People of Michigan v. David Michael O'Brien
333543
| Mich. Ct. App. | Dec 19, 2017Background
- Defendant David O’Brien pleaded guilty to second-degree criminal sexual conduct (MCL 750.520c(1)(a)) for touching a child under 13 and was sentenced to 3–15 years imprisonment.
- After sentencing, O’Brien moved to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing the plea’s factual basis was insufficient because he never admitted the touching was for a sexual purpose.
- At the plea hearing, O’Brien admitted touching the victim’s vagina in an “inappropriate manner” and said it was not “just wiping her,” but did not expressly say the touching was for sexual gratification.
- O’Brien also argued ineffective assistance of counsel, claiming counsel misdescribed the statutory element (saying “inappropriate manner” rather than “sexual gratification”) and thus induced the plea.
- The trial court denied the motion to withdraw, finding the factual admissions supported a reasonable inference of sexual purpose; O’Brien appealed and this Court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of factual basis for CSC-II plea | Admissions that defendant touched the victim’s vagina in an “inappropriate manner” and not while “just wiping her” support an inculpatory inference of sexual purpose | Plea lacked an admission of sexual purpose; failure to expressly admit touching was for sexual gratification renders factual basis insufficient | Affirmed — an inculpatory inference that the touching was for sexual purpose can be drawn from defendant’s admissions; factual basis adequate |
| Whether a reasonable person could construe the touching as sexual | The objective standard allows inferring sexual purpose from conduct described as inappropriate and not diaper-related | The touching could reasonably be explained as noncriminal (wiping during diaper change) absent an explicit sexual-purpose admission | Affirmed — trial court reasonably viewed the conduct as capable of being construed as sexual; noncriminal purpose was denied by defendant at plea, so inference of sexual purpose stands |
| Ineffective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations | Counsel adequately advised; defendant failed to preserve claim and record does not show deficient performance | Counsel misexplained elements (used “inappropriate manner” instead of “sexual gratification”), inducing an unknowing plea | Affirmed — claim unpreserved and record contains no clear error showing counsel’s performance fell below competent range; plea was knowing and voluntary |
| Whether relief is available post‑sentence to withdraw plea | If plea process was defective, court must rectify under MCR 6.310(C) | Defendant relied on pre-sentencing authority (Spencer) and argued plea induced by bad advice | Affirmed — no defect found in plea-taking; Spencer (pre-sentencing rule) inapplicable; MCR 6.310(C) requires a showing of a plea-taking defect which was not made |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Fonville, 291 Mich. App. 363 (factual basis for plea adequate if inculpatory inference can be drawn)
- People v. Adkins, 272 Mich. App. 37 (standard of review for post-sentencing plea-withdrawal motions)
- People v. Duenaz, 306 Mich. App. 85 (elements of second-degree criminal sexual conduct)
- People v. DeLeon, 317 Mich. App. 714 (objective reasonable-person standard for sexual-purpose inference)
- People v. Bosca, 310 Mich. App. 1 (minimal circumstantial evidence can establish state of mind)
- People v. Brown, 492 Mich. 684 (post-sentencing plea withdrawal governed by MCR 6.310(C))
- People v. Lucey, 287 Mich. App. 267 (plea voluntariness and counsel competence in plea context)