PennEast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey
594 U.S. 482
| SCOTUS | 2021Background
- The Natural Gas Act (NGA) requires a FERC certificate to build interstate pipelines; Congress amended the NGA in 1947 (15 U.S.C. §717f(h)) to let certificate holders use federal eminent domain when voluntary acquisition fails.
- PennEast received a FERC certificate to build a 116‑mile pipeline from Pennsylvania to New Jersey and filed condemnation actions under §717f(h) to acquire rights‑of‑way, including parcels in which New Jersey or the New Jersey Conservation Foundation claimed interests.
- New Jersey moved to dismiss on sovereign‑immunity grounds; the District Court denied the motion and granted condemnation and preliminary relief as to state parcels.
- The Third Circuit vacated the District Court insofar as it affected New Jersey, concluding §717f(h) does not clearly authorize private parties to sue nonconsenting States and that sovereign immunity barred PennEast’s suit against the State.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed: it held §717f(h) delegates the federal eminent domain power to certificate holders to condemn necessary rights‑of‑way, including interests owned by States, and that suits of this sort are consistent with the plan of the Constitutional Convention and longstanding precedent.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (PennEast) | Defendant's Argument (New Jersey) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §717r(b)’s exclusive‑review provision deprived the Third Circuit of jurisdiction to decide whether §717f(h) authorizes suits against States | PennEast: The Third Circuit could decide New Jersey’s immunity defense because the State was defending a condemnation action, not seeking to modify the FERC order | New Jersey/United States: Challenges over authority to sue States necessarily implicate and would modify the FERC certificate and so fall under exclusive D.C. Circuit review | Court: Third Circuit had jurisdiction; New Jersey’s defense did not modify or set aside the FERC order and was not a collateral attack on that order |
| Whether §717f(h) delegates to certificate holders the federal eminent‑domain power to condemn state‑owned or state‑interested land | PennEast: §717f(h) is a categorical delegation to acquire necessary rights‑of‑way by eminent domain, covering private and state lands | New Jersey: The NGA cannot be read to authorize private condemnations of state property because of state sovereign immunity | Court: §717f(h) delegates the federal eminent domain power to certificate holders, including the authority to condemn state interests |
| Whether state sovereign immunity bars private condemnation suits by federal delegatees, or whether States consented in the Constitutional ‘‘plan of the Convention’’ to such suits | PennEast: States surrendered immunity in the plan of the Convention to the federal eminent‑domain power, including its exercise by private delegatees | New Jersey: Seminole Tribe and related precedent foreclose using Article I powers (like the Commerce Clause) to subject nonconsenting States to private suit; no founding‑era evidence shows States consented to private condemnation suits | Court: States implicitly consented in the constitutional plan to the exercise of federal eminent domain (including by delegatees); sovereign immunity does not bar such condemnation suits |
| Whether §717f(h) must use an "unmistakably clear" statement to authorize delegatees to condemn state property | PennEast: No heightened clarity requirement applies to delegating the federal eminent‑domain power; §717f(h) is clear enough | New Jersey: Even if private condemnation is generally permitted, §717f(h) lacks the unmistakeable‑clarity needed to let private parties sue States | Court: No special ‘‘unmistakably clear’’ rule applies here; §717f(h) sufficiently delegates the eminent‑domain authority, so no additional clarity requirement bars suits against States |
Key Cases Cited
- Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1876) (federal eminent‑domain power extends to property within a State and cannot be limited by States)
- Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941) (land owned by a State is not a barrier to condemnation by the United States)
- Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 153 U.S. 525 (1894) (Congress may delegate federal eminent‑domain authority to private corporations)
- Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas R. Co., 135 U.S. 641 (1890) (upholding private delegatees’ exercise of federal eminent domain against non‑Federal property interests)
- Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (Congress may not use its Article I powers to abrogate state sovereign immunity)
- Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (States retain sovereign immunity absent clear consent or constitutional exception; concept of consent in the plan of the Convention)
- United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621 (1892) (United States may sue States; structural basis for certain suits by the federal government)
- Central Va. Community College v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006) (Bankruptcy Clause was understood to permit suits that would otherwise be barred by state sovereign immunity)
- Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991) (discussing clarity requirements for state consent and limits on waiving sovereign immunity)
- United States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17 (1958) (federal eminent‑domain takings may be effectuated either by direct possession or condemnation proceedings)