistance for not using Lapeer transcripts	Any error by counsel did not prejudice outcome; victim testimony consistent across trials.	Counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach with Lapeer transcripts; this likely affected the verdict.	Rejected — counsel misunderstood the pretrial ruling (not strategic), but defendant failed to show a reasonable probability of a different outcome.
Prosecutorial elicitation / improper credibility testimony	Step‑mother’s brief testimony was not a direct credibility opinion and was permissible follow-up to defense questioning.	Prosecutor elicited testimony vouching for the victim and explaining divorce as based on the allegations, improperly bolstering credibility.	Mixed — Court found admission was an abuse of discretion (testimony improperly tended to support credibility) but harmless given the evidence and jury instructions.
Cumulative error	Combined errors warranted a new trial.	Errors were minimal/harmless and not cumulative.	Rejected — only one harmless error identified; no cumulative-error relief.

Key Cases Cited

Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970) (issue preclusion component of Double Jeopardy)
Trakhtenberg v. People, 493 Mich. 38 (2012) (standards of review; ineffective assistance framework)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong ineffective assistance test)
Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986) (right to present a defense)
People v. Musser, 494 Mich. 337 (2013) (witnesses may not testify to another’s credibility)
People v. Oliphant, 399 Mich. 472 (1976) (acquittal establishes prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt)
People v. Armstrong, 490 Mich. 281 (2011) (limits on labeling counsel choices as strategy where based on mistake)
People v. Carines, 460 Mich. 750 (1999) (plain-error review standard)