Penn v. Escorsio
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 16239
1st Cir.2014Background
- Matthew Lalli, a pretrial detainee at Knox County Jail, scored highly on intake suicide-risk screening (≥20 points) and reported prior suicide attempt and suicidal thoughts.
- Sergeant Dane Winslow (shift supervisor) reviewed intake forms, placed Lalli on a “welfare watch” and housed him in Cell 135 (not the suicide-prevention cell) without removing bedding or otherwise disabling means.
- Officer Angela Escorsio was intake/transport officer on Oct. 5, 2009; Lalli made multiple overt suicide threats at the courthouse, during transport, and back at the jail; staff observed his distress but did not consistently relay or act on all warnings.
- Escorsio returned Lalli to Cell 135 (rather than immediately placing him in the monitored suicide cell), allegedly performed cursory checks, told him to “shut up,” and did not remove bedding or put him in a suicide smock before leaving him alone.
- Lalli later used a sheet in Cell 135 to hang himself, suffered an anoxic brain injury; his guardian sued Winslow and Escorsio under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference; district court denied summary judgment and qualified immunity; defendants appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether officers exhibited deliberate indifference to a pretrial detainee's serious suicide risk | Penn: Winslow and Escorsio knew or should have known of a substantial suicide risk and took effectively no meaningful measures to abate it | Winslow/Escorsio: they took some steps (welfare watch, housing decisions, intermittent checks), so no deliberate indifference | Court: On plaintiff‑favorable facts, a reasonable jury could find defendants effectively failed to take any action to abate the known substantial risk (triable issue) |
| Whether qualified immunity shields defendants at summary judgment | Penn: Clearly established law required reasonable measures once officials knew of substantial suicide risk; defendants not entitled to immunity on this record | Defendants: Even if law is general, they reasonably relied on their actions and could not have known they violated clearly established rights | Court: Defendants conceded the governing rule; given the district court’s plaintiff‑favorable factual findings (effectively no action), qualified immunity not available at summary judgment |
| Whether appellate court may review factual disputes underlying denial of qualified immunity | Penn: N/A (plaintiff insists factual inferences were proper) | Defendants: Challenge district court’s factual findings and contend appeal should resolve those matters | Court: Jurisdiction is limited; appellate review cannot resolve fact‑intensive evidentiary disputes—only pure legal issues remain reviewable |
| Scope of decision re: future immunity at trial | Penn: N/A | Defendants: Preserve right to assert qualified immunity at trial | Court: Decision limited to summary judgment phase; defendants may still raise qualified immunity as an affirmative defense at trial if evidence supports it |
Key Cases Cited
- Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012 (Sup. Ct.) (distinguishing legal questions from factbound evidence‑sufficiency issues in qualified immunity appeals)
- Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995) (interlocutory appeals of qualified immunity are limited where resolution turns on factual issues)
- Cady v. Walsh, 753 F.3d 348 (1st Cir. 2014) (panel reiterating limits on interlocutory review when denial of qualified immunity rests on factual disputes)
- Camilo‑Robles v. Hoyos, 151 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1998) (deliberate indifference standard for suicide cases; supervisory negligence can become deliberate indifference)
- Elliott v. Cheshire Cnty., N.H., 940 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1991) (establishing deliberate indifference test for jail officials)
- Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) (plaintiff‑favorable facts may be disregarded if blatantly contradicted by record)