People Of Mi V Donald Wayne Davis Jr, 983 N.W.2d 325

Background

Defendant Donald W. Davis, Jr. was tried for the 2016 shooting death of Devante Hanson; key prosecution witness was a co‑defendant who pleaded guilty and testified against Davis.
On day two of trial an observer (the mother of the victim’s child, Daundria Frye) spoke briefly to a juror during a recess.
The trial judge ordered everyone in the gallery except the victim’s mother to leave and told them not to return for the remainder of the trial; no contemporaneous defense objection was made.
The trial resumed largely without public observers; 14 witnesses (13 for the prosecution) later testified, closing arguments were presented, the jury was instructed, and Davis was convicted.
On appeal the Court of Appeals treated defense counsel’s posttrial testimony as showing waiver and affirmed; this Court granted review, held the order was a closure (not a mere clearing), and concluded the closure was plain structural error requiring reversal.
The Supreme Court (majority) also held that a forfeited structural error presumptively satisfies the Carines plain‑error standard’s third and fourth prongs unless the prosecution rebuts that presumption; remanded for a new trial.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (People)	Defendant's Argument (Davis)	Held
Did defense waive the public‑trial claim by failing to object?	Defense counsel’s post‑trial testimony shows the decision not to object was intentional, so the claim was waived.	Silence at trial was forfeiture, not waiver; posttrial testimony cannot retroactively convert silence into waiver.	Forfeiture, not waiver—posttrial counsel statements do not show the required clear, affirmative relinquishment.
Was the courtroom actually closed to the public?	The courtroom remained effectively open (doors unlocked, no posted signs, deputies didn’t block entry).	The judge’s oral order expressly barred all but the victim’s mother for the remainder of trial—this was a closure.	The judge’s oral instruction closed the courtroom for the majority of trial; failure to lock doors or eject later observers does not negate the closure.
Did the closure satisfy constitutional standards (Waller): overriding interest, narrow tailoring, alternatives, findings?	Closure was justified to protect jury impartiality and was reasonable under the circumstances.	The closure was overbroad, trial court failed to consider or adopt narrower alternatives, and made inadequate findings.	The closure implicated an overriding interest but was broader than necessary, alternatives weren’t considered, and findings were inadequate—constitutional error occurred.
Forfeited structural error: did it constitute plain error requiring reversal?	Any forfeited error did not seriously affect fairness/integrity because removal mainly excluded pro‑victim observers and did not prejudice defendant.	Public‑trial violations are structural; a forfeited structural error satisfies Carines prongs—prejudice need not be shown and a rebuttable presumption of serious effect arises.	The denial of the public‑trial right is a structural error that satisfies the third Carines prong; it creates a rebuttable presumption under the fourth prong and the prosecution failed to rebut it—reversal required.

Key Cases Cited

Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984) (rule for when courtroom closure is constitutionally permissible: overriding interest, narrow tailoring, consideration of alternatives, and findings)
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979) (public‑trial right promotes fairness, accountability, witness encouragement, and discourages perjury)
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991) (structural errors defy harmless‑error analysis)
Weaver v. Massachusetts, 137 S. Ct. 1899 (2017) (public‑trial violations are structural but may not always produce fundamental unfairness; context matters for prejudice analysis)
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993) (definition of waiver vs. forfeiture and Olano/Carines framework for plain error)
People v. Carines, 460 Mich. 750 (1999) (Michigan adoption of the four‑part plain‑error test for unpreserved constitutional errors)
People v. Vaughn, 491 Mich. 642 (2012) (application of public‑trial and plain‑error principles; silence at trial yields forfeiture not waiver)
Gonzalez‑Lopez v. United States, 548 U.S. 140 (2006) (structural‑error doctrine and limits of harmless‑error analysis)
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (harmless‑beyond‑a‑reasonable‑doubt standard and limits where rights are foundational)
Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999) (distinction between trial errors and structural errors affecting the trial framework)
People v. Cain, 498 Mich. 108 (2015) (reaffirming Carines application and that defendants must satisfy Carines even for structural errors on direct review)